Transcript [00:00] The Iranians want the blockade lifted [00:03] and they want to be able to sell oil and [00:04] I heard that just today the blockade was [00:06] Trump announced reinstating it. But the [00:08] Iranians want relief. They don't want to [00:10] get bombed. But if everything is too [00:12] quiet in the straight of war moves, they [00:14] run the risk of what currently their [00:16] worst nightmare is Trump does well in [00:17] the midterms and they want to scuttle [00:19] it. So they want enough escalation that [00:21] things are are not going well for Trump [00:24] but not too much escalation. So both [00:26] sides are kind of managing this [00:28] escalation [00:30] and [snorts] you know it's it's a uh so [00:32] it's not exactly a stalemate but it's [00:35] this very delicate dance that they're [00:37] doing. Welcome to this episode of [00:39] Shouldertoshoulder, a podcast where a [00:41] pastor and a rabbi get to the heart of [00:42] issues that matter to people of faith. [00:44] I'm Pastor Doug Reed here with my friend [00:46] Rabbi Pesaki. And on this episode, we'll [00:48] be having a conversation with our good [00:50] friend who's no stranger to this [00:51] podcast, Elliot Choff of the podcast [00:55] Conflict Uncovered. You have to go and [00:57] check it out. Before we jump into our [00:59] conversation, please like our Facebook [01:01] page and join our Facebook group, the [01:03] Shoulderto-Ser Community, where you can [01:05] interact with Pesak and me all week [01:07] long. The best way to support this [01:09] podcast is to go on over to Patreon, [01:11] subscribe to Shouldertoshoulder. For [01:13] just $10 a month, you're helping us [01:15] bring this message of [01:16] shoulder-to-shoulder to more and more [01:17] people all around the world. 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A live webinar 100 [02:06] p.m. Eastern time, 8:00 p.m. in Israel. [02:08] But don't worry if you can't make that [02:10] time. If you register for the webinar, [02:13] you will receive an email with the full [02:16] webinar that you can watch on your own [02:17] time. But you'll only get that email if [02:19] you're registered for it. So even if you [02:20] can't make it, make sure that you [02:22] register. And here is the lineup. We are [02:25] going to be talking about everything [02:26] going on with Iran in the Middle East. [02:28] And we have Brigadier General Amir [02:31] Avivi, founder of the Israel Defense and [02:33] Security Forum, one of the top military [02:36] minds in Israel. And we have Brian [02:38] Kennedy, president of the American [02:40] Strategy Group, former president of the [02:42] Claremont Institute, one of the most [02:44] influential public intellectuals in [02:46] American conservative political life. [02:48] Dr. David Wormser, who is very familiar [02:51] to this audience, senior analyst for [02:53] Middle East affairs at the Center for [02:54] Security Policy, former adviser in [02:56] multiple white houses me and former [02:58] member of the National Security Council. [03:00] And rounding out the lineup, Lieutenant [03:03] Colonel Jonathan Kria, senior fellow at [03:05] the Foundation for Defense of [03:06] Democracies and former IDF spokesman. an [03:09] absolute allstar lineup talking about [03:12] what's happening next in the Middle East [03:14] that is taking place next Monday, this [03:16] coming Monday, I should say, 1:00 p.m. [03:18] Eastern, 8:00 p.m. in Israel live. But [03:20] if you register, you get the podcast, [03:22] uh, you get the whole webinar anyway. [03:24] And the way to register is you could [03:26] either go to israel 365action.com [03:28] and on the front page there, there [03:30] should be a link to register, or you [03:32] could click the link in the description [03:34] of this video if you're watching on [03:35] YouTube. That is israel365.com/regime. [03:38] I think we'll give it to our producer [03:40] Scott and he can put it in the audio [03:41] links as well for this for this episode. [03:44] Uh and uh and just that's israel [03:47] 365.com/regime [03:49] as in regime change and uh you could [03:52] register for this webinar. It's going to [03:53] be an amazing amazing program. [03:58] That sounds incredible. Excited to hear [04:01] and be a part of that. It's going to be [04:03] great. So register and get on that [04:06] webinar. Well, Peso, there's lots [04:09] happening in the world. There's lots [04:11] going on. President Trump has said [04:13] ceasefire is over. He decided that he [04:16] was only going to take one ride in his [04:18] new Qatari airplane. And there are [04:20] several other things that were not just [04:23] uh surprising, but I I guess some of it [04:26] was a little anticipated and some of it [04:28] uh was a bit of a surprise, but it seems [04:30] that President Trump is now re-engaged [04:33] uh with Iran. At least uh the bombs are [04:35] starting to fall and we got lots to talk [04:38] about with our guest today. No guest of [04:41] this show, our friend Elliot Cho. [04:44] >> Yeah, it you know I don't think we [04:46] should even bother having any [04:47] conversation about these things before [04:48] we bring Elliot in. I mean, I don't know [04:50] if we're going to agree on everything [04:51] because we haven't talked to Elliot in a [04:52] while, but Elliot Cho is no stranger to [04:55] this podcast. He is the host of Conflict [04:57] Uncovered. Um I should say retired uh or [05:00] or