Videos > Israel Matters #13: The Balance Between Empty Threats & Deterrence Israel Matters #13: The Balance Between Empty Threats & Deterrence Pesach Wolicki 96 views • 2 likes 6 years ago • 28:39 min
Transcript [00:02] welcome back to israel matters everyone [00:04] once again i'm rabbi pesachwalicki and [00:06] i'm here with my dear friend [00:07] elliot shodhoff how you doing elliott [00:09] i'm good how are you pesach [00:11] good i had a very busy weekend i [00:13] understand monsaltov [00:15] thank you very much it was my son's bar [00:17] mitzvah this shabbat my son assaf [00:20] he's the seventh of my eight children [00:22] yes i know eight kids a lot of kids [00:25] um but he's the and he's the last bar [00:27] mitzvah the next one is a daughter [00:29] and it was just a very busy hectic uh [00:31] hectic time we didn't do a big party [00:33] because of coronavirus but there was [00:34] still a lot going on [00:37] i just wanted to share a quick thought [00:39] from [00:41] something that i thought about last [00:43] night after shabbat was over right at [00:45] the end of shabbat we have [00:46] a custom a jewish practice that [00:50] every month in the first two weeks [00:53] sometime within the first two weeks [00:55] after the new moon [00:56] we go outside usually after shabbat on a [00:59] saturday night [01:00] and we look at the moon and we say [01:01] certain prayers [01:03] after looking at the moon kind of [01:07] prayers over the moon we're not praying [01:08] to the moon even though it kind of looks [01:09] like that standing outside but we [01:12] we say these prayers and the prayers are [01:14] really about [01:16] the renewal and the constant rebirth of [01:19] the jewish people [01:20] and the jewish people have always seen [01:22] the moon as a metaphor for our own [01:23] existence [01:25] where it kind of shrinks down and almost [01:28] disappears and then rises again and [01:30] and brings light into the world but i [01:32] wanted to share one little thought i had [01:33] as i was saying [01:35] uh this these prayers kidus levana about [01:38] the fact that the moon [01:40] uh is seen as symbolic of the people of [01:42] israel and has been for thousands of [01:44] years [01:45] and that is that we know now and this [01:48] wasn't necessarily known [01:49] in ancient times but we know now that [01:51] the moon is always reflecting [01:54] is only reflecting the light of the sun [01:56] it doesn't have its own light [01:57] and that wasn't necessarily known by [01:59] people in the ancient world [02:01] but knowing that i think it gives a [02:03] deeper understanding [02:04] to the moon as a metaphor for the people [02:07] of israel [02:08] and that [02:12] god is the source of light and our job [02:15] if we're the moon is to reflect that [02:18] light into the world [02:20] so the light that we are shining in the [02:22] world as a light [02:23] unto the nations is really god's light [02:25] that we're reflecting and that [02:27] helps to understand a verse in isaiah [02:29] and what this all end [02:30] in isaiah chapter 30 verse 26 there's a [02:33] verse that [02:34] it's one of it's in one of these [02:35] prophecies about the end times about the [02:37] future [02:38] and we believe that we're living in that [02:40] future now and the verse says as follows [02:43] at that time the light of the moon will [02:45] be [02:46] like the light of the sun and the light [02:50] of the sun will be sevenfold now [02:51] obviously this is not meant to be taken [02:53] literally if the moon was as bright as [02:54] the sun that would mean that it would be [02:55] as bright as nighttime as it is during [02:57] the day [02:59] and then it would mean that if the sun [03:01] was even brighter [03:02] it's not really a world that we could [03:03] live in what it's really what it really [03:05] means i think we think about this symbol [03:08] is that we'll have the ability to [03:10] reflect so much of god's light in the [03:12] world [03:13] that it won't just be a kind of little [03:15] light in a dark sky but we'll actually [03:17] be able to illuminate [03:18] the world and that's it really speaks to [03:19] our mission i just thought that was a [03:20] nice [03:21] way to start thinking about a lot of the [03:23] stuff that's going on in the world today [03:25] and how the how the nation of israel [03:27] with all the bad things going on [03:29] is really just getting stronger and more [03:32] stable and [03:33] uh thank god we're living in such in [03:35] such glorious times but we