Transcript [00:02] So, [00:03] where are we with this Iran United [00:05] States negotiation thing? We know we [00:08] have the MOU, the 14-point MOU. We know [00:11] that they then went to Geneva and they [00:13] had a first round of talks where [00:15] something was agreed upon. [00:17] And [00:19] yesterday President Trump said said that [00:20] there would be more negotiations today. [00:23] The Iranians then said no, there aren't. [00:25] It's not exactly clear where things [00:27] stand and we know that we have this kind [00:28] of fragile ceasefire. There've been some [00:30] skirmishes in the Strait of Hormuz, so [00:32] they're kind of open but not fully open. [00:35] If you watch my I made other videos [00:37] about that about the Hormuz situation [00:40] over the last couple days. [00:42] So, I figured this would be a good [00:44] moment to discuss how the Iranians see [00:50] the whole concept of negotiations. [00:53] Now, admittedly, [00:55] they need to justify the fact that [00:57] they're negotiating to their own people. [01:00] Within Iran, there are many reports that [01:02] within Iran, within the diehards, the [01:04] ideological diehards who drank the [01:06] Kool-Aid [01:07] of the regime, they're very upset at [01:12] the at those who are negotiating. [01:15] They're very upset at them. [01:17] Because [01:18] you know, they see negotiation as a kind [01:20] of capitulation and they want revenge [01:23] you know, for the death of uh [01:26] of Khamenei. [01:27] You know, so so they also you know, so [01:29] the regime kind of has to justify the [01:31] fact that they're negotiating. So, keep [01:33] that in mind as you watch these clips. [01:35] The two clips we're going to watch, [01:36] they're both pretty short, just a couple [01:37] minutes each. [01:39] Are both courtesy of memory.org, the [01:42] Middle East Media Research Institute, [01:45] MEMRI. You got to follow them. They do a [01:46] lot of fantastic reports on what's going [01:48] on in in Middle Eastern media. They do a [01:51] lot of translations. [01:53] They also post video clips. They They [01:55] post all the clips to their YouTube [01:56] channel, so don't just rely on that. You [01:58] should really go to their website, [01:59] memri.org. I'm a huge fan. I find them [02:01] indispensable for understanding the [02:03] Middle East. Let's take a look at these [02:05] two clips. The first clip that we're [02:06] going to see, [02:08] this is um [02:10] This is Madi Mohamadi, strategic advisor [02:13] to Iranian speaker Ghalibaf. That's the [02:16] guy who's like leading the negotiations. [02:18] We know who that is. We've talked about [02:19] him a lot. The butcher. We've seen his [02:22] face. And this is a uh clip from June [02:24] 10th, from just a couple weeks ago, [02:27] about negotiations. And uh thankfully, [02:30] even though there's uh it's in Persian, [02:32] they did a voiceover, so I don't have to [02:35] do it myself. Here we go. [03:05] mooshak darid pahpad darid qudrat [03:08] e'telati o amniyati darid muqawamat [03:11] darid muttahedin eton ro darid mozakerat [03:13] ham darid [03:19] shoma dar lahzeh i ke darid faqat [03:21] namayid faramoosh konid ke dar hal e [03:22] jangid aqayi Qalibaf hamisheh miguyad [03:25] mozakerat abzar e mobarezeh ast doshman [03:27] tahqir shodeh doshman shekast khordeh [03:29] aqayi Shahid Fatemi shavad azash emtiyaz [03:31] gereft [03:32] ba'dan be ta'ahodash amal mikonad na [03:34] vali mohem in ast ke shoma ye juri hamun [03:37] lahzeh avval ye emtiyazi begirid ke az [03:39] farda agar kolli mize mozakerat ham be [03:40] ham khord shoma un chizi ra ke lahzeh [03:42] avval be dast avardid digeh negahash [03:44] darid naqd ye chizi avvalash migirim va [03:46] midanim ba'dash be nazar e man nazar e [03:48] shakhsi e man in ast ke ba'dash ham be [03:49] ham mikhorad khob bokhor mohem in ast ke [03:51] ma tu un lahzeh i avval ye chiz e asasi [03:54] az inha begirim [04:13] >> All right, there's that's clip number [04:15] one. [04:17] And you see what he's saying there? [04:21] There's no distinction between war and [04:22] negotiation. Negotiation is just another [04:26] tool of war. [04:28] Right? [04:29] Uh so, to go a little deeper, we're [04:31] going to play a clip that's much more [04:33] recent from June 27th. So, it's just a [04:35] couple of days ago. [04:37] And the guy in this clip is [04:39] uh a an IRGC general, a retired general, [04:43] Mohammad Hussein Saffar-Harandi. [04:46] He's a member of