reserve, not retired, reserve major [05:02] Elliot Chaf. He's not retired at all. In [05:04] fact, he's very very busy. He has served [05:06] in a whole a whole host of different [05:08] roles uh in Israel security uh different [05:12] roles as uh in in the in the military [05:16] and he was also a lecturer at Kyifa [05:18] University for many years. He is one of [05:19] the experts on military strategy and the [05:21] Middle East. And there's so much more we [05:24] could say about our dear friend. It's [05:25] been too long. Elliot, welcome back to [05:27] the Shouldertoshoulder podcast. [05:28] >> Absolutely. [05:29] >> Great to be back. [05:31] >> So Elliot, let me tee this up. Let me [05:33] tee this up with my thoughts because you [05:34] and I haven't spoken in a while. And [05:37] I've been watching President Trump and [05:39] back when the memorandum of [05:40] understanding was signed a few weeks [05:42] ago, there was all this consternation on [05:43] the Israeli side. Oh my gosh, he's [05:45] flipped. He's turned. What's he doing? [05:47] This flies in the face of everything [05:48] he'd been talking about since the [05:49] beginning of the war. How can this be? [05:51] And and you read the 14 points. And when [05:53] it first came out, we were all in shock. [05:54] It looked it looked like a wish list for [05:56] the Iranians. [05:58] And the way things are turning out and [06:00] the way Trump is talking, I'm starting [06:01] to sus to suspect that he looked at the [06:04] faction in his team who wanted to [06:06] negotiate, Witco, Kushner, Vance, and [06:09] said to them, "Hey, you guys want to [06:11] make a deal? Make a deal. I don't think [06:13] it's going to last. I don't think it's [06:15] going to work. [06:18] Promise them $300 billion reconstruction [06:20] fund lifting sanctions. Go for it. I [06:23] don't think they're going to do it." And [06:24] they went ahead and made the deal. And [06:26] sure enough, it fell apart. A dangerous [06:28] game of chicken perhaps, but I'm [06:30] starting to think that Trump didn't have [06:31] an about face at all. That he's allowing [06:33] the different factions in his camp to [06:35] let their policy play out shortly after [06:37] theou was signed. Rubio was off to the [06:39] Gulf States to do damage control. So, [06:42] I'm I'm not sure Trump is uh is fickle. [06:45] I think he might just be allowing the [06:46] different factions around him to play [06:48] out their policy and see which one is [06:50] successful. What do you think? [06:53] >> Well, first of all, I don't think he's [06:54] fickle. I think he's first of all under [06:59] cross pressure from a number of [07:03] different directions and I you mentioned [07:05] the faction within his camp who are more [07:09] let's say negotiationoriented [07:13] uh Wickoff Kushner Vance and perhaps a [07:16] few others [07:18] uh he has the midterms to to concern [07:20] himself with [07:22] frankly he did a very poor job of [07:29] preparing and explaining to the American [07:32] people why [07:35] this erupted at the end of February. Uh [07:39] you can say he didn't do it in advance [07:41] for surprise reasons, but he didn't do [07:44] it afterwards either. And that left him [07:47] sort of behind the eightball in public [07:50] relations. And I think he's he's now [07:52] trying to play catch-up on that. Uh so I [07:56] think there are a lot of reasons and and [07:57] and and I'm sure there are a bunch that [07:58] I just I haven't mentioned that have [08:01] nothing to do directly with the actual [08:05] situation [08:07] in the Gulf and with Iran and in the [08:10] Middle East. In other words, they're [08:12] related to but they're they're not the [08:14] core, but he has to take them into [08:16] account. [08:18] I think that he is also [08:22] by instinct [08:25] trying to do something that any western [08:28] leader would try to do. The only [08:30] question is under what circumstances and [08:33] that is to say you know what diplomacy [08:36] is better than war if I can if if if I [08:41] can gain my objectives through [08:43] diplomacy. Now I I'll I'll give you two [08:47] interesting strategic quotes on it. one [08:49] by um the renowned German strategist [08:54] Carl van Clausvitz who many people have [08:56] heard of wrote a book on war unreadable [09:00] in any language um but I I've I've [09:04] taught it for about 30 years uh and in [09:07] it he wrote and again one of the famous [09:09] there are a number of famous quotes in [09:11] the book that war is an extension of [09:13] policy by additional means in other [09:16] words policy should be. Now, he he he's [09:21] writing the way it should be, not the [09:22] way it necessarily is, but war should be [09:26] something that is done to promote an [09:29] existing policy by and and this is key [09:32] very often misquered by additional means [09:34] not by other means. Policy doesn't end [09:38] because war begins. War becomes another [09:41] layer of it. Now, it could become the [09:43] primary layer. That's number one. But we [09:46] can that's 19th century closets. But [09:50] let's go back 2500 years ago to a [09:53] Chinese strategist named Sunsu [09:56] who wrote a book called the art of war. [09:58] And in it he wrote the best battle the [10:02] best victory excuse me is that of the [10:05] battle you don't have to fight. [10:09] In other words, if you can convince your [10:11] adversary to acquies to give