Transcript [00:00] Hey everyone. [00:01] So, this in this video we are going to [00:03] talk about [00:05] how the Iranians approach negotiations. [00:08] And we're going to talk about it in a [00:09] general sense. What is their approach? [00:11] Because even from before the war started [00:14] on this channel and certainly [00:16] throughout the war and the ceasefire and [00:18] where we're up to now over these last [00:19] few months, [00:21] I've continually said things about how [00:23] the Iranians view negotiations, how they [00:25] view compromise, [00:27] how they approach negotiations [00:28] differently than the Americans do. [00:31] Instead of just throwing that out every [00:32] now and then, [00:34] I want to actually share with you [00:36] the overall picture of how they view [00:39] negotiations and it will help explain [00:41] everything that we're seeing. It will [00:42] help you explain all the behavior and [00:44] the this whole this whole dysfunctional [00:47] dynamic going on now between the [00:49] Iranians and the Americans. [00:51] Uh [00:52] we've all been watching this kind of [00:53] stalled negotiation situation, this back [00:56] and forth, the demands, the threats, the [00:58] impasse. And a lot of people are [00:59] confused. They don't know why Iran won't [01:01] make a deal. What are they doing? What's [01:03] their strategy? What's their What's [01:04] their end game? [01:06] And I'm going to answer all of that [01:07] today. So, stick around. Stick around. [01:10] It's very important conversation. [01:12] Um I also want to remind you to check [01:15] out the Israel 365 news channel. Make [01:18] sure that you're subscribed there, that [01:19] you're catching all the interviews that [01:20] we do. I'm going to be talking about uh [01:23] uh one of the interviews that we did [01:24] there last week, an important interview. [01:26] Today, we just put up another [01:28] conversation that I had with Dr. David [01:30] Wurmser of the Center for Security [01:32] Policy in Washington D.C. He's one of [01:33] the top experts on the Middle East in [01:35] the world. And uh we talked to him once [01:38] a week, fantastic conversation. So, go [01:40] over to Israel 365 news. Make sure [01:41] you're catching all the content there. [01:43] Okay, we're going to start off [01:44] with Jack Keane, one of our favorites, [01:47] and what he had to say couple days ago [01:51] about the state of the negotiations. And [01:53] we're going to use that [01:55] to talk about this whole topic of how [01:58] Iran negotiates. [02:01] >> Welcome back. An advisor to Supreme [02:03] Leader Mojtaba Khamenei threatening a [02:05] wider war and calling for the US to [02:07] unfreeze billions in Iranian assets. [02:10] This as the US and Iran have been [02:12] exchanging strikes overnight. Here to [02:14] react this so-called test of trust is [02:17] Fox News senior strategic analyst and [02:19] chairman of the Institute for the Study [02:21] of War, former General Jack Keane. [02:24] General, thank you for being here. [02:26] Obviously, this is going on and on for [02:28] weeks now. The president has [02:30] demonstrated great patience to try and [02:32] get this deal. I want to play for you a [02:35] soundbite. We're hearing now from a [02:36] military advisor to the Supreme Leader [02:40] about the negotiations. Here's what that [02:42] advisor had to say. Listen. [02:44] >> Okay, pay close attention here. We're [02:46] going to be referring back to what this [02:49] senior advisor to the Supreme Leader has [02:53] to say. [02:54] Here. [02:57] >> This is a sign of trust building. [02:59] If Trump takes the negotiation [03:01] seriously, $24 billion [03:03] is not much to America. [03:06] If he wants to reach an agreement with [03:07] Iran, [03:08] this $24 billion [03:10] is a test of trust that Iran wants to [03:13] have with Trump. [03:15] This is a test that America must pass [03:18] and the path will be opened. [03:20] This is our own money, not America's [03:22] money. [03:23] >> General, what's your reaction to that [03:25] and where do things stand as far as you [03:27] see it? [03:29] >> Yeah, well, I think that that leader [03:31] there has his head literally in the [03:33] wrong place. He thinks this is some kind [03:34] of arbitration. [03:36] You know, where each side is going to [03:38] make concessions to get to a common [03:39] point. That's That's not what this is [03:41] about. [03:43] I mean, we President Trump brought us [03:45] the first president almost 50 years [03:47] brought us to this consequential point [03:49] to take Iran off the map as a predator [03:53] to its neighbors in the region and