Iran's Expediency [04:48] Council and former minister [04:51] of culture and Islamic Guidance. Okay? [04:55] So, [04:56] here we go. Let's pick it up with him. [05:49] Okay. [06:31] >> [clears throat] [06:53] [clears throat] [06:59] >> All right, there you go. [07:02] So, [07:03] let's unpack what we just saw there. [07:06] Okay, we're going to we're going to [07:08] minimize this a little bit. [07:12] So, [07:13] negotiations, [07:15] missiles, drones, [07:17] it's all part of the same toolbox, [07:18] right? That's literally how they're [07:21] describing this. And he he mentioned the [07:24] Treaty of Hudaybiyyah. [07:27] In 628 AD [07:30] or CE, depending on which [07:33] lettering you prefer. [07:35] In the year 628, Muhammad led about [07:38] 1,400 of his followers [07:41] toward Mecca. [07:43] And the Quraysh tribe blocked them. [07:47] And instead of fighting, Muhammad agreed [07:49] to a 10-year truce. [07:52] And on paper, it looked like he was [07:53] capitulating. He turned back without [07:55] completing the pilgrimage. He agreed [07:58] that any Meccan who defected to his side [08:00] would be sent back. [08:02] No reciprocity. [08:04] Um he even dropped his title messenger [08:06] of God from the written agreement [08:08] because the Quraysh tribe objected to [08:11] it. And he signed this agreement, right? [08:13] His his own companions, Muhammad's own [08:15] people, were furious cuz it looked like [08:17] he was surrendering. [08:19] And then 2 years later, 2 years into the [08:21] 10-year agreement, [08:23] um [08:28] Muhammad declared the treaty null and [08:31] void, and he marched on Mecca with [08:33] overwhelming force. [08:35] I mean, there was some there was some [08:37] pretense for declaring it null and void, [08:39] saying that the Quraysh broke the truce. [08:42] But the city then fell without a fight. [08:45] And this is called a hudna in Islamic [08:47] tradition. [08:49] Um [08:50] and Hudaybiyyah, [08:52] it's called, sorry, isn't remembered as [08:53] a humiliation that it looked like [08:55] initially. It looked like, you know, he [08:57] was backing off. [08:59] But what it it's remembered as as the [09:01] prime example of a hudna, which is a [09:03] ceasefire. It's a It's a peace treaty [09:07] that is deceptive. [09:08] It's a truce that buys you time [09:12] until the balance of power shifts and [09:15] you're in a stronger position, and then [09:17] you go back to war. [09:19] It buys you time to make your future [09:21] conquest [09:23] possibly. Okay, that's the model. Again, [09:25] a truce that's signed with the explicit [09:28] pre-announced expectation to yourself, [09:30] to your people, that it's temporary, [09:33] where the real win, the real win of the [09:35] truce, and here we get into what they [09:37] were saying in this in the video, what [09:39] we're saying in the first video about [09:41] let's get whatever we can up front [09:43] knowing that the deal is going to fall [09:45] apart. Remember in that first video, he [09:46] was like, let's just take it What [09:49] matters most is what you get at the [09:50] beginning [09:52] of the agreement because that you have [09:54] in your pocket, and then the other stuff [09:56] that's promised later on, ah, it's never [09:58] going to happen anyway. You saw what he [10:00] said there. [10:04] Now, think of what that says about the [10:05] MOU, which I have I I pulled up on [10:07] screen here. [10:10] Now, let's make it a little bit bigger. [10:11] Let's take a look at the MOU cuz we've [10:12] been saying it about saying that about [10:13] the MOU. You have things that are [10:15] promised down the road. [10:18] And then you have things that are up [10:19] front. [10:21] Right? So, in the MOU, [10:24] the Islamabad memorandum that was signed [10:26] on June 17th, there's 14 clauses. [10:29] And clause 13, [10:32] I've mentioned this before, in clause [10:34] 13, [10:35] we have those items [10:37] that are supposed to be done up front [10:40] right at the beginning after signing the [10:42] MOU and subject to the beginning of the [10:43] implementation [10:45] of paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 10, and 11, [10:49] then we continue with everything else in [10:51] the negotiations. But the But the the [10:54] the precondition for moving forward is [10:56] these five items. [10:59] Right? So, what are these five items? [11:01] So, there's a cessation of hostilities [11:03] in Lebanon, [11:05] which we've talked about. There's