you what [10:15] your objectives are without fighting for [10:18] them, that's the best victory. And I [10:20] think those are good those are good [10:21] principles. You know that I'm a military [10:23] strategist and I'm also a political [10:25] strategist. Uh it's better to win [10:28] without fighting than to win with [10:30] fighting. I I think he's got that [10:32] instinctively whether he's ever read [10:33] Claus or or Sunsu. [10:36] The problem begins with who you're [10:39] dealing with and how [clears throat] you [10:41] deal with them. [10:43] And here I think we have a cultural [10:45] clash. We have western thinking. And I [10:48] don't want to belittle uh Trump or for [10:51] that matter Whit or or Kushner or any of [10:54] them, but this is not real estate [10:56] negotiating in New York. [11:00] This is international strategic conflict [11:04] negotiating [11:06] with a [11:08] leadership and a society that is light [11:11] years away in culture and value from [11:16] what they're used to dealing with. And [11:18] I'll give you just one simple example of [11:20] this. Uh in in America, in the West, [11:24] when you sign an agreement, that's the [11:26] end of negotiations. In the Middle East, [11:28] when you sign an agreement, that's the [11:30] beginning of the negotiation [11:32] [laughter] [11:35] and [11:36] it's it's hard to reconcile. You say, [11:39] "Hey, you know, we we shook hands, we [11:41] signed the documents, now let's all go [11:43] out and, you know, have a a drink or a [11:45] cup of coffee or whatever." I was like, [11:47] "No, no, no, no. Now we now we've just [11:49] established the basis from which we're [11:52] going to begin to negotiate." [laughter] [11:56] Okay. Now, I don't think it's a [11:58] question. [11:59] >> As as you're sitting there saying that, [12:01] I I think there's a lot of [12:02] misconceptions by most listeners uh to [12:06] this podcast and others, most [12:07] Westerners, they know the straight of [12:09] Hormuz. They've heard a couple of [12:11] talking points. And the only reason they [12:12] know the straight of Hormuz is because [12:13] they caught it on a news clip or Tik Tok [12:16] or something like that. They really have [12:18] no idea what's actually going on on the [12:21] ground. They really have no clue as to [12:23] how big Iran is. is they really have no [12:25] clue about the inner workings. They've [12:28] heard a couple of clips here. They've [12:30] seen a couple truth posts from Trump and [12:33] everybody's an Iran expert. Um, help us [12:36] with what are some of the misconceptions [12:39] that people the biggest ones that we're [12:41] missing with this? What's the plot line [12:43] we're missing? [12:45] >> Okay, first of all, um I think we're [12:49] once again we're missing a cultural [12:51] value difference. And here I want to be [12:54] clear. This isn't about being [12:56] duplicitous. It's about a different [12:58] understanding of what things mean. [13:01] The memorandum of understanding [13:04] or what I call the memorandum of [13:06] misunderstanding [13:07] talks about maintaining a status quo. In [13:11] the west, the status quo is what is when [13:14] you sign it. In the Middle East, the [13:17] status quo is whatever it is today. [13:21] In other words, if I change the status [13:23] quo yesterday, [13:25] today the status quo is what I changed [13:28] it to yesterday. [13:31] And that's exactly what the Iranians are [13:34] doing. [13:35] And I understand that the status quo was [13:40] there's going to be no change in their [13:43] nuclear weapons development program. But [13:47] if they changed it yesterday, the new [13:48] status quo is is today's status quo. And [13:53] if the straits of Hormuz were meant to [13:56] be frozen in status quo, freedom of of [13:59] navigation and no interruption and no [14:02] intervention and no, that was then. But [14:05] now we've changed the the status quo. [14:07] Now we're shooting at ships. That's the [14:09] new status quo. [14:12] And [14:14] it's it's a misunderstanding. It's in in [14:17] the sense of the two sides see the words [14:22] and they mean different things to them. [14:25] You know, let me give you a very brief [14:27] example from the the end of the Gulf War [14:30] in 1991. [14:32] Uh the Americans and the Iraqis sat [14:33] down. One of the things I talked about [14:34] was a no-fly zone. And in the agreement, [14:38] it said no aircraft will fly [14:40] >> [snorts] [14:41] >> etc etc over these these zones. And the [14:43] Americans said, "No, we need to specify [14:45] fixed wing and rotary wing." In other [14:47] words, regular aircraft and helicopters. [14:49] And the Iraqis said, "No, no, aircraft [14:51] is aircraft." And then like a week [14:54] later, they were flying helicopters over [14:55] the no-fly zone. And the Americans said, [14:57] "But but it it you said, "No, but look [15:00] what it says in in the document." Says [15:01] aircraft. Aircraft means fixed wing. You [15:03] didn't specify rotary wing, so it's [15:05] okay. [15:07] [laughter] [15:08] >> That happened. [15:10] Yeah, [laughter] that's how it happens. [15:14] And Americans say, "Hey, you know, a [15:16] verbal agreement is just as valid as a [15:18] written one." In a in the Middle East, [15:21] the written agreement has no value. The [15:23] verbal agreement is non-existent. [15:27] And that's what we're seeing. The [15:30] Iranians are pushing every which