to [03:55] worldwide sponsor of terrorism. Once and [03:58] for all, we're going to stop the killing [04:00] that they've imposed on others and [04:02] they've imposed on their own people. [04:04] That was generally the objective of Epic [04:07] Fury. [04:08] And President Trump stopped it after [04:11] they took shut down the Strait of Hormuz [04:13] because they appeared to use that as a [04:15] negotiating lever [04:17] to make a deal. And they said that they [04:19] would open the straits in 2 weeks [04:22] and they never did. And we are here in [04:24] negotiations trying to work something [04:27] out. But what we're insisting on and we [04:30] have the leverage to do it, we have 5 [04:33] weeks of Epic Fury with two more to go [04:35] to finish them. [04:36] We have the naval blockade, which is [04:39] creating economic peril along with the [04:41] very long list of things that Secretary [04:43] Bessen [04:44] and his outstanding economic team is [04:46] doing to impose economic pressure on [04:49] Iran. [04:50] So, those are our leverage points, but [04:52] what we're trying to achieve in the [04:54] negotiations is pretty simple. [04:57] We want our maximalist demands that we [05:00] would achieve if we were using military [05:02] force. [05:03] That is what we want from the regime. We [05:06] don't intend to throw them a lifeline [05:09] and unfreeze frozen assets to them and [05:11] give them billions of dollars so that [05:14] they we can recover, reverse the tenants [05:17] and implementation of the deal and go [05:18] back to where they were. Who do they [05:20] think they're talking to? Are we fools? [05:23] >> Before we go on, we're going to play the [05:24] rest of the clip [05:26] just to interject here. [05:28] President Trump did say at the very [05:30] beginning of the war [05:32] that he would accept nothing less than [05:33] unconditional surrender and that he [05:35] wanted his negotiators to insist on all [05:37] of his demands. [05:38] And when they stopped the hostilities at [05:40] the time, Trump's intent was, "Okay, [05:42] we're stopping the hostilities so they [05:44] can come to the table and surrender." [05:46] And basically give in to Trump's [05:48] demands. [05:49] That's the way the Americans see this, [05:52] but it's not the way the Iranians see [05:54] it, [05:55] as we'll see. [05:56] >> That's not who we are. What President [05:58] Trump is insisting on, I'm offering you [06:00] something. [06:01] You give me what I'm trying to achieve [06:03] through military force and economic [06:06] pressure, [06:07] or I return to military force. [06:10] That's the deal that's on the table. [06:12] What [06:13] what this government official is talking [06:15] about is something quite different. [06:18] We're not conducting an arbitration [06:19] between a labor union and a and a [06:22] business firm here, and we try to work [06:24] something out equitably. That's not what [06:26] this is about. This is meet our [06:28] objectives without having to impose [06:31] more military force on you, or not. [06:35] That's kind of the the impasse we have. [06:38] >> So, General, this has been going on for [06:39] 8 weeks now. The President's showing [06:41] great patience here, and even I was at [06:43] the White House this week. President was [06:45] talking about if this deal gets signed, [06:46] some of the details would allow would [06:49] include Iran allowing the US to go in [06:52] and get that so-called nuclear dust [06:54] that's near bomb-grade enriched to 60%. [06:57] But yet, as this drags on, are you [06:59] concerned that we are headed down a path [07:02] that's going to lead to renew the [07:04] fighting? [07:07] >> Well, I think we're pretty close to one [07:08] or the other right now, and I think [07:10] we'll probably in a couple days get an [07:13] answer. It seems to me [07:15] that the administration is at a point [07:18] where [07:19] they have run out of strategic patience. [07:21] They have given Iran lots of rope here [07:24] over the as you noted, 8 weeks we have [07:27] been at this. And I think the Iranians' [07:30] intention [07:31] is not as earnest as their negotiators [07:35] indicate to our negotiators. I think [07:38] where the the leaders who are actually [07:40] controlling the regime are is drag this [07:43] thing out as far as possible, get closer [07:45] to the midterm elections in the United [07:47] States [07:48] because then they believe the likelihood [07:50] of the president pulling the trigger and [07:53] going back to combat operations are slim [07:55] to none. That I think is their I don't [07:58] buy that. I I don't think [08:00] they have miscalculated