other [11:06] videos I've made about over the last few [11:08] days. That's a separate issue. So, [11:09] there's that. [11:11] And then we have number four. Number [11:13] four is [11:15] the United States will remove its naval [11:16] blockade. [11:19] Okay, number five, [11:21] um [11:22] is that the Straits of Hormuz will open. [11:27] And then 10 and 11 [11:29] are a a termination of US sanctions [11:34] and an unfreezing of Iranian assets. [11:39] Right, those are the those are the [11:40] items. [11:43] So, [11:46] so think about that. [11:48] Now, the back half of the deal [11:51] is is, you know, what's going to happen [11:53] with the nuclear and you know, and other [11:57] issues to be worked out later on. [12:00] Arrangements for the Strait of Hormuz [12:02] long-term with Oman, whatever that [12:04] meant. [12:07] But, the document, the MOU structures [12:09] these items as preconditions. [12:11] That's the cash up front that this guy's [12:14] that this first guy Galibov's advisor [12:16] was talking about in the first video. [12:18] Cash in hand, [12:21] unfreeze our assets, lift the blockade, [12:24] so that we can sell our oil. And that's [12:26] what they've been doing. Ever since this [12:27] MOU went into effect, Iran's just been [12:30] selling their oil, selling their oil, [12:31] selling their oil, getting cash. [12:35] Getting cash, as much of much cash as [12:38] they can, and they're working furiously [12:39] to get their assets unfrozen. [12:42] They're also trying to get Israel to [12:44] back off in Lebanon, which Israel's not [12:46] doing, so they're a little frustrated. [12:47] But, you understand the thinking behind [12:49] the way the MOU works for the Iranians [12:52] is this [12:54] is this thinking. [12:56] What he called in that video cash in [12:58] hand, nuked in the in the in the [13:00] Persian. That is [13:02] it's written into the agreement. [13:05] Right, so when you get to paragraph [13:06] eight, when it talks about the uranium [13:08] stockpile, it's like, oh, we're going to [13:10] work it out down the road. The missile [13:13] program's not even mentioned. [13:17] Right, and then you have uh you have [13:18] also, what is it, paragraph seven. [13:22] The United States of America undertakes [13:24] to terminate all types of sanctions [13:26] against the against the council, the [13:28] Republic of Iran, the United States [13:29] acknowledged the critical importance of [13:31] the sanctions termination, but that's [13:33] much much later. There are things that [13:34] are kicked down the road. The $300 is [13:36] kicked down the road, but the things [13:38] they get right away is their unfrozen [13:41] assets. They get the blockade lifted so [13:43] they can sell their oil. [13:45] Right, these are the things that they [13:46] want right up front. They want cash. [13:51] But as you saw from those videos, [13:54] they're not interested in fulfilling the [13:56] rest of the of the MOU. [14:00] Now, the US didn't walk away completely [14:03] empty-handed. [14:04] Hormuz kind of reopened a bit. [14:07] J.D. Vance announced that Iran had [14:08] agreed in principle to let inspectors in [14:12] calling it a major milestone toward [14:14] ending Iran's weapon program. [14:16] Uh but uh [14:18] but that was just an agreement to allow [14:20] inspections at some point in the future, [14:22] which of course Iran then denied and [14:24] they said they're not going to allow [14:25] them into the main nuclear sites. [14:27] So even the best win that the US can [14:30] point to is really just an unverified [14:32] promise. [14:35] See, the US believes that when you have [14:36] an agreement to move forward to certain [14:38] later clauses that you mean it. [14:42] But listen to the guys that I just [14:43] played you in that videos in those [14:45] videos. [14:47] They're like all that matters is what we [14:49] get right up front. The stuff that comes [14:51] later, eh, it's going to fall apart. [14:55] If you unfreeze assets, if you lift a [14:57] blockade and let Iran sell its oil, that [14:59] cash doesn't get un- [15:01] deliver I mean they make that money. [15:03] That money's in their pocket. Right now [15:05] every day Iran is selling its oil. The [15:07] blockade hasn't been reinstated. They [15:09] are selling [15:10] They are making [15:12] lots and lots of money [15:14] as we speak selling their oil. [15:18] And they still have that money even if, [15:19] you know, so so that every day that