way [15:33] they possibly can against the envelope [15:38] to m to create a new status quo every [15:41] day. Incidentally, Yaser Arafat did this [15:43] for decades. [15:45] We would go into negotiations, Israel [15:48] would make an offer, he would reject it, [15:50] and the next negotiations he would say, [15:52] "No, no, the offer that they made is now [15:54] part of the status quo of the [15:56] negotiations." [15:57] >> Meaning that's the starting point of the [15:58] next round, right? It's [16:00] >> that's right. [16:01] >> Yeah. But it's our own fault for falling [16:03] for it as westerners. [16:05] >> Of course it is. [16:06] >> Because we come from a society where [16:08] compromise is a virtue and they come [16:11] from a society where compromise is a [16:13] sign of weakness. [16:14] >> Weakness [16:14] >> and therefore we're actually signaling [16:17] different things when we advocate for [16:18] compromise. I I want to I want to ask [16:20] you a question about this current this [16:23] current dance that uh that the Americans [16:26] are doing with the Iranians. [16:28] and I was doing my own kind of [16:30] amateur-ish research and you could [16:32] probably tell me more about this. That's [16:33] why I was looking forward to having you [16:34] on that there's this concept in this [16:38] type of situation called controlled [16:40] escalation right in in military strategy [16:43] where and correct me if I'm wrong but [16:46] what we're seeing here is a perfect [16:47] example of it where on both sides the [16:50] Iranians and the Americans there's an [16:53] interest in keeping things quiet but [16:55] there's also an interest in in in [16:57] escalating and they're balancing these [16:59] interests let me explain [17:00] >> for for the Americans [17:02] They need to degrade the Iranian [17:05] capability to close the straight of [17:07] Hormuz because so there's all this [17:08] there's all these Iranian assets whether [17:10] they're boats or drone launch sites or [17:14] missile launch sites and air defenses [17:16] around the straight of Hormuz and the [17:17] Americans have an interest in in [17:19] degrading all of that neutering all of [17:21] it so that the straight of Hormuz can be [17:23] open but they don't want to engage in [17:26] any kind of escalation that'll turn this [17:27] again into allout war possibly causing a [17:30] a a spike in oil prices. On the other [17:32] hand, they want to do it early enough [17:34] that they could get that job done and [17:36] have the straits open in enough time [17:38] ahead of the of the midterm elections [17:40] that it doesn't cause a problem. So, [17:41] they're kind of trying to balance how [17:43] much escalation. And then on the Iranian [17:45] side, it's the same thing. The Iranians [17:48] want the blockade lifted and they want [17:50] to be able to sell oil. And I heard that [17:52] just today the blockade was Trump [17:53] announced reinstating it. But the [17:55] Iranians want relief. They don't want to [17:57] get bombed. But if everything is too [17:59] quiet in the straight of four moves, [18:00] they run the risk of what currently [18:02] their worst nightmare is Trump does well [18:04] in the midterms and they want to scuttle [18:06] it. So they want enough escalation that [18:08] things are are not going well for Trump, [18:10] but not too much escalation. So both [18:13] sides are kind of managing this [18:14] escalation. [18:16] And you know, it's it's a uh so it's not [18:20] exactly a stalemate, but it's this very [18:23] delicate dance that they're doing. [18:26] >> Yes. the the um international relations [18:29] term for it is coercive diplomacy [18:32] [clears throat] [18:33] and it's the idea of controlled [18:36] escalation is an element of it in the [18:39] sense that [18:41] which both each side wants to create a [18:46] situation where the threat to the other [18:49] side threatens them at a higher cost [18:53] than the the perceived value of what [18:55] they're going to get by violating it. [18:58] >> Okay, slow down, back up, unpack that [19:00] again. Explain that. [19:02] >> All right, simple costbenefit analysis. [19:05] If I want you to do something or you [19:08] know, let let's put it in in what would [19:10] be called deterrence terms. I don't want [19:13] you to do something. I want you to not [19:15] do something. And I tell you, if you do [19:20] what I don't want you to do, I am going [19:23] to impose a cost on you. It could be [19:26] retaliation. It could be sanction. It [19:29] could be something. But I'm going to [19:31] impose a cost on you that is higher than [19:35] the value that you get from what you did [19:38] that I didn't want you to do. [19:42] Right. Okay. You You gained a dollar [19:45] from what you did and I'm making it cost [19:48] you $2 for doing it. [19:50] >> Whoa, whoa. But in order for that to [19:53] work, I have to have an accurate [19:55] understanding of the value my enemy [19:58] places on each outcome. [20:00] >> Precisely. [20:01] That's the weakness of the theory. But [20:04] it's worse than that because if I [20:08] underestimate the value to you and I [20:11] actually charged you less than it than [20:14] you gain, I am creating escalation [20:17] because you're making a profit on every [20:19] exchange rather than a loss. Okay. Now [20:23] read this into our situation. [20:26] Okay. The Iranians are doing what [20:28] they're doing mostly for soft