what President [08:02] Trump wants before. Remember Griff for [08:04] our audience [08:06] prior to the 12-day war, he went into a [08:08] 60-day negotiating clock [08:10] with this same regime over the same [08:12] issues we're discussing now. [08:15] And they didn't fulfill that 60-day [08:18] clock. They were not willing to make a [08:20] deal. On the 61st day, he green-lighted [08:23] the 12-day war that began with Israel [08:25] attacking Iran for the first time in its [08:27] history. [08:29] I think we're at that point now [08:31] in terms of the president running out of [08:34] patience, having given them all of this [08:36] time [08:38] to make a deal here that makes sense. [08:40] So, in other words, you have to meet our [08:41] objectives [08:43] or we return to military operations and [08:46] put as much economic pressure on you [08:48] along with that, which would likely put [08:51] the regime on a path [08:53] to economic collapse and certainly quite [08:56] vulnerable to the Iranian people. [08:58] Something that we had in mind from the [09:00] very beginning. [09:01] >> That's right. It's good to remind our [09:02] viewers of that. Great insight as [09:04] always, General Jack Keane. [09:06] >> Okay. [09:08] So, that's General Jack Keane. [09:11] And I've got to say [09:13] that [09:16] you know, you you know, when you when [09:18] you listen to what he's saying, he's so [09:20] confident. [09:22] He's so so confident that [09:25] you know, President Trump is not looking [09:27] for an off-ramp and and not worried [09:30] about the midterms and is more than [09:32] willing to go back to kinetic action and [09:34] that the [09:35] that the [09:36] uh that the calculation the strategic [09:39] calculation of the Iranians of the [09:41] regime that if they get closer to the [09:43] midterms there's less of a chance of [09:45] kinetic action and Jack Jack Keane [09:47] pooh-poohs that and says that they're [09:48] mis- that they're misreading Trump. I [09:50] wish I had his confidence. Um [09:53] cuz it certainly looks like Trump is [09:55] signaling that he does not want to go [09:56] back to kinetic action. [09:58] In any event, [10:00] uh so that's so that's Jack Keane's [10:02] that's Jack Keane's take here. And I [10:04] want to show you this article which I'm [10:05] going to be I'm going to be quoting [10:07] from. [10:08] But let me first uh [10:12] let me first sum up what we just saw [10:13] here. [10:15] You have this military advisor of the [10:16] supreme leader [10:18] who goes on TV and basically says, "Give [10:20] us $24 billion as a test of trust. [10:24] This is what America needs to do to [10:25] prove it's serious." [10:27] And Keane's reaction is exactly right, [10:29] right? He says, [10:31] "That's not what this is. This isn't an [10:32] arbitration. This isn't This isn't two [10:34] sides sitting down to work out a [10:36] compromise. [10:37] This is meet our demands or we go back [10:39] to military force. That's the deal." [10:42] Again, I [10:43] I I hope he's right [10:45] that that's the type of resolve that [10:46] President Trump is bringing to this. [10:48] Who knows? [10:50] But here's what I want to do today. [10:51] Because [10:52] what Keane is describing, you know, he's [10:55] Keane is describing what he's seeing and [10:57] he's reacting to it. But I want to go a [10:59] level deeper. I want to explain to you [11:01] why Iran behaves this way. Where does [11:02] this come from? Why do they keep doing [11:04] this? [11:06] Like why does this pattern repeat? [11:10] So I recently came across a paper. [11:12] It was shared with me by the author. And [11:15] I think every single person following [11:16] the situation needs to read. It was [11:18] written by Dr. Harold Rhode, r h o d e. [11:22] Dr. Harold Rhode. And before I tell you [11:24] what's in it, let me tell you who he is [11:25] because this matters. [11:27] Harold Rhode got his PhD [11:29] in Islamic history from Columbia [11:32] University. He speaks Arabic, Hebrew, [11:34] Persian, Turkish. [11:36] As a young scholar, as a student, he [11:37] actually lived and studied in Iran. He [11:40] was there during the early stages of the [11:42] revolution in the '70s. [11:43] The revolution that brought Khomeini to [11:45] power. [11:46] He watched it happen. He was there on [11:48] the streets. [11:49] He then spent 28 years as the senior [11:52] advisor on the Islamic world inside the [11:54] office of the US Secretary of Defense. [11:58] Okay, so he's not a journalist. He's not [11:59] a pundit. He's not a political person. [12:01] He's an expert on that part of the [12:03] world. [12:05] Okay, he's someone who was in