it [15:21] goes on, and the blockade isn't [15:23] reinstated, they're making bank, and [15:25] they don't care what happens with the [15:27] other clauses, the IAEA inspector [15:29] commitment. [15:32] That's down the road. [15:34] And they're already signaling that [15:35] they're not going to allow it. [15:40] See, the really deeper point here, and [15:42] this is why I made this video, [15:44] is what do you think an an agreement is? [15:47] In the Western tradition, a signed [15:49] agreement is [15:50] it binds you. [15:54] Agreements are kept. [15:57] You negotiate, you sign, [16:00] and from that point forward, the [16:01] document binds you. [16:05] That's the premise that makes a treaty [16:07] worth signing. [16:09] And anyone who watches the Middle East [16:10] knows that treaties don't have much [16:12] meaning, but maybe we now understand [16:14] why. [16:15] Cuz listen again to what we just heard [16:17] in their own words, negotiation [16:20] is is explicit is not the end of [16:22] hostilities. It's explicitly described [16:24] as one of many tools in your war kit, [16:28] alongside your missiles, your drones, [16:30] your weapon right? It's It's just [16:31] another tool in the kit of war. [16:34] It's not a different category. [16:39] Right? It's a continuation of war. He He [16:42] mentioned He mentioned Qalibaf's line [16:44] that we [16:45] that negotiation is a tool of struggle, [16:48] meaning meaning it's a tool of the of [16:51] the fight. [16:52] Negotiation isn't finding common ground. [16:56] It's a tool of struggle. [16:59] And the model that the second guy [17:00] reaches for, [17:02] he refers back to is Hudaybiyyah, a [17:05] truce whose entire historical value in [17:08] their telling was that it didn't hold. [17:12] The point of that treaty wasn't peace. [17:16] The point of that treaty wasn't [17:17] resolution of conflict. The point of [17:19] that treaty was to buy time until you [17:22] are strong enough. To buy time that [17:25] allows you to regroup and regain [17:27] strength. [17:29] That was the point of the treaty that [17:31] Muhammad made. [17:35] The objective of conquest [17:37] remains. [17:40] If that's how these people think about [17:41] agreements, I mean [17:43] when they signed this MOU, [17:47] they're not they don't think about it [17:49] the same way that the Westerners who [17:51] signed it think about it. [17:54] They are [17:56] banking the irreversible items that they [17:59] get right away, the cash, [18:02] the lifting of the blockade, hopefully [18:04] the protection of Hezbollah, which they [18:05] didn't get, sanctions relief, [18:08] unfreezing their assets. The things that [18:11] are promised them right up front, they [18:12] want that. That's That's why they signed [18:14] it. [18:16] They don't care about everything else in [18:17] the document. [18:22] Right, once you understand that, then [18:23] clause 13 in the document, which says [18:26] these are the things that have to be up [18:27] front, you understand that's the whole [18:28] deal for Iran. [18:33] Take what you can get now [18:35] regardless of what happens later. That's [18:37] literally what that guy said. [18:40] So, the Americans signed a document that [18:42] they see themselves as bound by. The [18:44] Iranians signed a document designed to [18:46] extract whatever they could get before [18:49] the other side, [18:51] you know, figures out that this [18:53] document's not really going anywhere. [18:57] Anyway, that's that's their that's the [18:59] view of this whole thing. Anyway, so [19:01] just so we know who we're dealing with, [19:03] maybe someone could show these memory [19:04] videos to J.D. Vance or Steve Witcoff or [19:07] something. Maybe that would be helpful [19:09] in their negotiations. [19:11] All right, hope this was helpful. [19:14] No good news in this one, folks. Or [19:16] maybe the good news is that this will [19:17] all fall apart and we'll get back to [19:19] actual fighting [19:20] and deal with this regime once and for [19:22] all. But just so we understand, they [19:24] have no intention [19:26] of ever ever [19:28] fulfilling [19:30] the the demands of the Americans. They [19:31] have no intention of capitulating to [19:34] anything that Trump wants. They have [19:36] zero intention of that. [19:38] Now, you might argue they're just [19:39] signaling to their people, but this is [19:42] just the way they've always been. [19:44] Uh [19:45] all right, folks. God bless you all.