reasons, [20:32] not for hard strategic reasons. What I [20:35] mean by that is they're doing it for [20:37] prestige. They're doing it to maintain [20:40] their position in the country and around [20:43] the Middle East. They're doing it to set [20:46] up a future, as I said, recreating [20:49] status quo. They're doing it in order to [20:54] embarrass the American administration. [20:58] And I'm going to throw two more things [20:59] into it. [21:01] One, one of the consequences of the [21:05] decapitation strategy of the last round [21:09] that started at the end of February, [21:11] which by the way, I think was a very [21:12] good strategy. But one of the [21:14] consequences was that the people who are [21:17] now in control in Iran are a more [21:21] hardline than the ones who were taken [21:23] out. [21:25] And I I intentionally don't say moderate [21:27] versus extreme or fanatic. They're all [21:30] extreme fanatics, but they are more [21:32] hardline. [21:34] And two, they have less experience. [21:37] Okay? Like it or not, Ayatollah Kamei [21:42] had been around for decades. He knew how [21:45] to play the game [21:47] the I don't know what what's happening [21:49] with with you know Fa Jun Jr. but the [21:52] IRGC guys who are running the show now [21:56] don't have a lot of experience doing [21:58] what they're doing. The likelihood that [22:00] that that combined with their radical [22:04] Islamist jihadi ideanist [22:08] ideology will lead them to make a [22:11] mistake [22:13] in anticipating American response is [22:17] significantly higher than with the [22:19] previous regime. That's issue number [22:21] one. Issue number two, Western liberal [22:24] democracies [22:27] inherently [22:28] are seen as weak by fascist totalitarian [22:33] dictatorial regimes. This is jihadi, not [22:36] jihadi. Doesn't make any difference. [22:38] It's why the Japanese attacked Pearl [22:40] Harbor. It's why Hitler declared war on [22:42] America. I can give you a long list. And [22:44] the reason for it is very simple. The [22:47] things that we know that make and I I'll [22:50] be very specific. America that make [22:52] America inherently strong. [22:56] Rights, freedoms, [22:59] and the like are looked upon by people [23:02] like the Iranian regime as weakness. [23:06] Thousands of people coming out to [23:08] demonstrate against the government and [23:10] everybody goes home safely. And it's [23:12] true in Israel as well. We see it as the [23:15] strength of our democracy. They see it [23:18] as how the heck can you run a country [23:19] that way? How could you let your [23:21] citizens humiliate you? That's right. [23:23] Machine gun them. Kill 40,000 of them [23:25] and that'll teach them a lesson. How can [23:28] you not kill tens of thousands of your [23:30] people when they demonstration like [23:31] demonstrate like that? That is weakness. [23:35] And those two elements in addition to [23:37] the things that you said, I I think it's [23:39] a it's a a complex picture, but those [23:41] two additional elements mean that they [23:44] are going to keep ratcheting it up. And [23:47] while America is trying to contain the [23:49] situation, they're trying to push the [23:52] containment as far as it can go. And I [23:55] think what we've seen over the past few [23:56] days, they are very, very quickly [23:58] getting to the point where it's beyond [24:01] what Trump and the administration are [24:04] willing to tolerate. They don't see it [24:07] because they can't see it. [24:11] Well, so I have a quick question. the [24:15] during this last couple days, the the [24:17] latest round of uh exchange between the [24:20] US and Iran, Iran has lashed out at just [24:23] about all of the Gulf States, has shot [24:26] missiles towards US bases in Jordan and [24:28] elsewhere, but has been strangely not [24:30] targeting Israel. Why have they not sent [24:33] any missiles to Israel? [24:36] Not strange at all, because Israel will [24:40] not play the Trump game. [24:43] and at least not initially. And and and [24:46] here I think we we need to be very [24:47] specific and what they're afraid of, I [24:49] believe. Okay. Kuwait, Oman, Jordan, [24:54] whatever. [24:56] They know that they're not going to do [24:57] anything to them. Jordan isn't going to [24:58] do anything in response. You know what [25:00] they So, so they'll bomb a target. They [25:03] don't care about that. [25:06] If I am reading them correctly, that [25:09] they are reading the situation [25:10] correctly. They know that if they launch [25:14] ballistic missiles at Israel now, Israel [25:17] will respond immediately with a massive [25:21] counter strike. Now, when I say massive, [25:25] I want I also want to be clear on this. [25:27] What the Americans have been doing up [25:28] until now over the past few days, 80 [25:31] targets here and 90 targets there and [25:33] 150 targets, that is all symbolic [25:38] signaling. [25:40] In other words, nothing has really been [25:42] hit that the Iranians care about [25:44] terribly much. This is slap in the face [25:48] level response because it's trying to [25:51] get a a message across. Again, this is [25:53] part of coercive diplomacy. If you do [25:55] that, I'm going to slap you a couple of [25:57] times until you get the message. [25:59] If Israel is struck, Israel, unless I [26:04] completely misreading the strategic [26:07] understanding of the Israeli leadership, [26:09] military