the room [12:06] at the highest levels of American [12:08] national security for nearly three [12:10] decades writing strategy papers on Iran, [12:13] on Iraq, on the broader Islamic world [12:16] for the people making the decisions. [12:18] Okay, he's a protege of Bernard Lewis. [12:19] They were very close. [12:21] Bernard Lewis is widely considered the [12:22] greatest Western scholar of Islam in the [12:24] Middle East in the 20th century. [12:26] So, after retiring from the Pentagon, [12:28] Harold Rhode became a senior fellow at [12:30] the Gatestone Institute. [12:32] And also at the Jerusalem Center for [12:34] Security and Foreign Affairs, which is [12:36] really like the premier Middle East uh [12:39] analysis think tank [12:41] in the Middle East. [12:43] And I had the honor of meeting Harold [12:44] recently. I interviewed him on the [12:46] Israel 365 news channel last week. You [12:48] could go find that interview and watch [12:49] it and we talk about some of these [12:51] issues there. [12:52] But Harold is one of the most [12:53] credentialed, most experienced voices on [12:55] the subject of Iran in the world, [12:58] period. And he wrote a paper, you have [13:00] it here up on the screen, called The [13:02] Sources of Iranian negotiating behavior. [13:04] Not a very exciting title, but look at [13:07] that title again. The Sources of Iranian [13:09] negotiating behavior. And here's the [13:10] thing I want you to understand before I [13:11] tell you what's in this paper. [13:13] He wrote this paper in 2010. [13:17] 16 years ago. I want you to keep that in [13:20] your head as I walk you through the key [13:22] points. [13:23] Because when you hear what he wrote, [13:24] you're going to feel like you're reading [13:25] a description of your news feed from [13:28] this morning, from every day that we're [13:29] dealing with now. [13:31] Every pattern we've been watching, the [13:33] stalling, the demands for [13:34] confidence-building measures, [13:36] the [13:37] that sounds like they're into [13:39] compromises, but they're not really [13:41] the the calm and the warmth that you [13:44] get, you know, like like with these [13:45] Iranian leaders, they seem so relaxed, [13:47] right? Where is this is coming from? [13:50] And and their whole way that they try to [13:52] kick the can down the road and run out [13:54] the clock, it's not just about this [13:56] situation. These are all tactics of [13:59] Iranian negotiation that Harold Rhode [14:02] laid out 16 years ago in this paper. [14:05] This isn't hindsight. This is someone [14:07] who looked back after This isn't This [14:09] isn't someone looking back after the [14:11] fact and saying, "I told you." This is [14:13] someone who understood Iranian political [14:15] culture so deeply that he essentially [14:18] wrote out a playbook that we've been [14:20] watching Iran run ever since. [14:24] And especially throughout this war and [14:26] through these negotiations. [14:28] So, when someone writes something 16 [14:30] years ago and it reads like today's [14:31] headlines, it's it's worth looking at. [14:33] Okay. [14:34] Lesson one. So, he goes through in the [14:36] piece, he wrote it in different [14:38] sections, and there's a number of [14:39] different lessons that he pulls out [14:41] about or or or just key axioms, key [14:44] ideas about how Iran views negotiation. [14:48] And it's not just about the regime, it's [14:49] about the culture, Persian culture, [14:51] history. He's an expert in all this [14:53] stuff. So, he he talks about this from [14:55] real knowledge. Here we go. Number one, [14:58] lesson one is strength is everything, [15:00] and weakness is an invitation for [15:02] aggression. So, Rhode explains that in [15:05] Iranian political culture, [15:07] compromise is not a virtue. It's not a [15:10] sign of being reasonable. [15:12] They know that we view it that way, so [15:14] they say things like this guy said about [15:16] building trust. But in their world, [15:21] compromise is not something that [15:22] reasonable people do to reach a mutually [15:25] beneficial outcome. In Iranian thinking, [15:28] if you compromise, it's a sign of lack [15:30] of confidence, it's a sign of weakness, [15:32] and it's a sign that you're submitting. [15:34] And it brings shame on the person who [15:36] compromises. [15:38] So, if you flip that around, a person [15:41] who forces someone else to compromise, [15:43] who induces a compromise, if I can [15:45] induce you to make a compromise, [15:48] that's a win for me, and that and that [15:50] that changes the balance in the [15:52] relationship. That increases my honor [15:54] and my power. That's