and civilian, Israel knows two [26:12] things. One, it will be able to get away [26:16] with [26:18] possibly more, but certainly one counter [26:21] strike against Iran. In other words, if [26:25] Iranian missiles hit Israeli targets or [26:27] fired at Israeli targets, Trump is not [26:30] going to tell Israel it can't respond. [26:33] However, once Israel responds, there's a [26:36] very high probability based on our [26:38] recent experience that Trump will turn [26:40] around and say, "Okay, once was enough. [26:42] That's it. You can't do it again." [26:45] because because Trump doesn't want the [26:47] allout war, but politically he'll have [26:50] to allow Israel to do that. You know, [26:52] and a few weeks ago, we had now it's [26:55] close to a month ago now, maybe it's a [26:57] month ago, we had this one day where [26:59] Iran attacked Israel, right? And it was [27:00] right after Israel attacked abah [27:04] headquarters in Beirut and then Iran [27:07] retaliated on their behalf with a few [27:09] missiles at Israel. The whole attack [27:11] lasted a couple hours. like there was a [27:13] few missiles thrown at Israel. We had [27:15] one air raid siren where I live [27:18] >> and then and Israel retaliated by [27:20] apparently knocking out some massive [27:22] prochemical [27:24] >> plant that caused serious damage. The [27:26] type of infrastructure regime target [27:30] that America is not hitting right now. [27:31] So I think I think that just supports [27:33] your point that if Iran were to fire [27:35] miss fire missiles at is Israel's [27:37] licking its chops waiting for Iran to [27:39] fire something at us to have an excuse [27:41] to go in there [27:42] >> and inflict the type of damage that [27:45] America is not willing to inflict. [27:47] >> Yes. And under the assumption that will [27:50] only get one shot at it. [27:53] That will be an over [27:56] rather than under response. In other [27:59] words, it'll be the the antithesis of [28:02] what the Americans are doing, what you [28:04] call controlled escalation, and and I I [28:06] think the term is valid. In other words, [28:08] we're going to hit 80 today and 90 [28:09] tomorrow and 150 the next day. And give [28:12] them the sense that every day it's going [28:13] to go go up. Israel knows it's not going [28:16] to have that opportunity. It won't be [28:18] able to hit 20 targets today with the [28:21] threat of hitting 50 tomorrow because [28:23] after whatever is done today, there's a [28:25] very, very good chance that Trump will [28:27] turn around and say, "That's it. No [28:29] more." [28:31] And what that means is that the Israeli [28:34] initial response is likely to be [28:38] massive, [28:40] overwhelming, and hitting targets that [28:42] the Americans might hit sometime in the [28:45] future, but are not trying to go after [28:47] today because they still want to leave [28:49] that window of maybe the Iranian [28:52] leadership will figure it out. Hope [28:55] springs eternal. Well, in in your [28:58] estimation, what are those targets that [29:00] would cause enough pain for Iran to say [29:05] uncle? [29:07] >> I don't even I'm not sure it's about [29:09] saying uncle, but it would mean it would [29:11] be first of all energy resource [29:15] infrastructure. [29:16] It could be um and this was already [29:19] threatened transportation infrastructure [29:25] existing the um the the rebuilt or in [29:30] the process of rebuilding [29:32] nuclear program as well as ballistic [29:35] missiles program [29:37] and IRGC and besiege [29:42] command and control infrastructure which [29:44] would also hurt them badly. [29:47] uh if Israel went after it. So I think [29:49] those are the categories. The specifics [29:52] I leave to Israeli Air Force [29:55] intelligence and and the Mossad and [29:57] those guys who I'm sure have a long list [30:01] prioritized [30:03] um just waiting for the order. I would [30:05] be shocked, seriously shocked if the Air [30:09] Force does not already have operational [30:11] orders for that strike written up with [30:16] the times written as variables. In other [30:20] words, h as opposed to the, you know, [30:22] the hour and then just plug it in and [30:25] and and go. Elliot, you mentioned before [30:29] the [30:31] this concept from SunSu [30:36] and and or from Clausvitz that if you [30:40] could win [30:42] without kinetic action that's much [30:45] that's much preferable and certainly in [30:47] this situation where kinetic action [30:49] causes economic disruptions globally it [30:52] causes domestic problems for Trump. [30:53] >> Sure. So in this situation where we [30:57] don't even know if this or that air [31:00] strike is more dangerous to the regime [31:03] than a more hermetic blockade or the [31:06] very fact that even even if it's not [31:08] hermetic the the the catastrophic [31:11] collapse of the Iranian economy can only [31:14] go on so long. So is it possible that [31:18] you know even though in our camp there's [31:19] people tend to like are looking forward [31:21] to when things go kinetic again and see [31:23] the ceasefire as a problem [31:25] [sighs and gasps] but as long as Iran is [31:28] is is collapsing from within and that's [31:30] progressing and we can and we can keep [31:32] the economic strangle hold going isn't [31:36] it preferable to just be patient and [31:39] keep that going rather than to do [31:41] anything kinetic [31:44] >> if you could project [31:46] into the future in a linear fashion. [31:49] Yes. The problem is the enemy has a vote [31:54] and [31:56] they have a whole bunch of ways to get [31:59] around it including China, Russia. [32:04] Uh all the indicators of imminent [32:09] collapse [32:11] could be 20 years off. [32:14] We don't know. And and and that's where [32:16] the problem is. Uh or or it could be [32:18] tomorrow. I mean, remember the the fall [32:20] of the Soviet Union? We woke up one [32:23] morning and it was gone. Uh or the the [32:27] Syrian regime for that matter. [32:29] >> Yeah. It happened suddenly. [32:30] >> The problem with that, right? But the [32:33] problem with that as a strategy is that [32:35] the reverse is also true. Look how long [32:37] Saddam Hussein held out [32:39] under sanctions and having been beaten [32:42] up and and all of that. Um so the the [32:47] short answer is yes and the long answer [32:49] is yes but no. [32:51] Uh it would be preferable if it works [32:55] but there's no guarantee and if it fails [32:58] you're in a really bad position. [33:03] Now, I know Elliot, you don't like to [33:05] play profit, but what are the things you [33:09] are looking at? What are you keeping [33:10] your eye on and saying, "If that [33:13] happens, then I'm going to look for [33:15] this." What are the couple of key [33:16] indicators you're watching to say this [33:19] is going to go in this direction or that [33:21] direction? [33:24] >> First of all, Iranian missteps. They the [33:27] reports were and I only saw it. I didn't [33:29] see them confirmed. Maybe you guys have [33:32] uh that they fired at American warships [33:34] today. [33:37] Now, firing at American warships can be [33:40] symbolic. In other words, you send a [33:42] couple of drones knowing they're going [33:44] to get shot down. On the other hand, [33:46] when they put a missile into an aircraft [33:47] carrier, even even by accident, [33:52] >> that's going to be a problem. [33:53] >> You know, they they've changed the [33:56] rules. uh on on this end I've I've [33:59] always referred to this via visa visbah [34:01] over the years uh something that I call [34:04] the nursery school scenario [34:07] uh you know they're firing rockets and [34:09] they're landing here and they're landing [34:10] there but the first one that hits a [34:11] nursery school and kills 15 kids uh the [34:15] whole that that whole tit fortat [34:19] system simply falls apart. So, [34:23] an error of calculation [34:27] uh with [34:29] depending on whose side you're on, the [34:31] good luck or bad luck of it actually [34:33] working [34:35] is one of the things that I'm looking [34:36] at. And how many times they do it, of [34:38] course, increases the odds that it could [34:40] happen. [34:42] Okay? And and I just want to be clear, [34:44] hitting an American air carrier is not [34:46] simple, but mistakes happen. [34:48] uh some guy looks up instead of looking [34:51] down and and hits the wrong button and [34:53] the missile gets through. [34:56] And again, I I am neither predicting it [34:58] and certainly not hoping for it, but [35:01] it's an example. Um [35:05] sinking a whole bunch of ships in the [35:08] straits. [35:09] [clears throat] It's one thing to to hit [35:11] one or two every now and then. uh if [35:14] they launch a massive [35:17] attack and sink, pick your number, 15 [35:20] tankers in one day, [35:24] and they didn't mean to. They attacked [35:26] 15 hoping to get two [35:30] completely changes the situation. [35:34] If they decide, and I I I can see an an [35:38] outofcrol escalation that goes something [35:40] like this. They tellah to start firing [35:44] at Israel. [35:46] Israel responds [35:49] heavily againstah. [35:51] Iran says, "If you keep responding, [35:53] we're coming in." [35:56] Fires more rockets. Israel, of course, [35:58] responds. [36:00] Iran [36:02] fires missiles into Tel Aviv. [36:06] We're in a different place than we are [36:07] where we're sitting at the moment. And [36:09] these are all I think reasonable [36:12] scenarios as they go. On the flip side, [36:16] uh if the Iranian people wake up [36:18] tomorrow morning and say enough is [36:20] enough and rise up on Mas against [36:24] the regime, we can see something going [36:26] in an entirely different direction. [36:30] Uh now let's throw in Hamas, the [36:34] Houthis. There was an incident today in [36:36] Sana. the the Saudis apparently bombed [36:38] the airport. Um there there's a lot of [36:42] stuff happening in in what we would call [36:44] the periphery, [36:46] but that could have an immediate effect [36:48] on the center as well. [36:49] >> Well, Elliot, I thought Hamas was [36:51] disbanding and the the board of peace [36:53] was taking over and it was all going [36:55] really well down there in Gaza. [36:56] >> Yeah. Whit Whitkov said they promised [36:58] him that they were going to disarm [37:00] [laughter] and you know, a kamas promise [37:03] is almost as good as a kamas guarantee. [37:06] >> [laughter] [37:06] >> Uh the UN the UN, God help us, issued a [37:11] report today saying that Hamas is [37:14] rebuilding. They're stealing aid. [37:17] They're preventing it from getting to [37:18] the population. The UN, [37:22] the Messiah has got to be around the [37:23] corner. [37:23] >> It's unbelievable. I mean I mean the UN [37:27] woke up what, two and a half years late [37:30] to this reality, [37:31] >> right? Quite