how the game works. [15:58] And here's the part that you should [15:59] really make you think. [16:01] Rohde says there that Iranians do not [16:04] see weakness as a reason to engage an [16:06] adversary in compromise. [16:08] They see it as [16:11] when you see weakness in the enemy, when [16:12] you see them capitulating and them [16:14] compromising, them rolling back some of [16:16] their demands, that's when you push [16:18] harder. [16:19] And that's when you that's when you go [16:20] on the offense. So, when the Iranian [16:22] advisor, when this guy goes on TV and [16:25] says, "Give us 24 million as a test of [16:27] trust," [16:29] what's he doing? It's a probe. What are [16:31] they doing? They're testing. [16:33] They're not looking for a [16:34] confidence-building measure. [16:36] They're testing to see if the Americans [16:38] will give in to their demand and make [16:40] that compromise. Is there any softness [16:43] in their position, in the American [16:44] position? And if they can extract a [16:46] concession, [16:49] then they know that they can push for [16:51] the next concession. [16:52] It'll prove to them that pressure can [16:54] yield concessions. [16:56] Okay, so he gives a [16:59] In the paper, so Harold Rohde gives a [17:01] stark example from history. He talks [17:02] about the Obama administration and that [17:05] when they signaled their desire to sit [17:07] down and negotiate with Iran, Iran [17:08] immediately hardened their position on [17:10] the nuclear issue. They always seem to [17:11] do that. They always It's like And then [17:13] it baffles us. Like, why are they Why [17:15] Why driving a harder bargain? Right? Why [17:17] do they do that? Because in Iranian [17:18] thinking if you ask to talk, at any [17:22] point where you say we want to [17:23] negotiate, if you say that, you say we'd [17:25] like to talk to you, for them [17:28] and if you do that before you've won [17:31] it proves that you don't believe you can [17:33] win. Because why why would you talk to [17:35] me if you could beat me? [17:37] You must not really have confidence that [17:39] you can win. [17:41] So, the offer to negotiate is itself a [17:43] sign of weakness in their thinking. [17:46] And when Iranian and when they smell [17:47] weakness, when this when these people [17:49] smell weakness, they go in for the kill. [17:52] Now, look at what Trump is doing and [17:53] what Keane is describing. Trump didn't [17:55] come to Iran with an outstretched hand. [17:57] He launched military operations. He [17:58] imposed a naval blockade. He has this [18:01] economic pressure through Secretary [18:03] Besson's team. [18:04] He's negotiating from a position of [18:06] demonstrated force. [18:08] And Road would tell you that's the only [18:09] posture Iran respects. The problem is [18:11] that [18:12] the Americans are also talking about all [18:14] sorts of concessions. They've rolled [18:15] back some of their demands. Some of the [18:16] demands they were making earlier they're [18:18] no longer making. Ballistic missiles, [18:20] funding for proxies. There's things that [18:22] have fallen away and the Iranians see [18:24] that. [18:25] When the Iranians are demanding that the [18:28] Americans get the Israelis to stop [18:30] attacking Hezbollah [18:32] part of the reason they're doing that is [18:33] a power play because if they and when [18:35] Trump then looks at Bibi and says stop, [18:39] the Iranians, and you see this in their [18:40] media, they say, "You see? [18:42] He's compromising. He's giving in to our [18:45] demands." And it emboldens them to dig [18:47] in for more. Okay. So, that's lesson [18:50] number one, that how weakness and [18:52] strength are understood and how and how [18:53] there's no such thing as compromise the [18:55] way we understand it. Lesson number two [18:57] from Harold Road is a concept in that in [19:00] Persian is called ketman. [19:03] Uh [19:03] that they'll tell you what you want to [19:05] hear. This is a concept that is most [19:07] important to understand about Iranian [19:09] communication. [19:10] So, Road, again, he introduces this word [19:12] ketman. In Arabic, the same word is [19:15] taqiyya, which means dissimulation or [19:17] deception. [19:19] Uh you might have heard that word. The [19:20] idea is simple but profound. What [19:22] Iranians say publicly is very often not [19:25] what they believe privately. [19:27] And they don't think of it as lying in [19:28] the way that we understand lying. Rhode [19:30] is very careful about this. He says [19:32] that's not the way they see it. In [19:33] Iranian culture, [19:35] it's a form of self-preservation. It's [19:36] like defensiveness that you don't reveal [19:38] everything. They don't think All right. [19:41] So, and it goes back like over 2,500 [19:43] years, [19:45] long before Islam. It's not an Islamic [19:47] concept, it's a Persian concept. [19:49] Um and it developed by being the subject [19:52] of conquest and foreign rule when saying [19:54] the wrong thing to the wrong ruler could [19:56] get you killed. Iranians became [19:58] extremely culturally skilled at wrapping [20:02] their true intentions in a layer of [20:04] politeness and calm and warmth and [20:07] telling powerful people exactly what [20:09] they want to hear or saying things in a [20:11] very calm voice that makes them sound [20:13] reasonable. You ever notice that about [20:15] these guys? Whenever you listen to their [20:16] to their foreign minister or to this guy [20:18] speaking, they're always very relaxed [20:19] and calm and composed. That is very [20:23] that is that is a very well-honed [20:25] cultural behavior. [20:27] And Rhode describes it with a beautiful [20:29] image. He says that Iranians love the [20:30] symbolism of the onion. [20:32] An onion has a core surrounded by many [20:35] protective layers. [20:37] Iranian culture, [20:38] Rhode explains, [20:40] has developed layer upon layer of [20:43] protection around its true core to the [20:45] point where someone where sometimes even [20:48] Iranians themselves don't even know [20:49] exactly what they believe. [20:51] And here's the problem for Americans [20:52] specifically. Rhode points out that [20:54] Westerners, and especially Americans, [20:56] who place enormous value on candor, [20:59] directness, and honesty. If someone [21:01] agrees to something, like they say they [21:03] they make a commitment, like we saw this [21:04] with Gaza, you know, it was so laughable [21:07] where the Americans kept saying, "Well, [21:08] Hamas agreed to disarm. They said they [21:10] would." Like, as though it means [21:11] anything. Like, they place Americans [21:13] it's almost seems naive. But, Americans [21:15] place a lot of value on people being [21:17] direct and honest and meaning what they [21:19] say. [21:20] And therefore, Americans are very [21:21] susceptible to ketman. [21:24] To this device, to this strategy of the [21:27] Iranians. [21:28] So, when an Iranian negotiator is warm [21:30] and gracious and engaging and friendly, [21:33] Americans read that as genuineness. [21:36] That's why you'll have you'll you'll [21:37] have these Americans saying, "Oh, I met [21:38] these people and they were lovely people [21:39] and they're reasonable." And the people [21:41] Or when Trump says, "The people we're [21:42] talking to are very reasonable people." [21:44] Because they're they are so skilled at [21:46] coming off as reasonable as possible. [21:49] Um [21:51] And they're And that's why they think [21:52] that they want to make a deal, even [21:54] though they don't. [21:55] A Rhodes says, "Don't judge Iranians by [21:57] their words, judge them by their [21:58] actions." That's the way to beat this [22:00] ketman thing. Just don't pay attention [22:02] to what they say, only pay attention to [22:03] how they behave. Think about this [22:06] Iranian advisor again. [22:08] This 24 billion dollars is a test of [22:11] trust, and then the path will be open to [22:13] more negotiations. Very warm language. [22:17] It's very conciliatory, you know, [22:19] framing, right? He's like, [22:21] it it'll be a test of trust and then the [22:22] path will be opened. But, what's he [22:24] saying? He's basically saying, "We're [22:25] holding you hostage. Give us 24 billion [22:27] dollars." [22:29] Does he think that Trump should hand [22:31] over money? [22:34] Right? It It It he makes it sound like [22:36] just such a reasonable thing, but it's [22:38] really just [22:39] he's trying to get money while giving [22:41] nothing in return yet. To see But, he [22:43] wants to also wants to test the [22:44] Americans. Will they give in to this? [22:46] Will they make the compromise? And if [22:47] they do, aha, now we go in for more. [22:50] So, ketman, [22:53] you know, that's ketman. So, Jack Keane, [22:56] he he's he's not having any of it. Like [22:58] you see in his comments, he's like, [22:59] "We're not here to give you a lifeline [23:01] and unfreeze frozen assets, so you can [23:03] recover and reverse everything. That's [23:04] not who we are. [23:06] But that's [23:07] And that's exactly what Harold Rhodes [23:09] said 16 years ago. Pay no attention to [23:11] what they say. [23:13] Only [23:14] Everything should be based on actions. [23:16] Your actions and their actions. Just