something. [37:32] >> Exactly. You know, Ellie, with the last [37:34] few minutes we have, maybe we could talk [37:36] about Lebanon because again, it's been [37:38] so long since we spoke to you and the [37:41] strategic calculus in Lebanon has gotten [37:43] really, really interesting with, you [37:46] know, the the Americans and theou [37:50] basically conceding that Iran has a say [37:52] in Lebanese uh in Lebanese security uh [37:55] decisions [37:57] >> in [snorts] the Lebanese security [37:58] situation. But then the deal that Marco [38:01] Rubio's office brokered between the [38:03] Israelis and the and the Lebanese [38:05] government directly, which was entirely [38:08] about Iran having zero say in Lebanon [38:12] security situation. And it's really not [38:14] it's about whether or not Lebanon is a [38:16] sovereign country, [38:18] >> but there are still a lot of different [38:20] forces pulling in different directions. [38:22] Erdogan is trying to have a say here as [38:25] well. What's your assessment of this [38:27] delicate situation in Lebanon? [38:31] >> First of all, predict predicting Lebanon [38:33] is is a fool's mission. I'm not going to [38:35] step into that. [38:37] I believe that [38:41] President Dun of Lebanon was Christian [38:46] uh would like very much to disarm and [38:50] oust Kizbollah [38:53] and that with American [38:56] uh carrot and stick aid threat [39:00] negotiating [39:01] brings them to where they are. And he [39:03] certainly doesn't want Iran in there. By [39:05] the way, anybody who knows the history [39:06] of Lebanon, um, [39:10] part of where we are today in Lebanon [39:12] has to do with Syrian [39:14] uh, intervention and involvement in the [39:16] country in the 70s and 80s and Iran [39:19] would be worse, not better. And and [39:21] Syria was a disaster. [39:24] So he certainly would like to a keep [39:26] Iran out and Syria for that matter and [39:29] Turkey for that matter and try to [39:31] maintain some sort of independence. [39:34] He's caught on the horns of a dilemma [39:38] because has stated outright that it will [39:41] bring down the country rather than give [39:43] up its position [39:46] because doesn't really care about [39:48] sovereign Lebanon. [39:50] It's an open question even today after [39:53] the beating that took from us over the [39:57] past couple of years whether [40:00] is stronger than the Lebanese army or [40:03] not. [40:05] Uh, and there are two reasons for that. [40:06] One, the Lebanese army is nothing to get [40:08] excited over. And two, it's made up a [40:11] large proportion of its troops are [40:14] Shiites. [40:16] And there's an open question whether [40:17] they will actually obey orders to go [40:20] after if the order is given. So, [40:23] President Dun, who's a former chief of [40:24] staff of the army, by the way, uh, is [40:27] caught in the horns of that dilemma as [40:28] well. We've agreed to hand over a couple [40:32] of areas on a pilot program to the [40:35] Lebanese army. That has not come to pass [40:38] yet. The Lebanese army hasn't gotten the [40:40] act together. The Americans have [40:42] promised uh an advisory role. They're [40:45] going to give some money to that, not a [40:47] huge amount. The only way I see it [40:50] working, and I don't think Aluna is [40:51] going to go for it, uh, because he's got [40:54] his own internal domestic issues, is if [40:57] he agrees to allow the IDF to support [41:01] his troops against [41:04] not with ground support. In other words, [41:07] not fighting shoulder-to-shoulder. [41:10] Throw pitch in for for the podcast. [41:12] >> It's a good nature podcast. [41:14] >> It is. uh but artillery support, air [41:18] support, um interdiction, which by the [41:21] way the Egyptians for many years did [41:24] with the Israeli air force against [41:27] al-Qaeda and ISIS forces in Sinai. [41:30] Uh you know, with all of the issues with [41:33] Egypt when they needed it, they called [41:35] in Israeli air strikes against al-Qaeda [41:38] in Sinai [41:40] and it was one of these, you know, big [41:42] open secrets. So if they go that way, [41:44] they've got a chance. No guarantees, but [41:47] they've got a chance. If he tries to [41:50] dance, [41:51] uh, you know, between all of the [41:53] raindrops simultaneously, I believe [41:55] he'll fail. Uh, Lebanon will once again [42:00] go from a weak state to a failed state, [42:04] possibly to a collapsed state. Um, and [42:07] then, you know, it's anybody's guess who [42:09] who goes into the vacuum. [42:12] Wow. Well, this has been really, really [42:15] uh helpful. And if you enjoyed Elliot's [42:18] analysis, I have to plug this. Go to [42:20] Conflict Uncovered. Uh you can get it [42:22] anywhere you listen to podcasts. Be sure [42:24] you'll get deep military uh analysis. [42:27] You'll be able to hear uh a lot more [42:29] from Elliot over on Conflict Uncovered. [42:32] Elliot, we always appreciate your [42:34] insight and appreciate you joining us [42:35] here on Shouldertoshoulder. [42:37] >> Always a pleasure. [42:39] And thank you for listening to today's [42:41] episode. If you enjoyed this episode, [42:43] please like, rate, and share this [42:44] podcast. Subscribe on Patreon. Come on [42:46] over to Facebook, like our page, join [42:47] our group as we would love to connect [42:49] with more and more of our [42:50] shoulder-to-shoulder family. We'll see [42:51] you on our next episode.