do [23:18] not pay attention to what they say, cuz [23:20] that's where they start deceiving you. [23:22] Lesson three from Harold Rhodes is [23:24] patience. And this is the one we've [23:26] talked about a lot over the last few [23:27] months. [23:29] That they'll wait you out. It's It is [23:31] their It's not just their negotiating [23:32] strategy in this negotiation. It's [23:34] always their negotiating strategy. [23:36] Harold Rhodes points out that Iranians [23:39] invented or adopted very early [23:42] uh adopted as their national game the [23:44] game of chess. [23:46] And there's a reason for that. Chess is [23:47] a game of patience, of calculation, of [23:51] thinking many moves ahead, of [23:53] anticipating your opponent's response. [23:56] Rhodes says that Iranians bring that [23:58] same mentality to geopolitics. They plan [24:00] and they calculate many, many steps [24:02] ahead, and they're extraordinarily [24:05] patient. And that's why it sometimes [24:07] seems insane, like they're under so much [24:08] military pressure and they just seem so [24:10] patient and so calm and just drag things [24:13] out. They are This is their culture. In [24:16] Iranian thinking, the one who can wait [24:18] out an opponent usually wins. And this [24:20] is a direct clash with Western, [24:22] especially American, culture. [24:25] Right? Cuz in American culture, we want [24:27] everything to happen quickly. [24:29] And you know, so and all these different [24:31] points on the deception issue, Americans [24:34] like directness and candor, [24:36] and your word being your word, and they [24:38] believe that [24:40] it's it's a sign of strength to deceive [24:42] your enemy. [24:45] They don't even view it as immoral. It's [24:46] just part of That's how you That's how [24:48] you win. That's how you negotiate. We [24:50] see compromise as a virtue and as and as [24:53] and as trust building. They see [24:54] compromise as a show of weakness. [24:58] Right? They We want things to be done [25:01] rather quickly to just move to [25:02] solutions. They want to drag things out. [25:05] Now, listen to what Keane says about [25:07] what the Iranian leadership is actually [25:09] doing in these negotiations. Like he [25:10] says this. He says, "Their strategy is [25:12] to drag things out past the American [25:15] midterm elections cuz they believe that [25:16] once the political calendar [25:18] tightens up, Trump is going to be less [25:20] likely to return to military operations. [25:22] And again, Jack Keane's very confident [25:24] that that's not true. [25:26] We'll see. [25:28] But bottom line is from the Iranians' [25:29] perspective, that's what we're talking [25:30] about in this video, they're not trying [25:32] to reach a deal. [25:34] They're not. What's their end game? [25:36] That's That's the wrong question. [25:38] They're They want to [25:41] always run out the clock, run out the [25:43] clock. They know that their negotiating [25:44] position improves as time passes. [25:48] Westerners get impatient. [25:50] Westerners start to come up with another [25:52] maybe another compromise they can live [25:54] with. [25:54] Another confidence-building measure they [25:56] can live with. Maybe I'll drop that [25:57] demand or drop that demand. And then [25:59] maybe we could get a deal. That's how [26:01] Westerners think. [26:02] And they know that. So, they're running [26:04] out the clock. They're playing chess. [26:07] Now, Rhodes wrote this exact [26:10] pattern. He wrote everything I've just [26:11] said in 2010. He warned that with [26:14] Iranians offering to come to the [26:15] negotiation table before winning [26:18] can actually escalate [26:21] the situation. It can invite more [26:23] demands. It can invite a It can make [26:25] them dig in them confidence that they'll [26:27] survive and that they're not at risk of [26:29] losing their regime. That's what happens [26:31] when you stop fighting and you go to the [26:33] negotiating table. So, every week that [26:35] you're at the table, from their [26:36] perspective, from the Iranians' [26:38] perspective, is a week that you're not [26:39] using military force [26:41] where you could use it. And if you don't [26:43] use military force where you could use [26:45] it, you're weak and you lack will. [26:48] And then Now, I know I can make demands [26:49] on you. Keane makes the critical point [26:52] Jack Keane makes the critical point that [26:53] Iran has miscalculated with Trump [26:55] before, right? He pointed out that [26:57] before the 12-day war, they had a 60-day [26:59] negotiating window, and then on day 61, [27:03] uh the way Keane puts it, Trump [27:05] green-lighted the war. [27:07] And King you know, Keane, Jack Keane [27:09] thinks we're at the same point now. [27:10] Okay, maybe. [27:14] I think Okay, let me sum all this up. [27:16] Harold Rhode wrote this paper in 2010. [27:20] 2010, and you should go read it, every [27:23] one of you. You should go read it. You [27:25] could find it on JCPA [27:28] I'm sorry, JCFA. [27:32] JCFA.org. [27:34] JCFA.org. The Jerusalem Center for [27:36] Security and Foreign Affairs. [27:38] Look up JCFA.org. [27:40] Harold Rhode, R H O D E. The article is [27:44] called The Sources of Iranian [27:45] Negotiating Behavior. Amazing, amazing [27:49] article. You all have to read it. [27:52] So, [27:53] but think about it, 16 years ago, he's [27:54] describing the deception, the warmth and [27:58] calm described you know, which is [27:59] designed to lull you into thinking [28:01] you're dealing with someone reasonable. [28:03] The Iranian view of compromise as shame. [28:07] Uh the chess player patience, the [28:09] strategy of waiting out an opponent. [28:13] The whole thing. [28:15] How goodwill gestures don't work. They [28:17] don't They don't get you closer to a [28:19] deal. They actually project weakness and [28:22] embolden the Iranians. And here we are [28:24] in 2026, 16 years later. [28:28] And [28:29] I'm looking at this paper, and I'm [28:31] looking what Jack Keane is saying on Fox [28:32] about where we are, and and [28:36] this is this Iranian behavior is not [28:38] irrational. It's not random. It's not [28:40] crazy. And it's not [28:43] it's not something that we didn't that [28:44] we didn't that we shouldn't have [28:46] expected. The fact that the Trump [28:47] administration has said at various [28:49] points that they're surprised at the [28:50] Iranian behavior [28:51] is shameful. It means that they have not [28:54] done their homework. [28:56] This behavior of the Iranians is deeply [28:58] rooted in a culture and a way of [29:00] thinking that goes back 2,500 years [29:02] through Persian empires, through [29:05] invasions and conquest and different [29:06] dynasties coming in and ruling over [29:08] them. This is Persian culture, is an [29:10] ancient civilization. When you [29:12] understand that history, when you [29:13] internalize what Harold Rhode is [29:15] teaching us, [29:17] nothing Iran does will surprise you [29:19] anymore. [29:22] You know, on on this channel, when I'm [29:23] saying these things in these videos [29:25] about the Iranians, I'm not just a guy [29:26] reading the news, okay? I mean, I am, [29:28] but I [29:30] I try to become as knowledgeable as [29:31] possible on the subject. And this essay [29:33] by Harold Rhode is an absolute [29:35] must-read. You'll read it and now you [29:37] you start to understand how to read, how [29:40] to listen to the Iranians, to listen to [29:42] what they're saying. [29:45] One thing that we learn from this is [29:47] that Western policy makers have had [29:50] access to this information. [29:52] Harold Rhode published this a decade and [29:55] a half ago. [29:58] And why aren't these people reading it? [30:03] Now, I hope the Trump's team [30:05] internalizes this. I I I hope they're [30:06] starting to understand who they're [30:08] dealing with. [30:09] And that there should be you have to you [30:11] have to if if we're going to take Harold [30:13] Rhode's advice, what does that mean? It [30:14] means maximum pressure. It means no [30:17] concessions before victory. [30:20] It means stop paying attention to what [30:21] they say and only pay attention to their [30:24] actions and don't give any concession [30:27] that is not in exchange for something [30:28] they have done, not that they're [30:30] committed to do, but that they have [30:31] done. [30:33] Like the like the Iranian demand for $24 [30:35] billion as a test of trust, Harold Rhode [30:37] would say to you, "Don't give them a [30:39] single dollar." [30:40] It's not trust building. [30:44] When he said when that Iranian advisor [30:46] said it's a test of the Americans, [30:48] he he meant I mean he said it's a test [30:50] of trust. You know what it's a test? [30:51] It's a test whether you're going to [30:53] capitulate, whether you're going to [30:54] compromise, whether you're weak. [31:00] 2010 he wrote this. [31:03] And it it's like explains everything. [31:06] All right, that's what I wanted to share [31:07] with you. Please share this video. [31:09] This is exactly the kind of background [31:10] knowledge that people need that helps [31:12] make sense of everything we're watching. [31:15] And always, as and as always, [31:19] God bless you. [31:20] Be well.