still have [03:37] our problems [03:38] uh as we talk about here uh elliott last [03:41] time we were [03:42] you took us back to the year 2000 and to [03:46] how things unfolded in the uh [03:49] the security zone buffer zone whatever [03:51] you want to call it that in [03:52] in south lebanon and with the israeli [03:55] pull out there and the implications of [03:56] that [03:58] there have been some skirmishes this [03:59] week little things you know [04:01] little uh firecrackers going on along [04:03] the southern border maybe you could take [04:05] us [04:06] into the northern border as well on the [04:08] northern border yeah i mean [04:10] again with hezbollah sorry i meant on [04:12] the northern border [04:13] and maybe you could take us uh into what [04:15] what has happened this week [04:17] and bring and use that to bring us back [04:19] into our story [04:21] um well a couple of things have been [04:24] reported there was one one major event [04:27] where some hezbollah [04:30] fighters opened fire on an israeli [04:32] position and we responded [04:35] with basically an all-night [04:38] barrage mainly of flares but also some [04:41] artillery [04:42] striking at some of their positions uh [04:44] essentially [04:45] sending them a subtle but clear message [04:50] that that kind of behavior is [04:51] unacceptable okay so where does a [04:53] flare-up like that [04:54] rank in terms of how close that is to [04:58] things turning into something bigger [05:00] meaning because there's stuff like this [05:02] the reason i ask is that is that we know [05:03] that if we pay close attention [05:05] there's little skirmishes all the time [05:07] all the time and [05:08] and what is this is this something [05:11] that's out of the ordinary that was [05:13] more or is this the kind of thing that [05:14] happens every couple weeks or every [05:16] couple months [05:16] that we should be this this is unusual [05:19] the last [05:20] um i would say [05:23] decade or so has been [05:27] very quiet along the border there were a [05:29] couple of blip [05:30] incidents um after we took out [05:35] a hezbollah leader in lebanon a few [05:37] years ago [05:38] uh but primarily it's been quiet [05:43] and they've been very careful [05:47] scrupulous about keeping it quiet [05:50] and in the past few months [05:54] it has picked up [05:57] not enormously but significantly [06:01] compared to the quiet that there was [06:03] and so what's the purpose or what's the [06:06] strategic uh what's the strategic [06:11] motive for kind of turning the you know [06:14] turning the burner a little higher [06:16] but not escalating too far like what do [06:18] they want from that [06:19] so first of all let me let me go back [06:23] one step to the to [06:24] your question um you know [06:27] how close are we to an eruption and the [06:29] answer is we you never know [06:31] because there's always the uh [06:34] the possibility of what i call the [06:36] nursery school scenario but [06:38] there are all sorts of variants on it [06:40] and by the way it can work in both [06:41] directions [06:42] in other words they can fire something [06:44] into our side and inadvertently [06:47] kill a bunch of kids we could fire onto [06:49] their side and inadvertently kill a [06:51] bunch of kids [06:52] and in either case we could suddenly [06:54] have an eruption that neither side [06:56] wanted to have happen on that particular [06:58] day [06:59] but the response must be [07:04] okay so anytime they're shooting there's [07:06] always the chance of an escalation [07:08] even if you say the probability is low [07:10] it's greater than zero [07:13] um now the why [07:17] let's go back there are certain [07:19] parallels to what we were talking about [07:21] last time and i [07:22] i want to elaborate on them because the [07:23] period we were talking about [07:25] was the aftermath of the pull-out in [07:28] 2000 [07:29] and it's a period that historically is [07:31] kind of bracketed [07:32] with the 2000 pull out from lebanon and [07:35] the 2006 war [07:38] with hezbollah in lebanon okay and that [07:40] will help us understand what's going on [07:42] now [07:42] exactly because we're we're in a place [07:45] today that is [07:46] similar somewhat to that period [07:49] of the end of 05 and into 06 [07:52] where the war broke out over the summer [07:54] it's not exactly the same but there are [07:55] certain important parallels [07:57] so let's just go back briefly 2000 [07:59] israel pulls out [08:01] uh we make it clear we're not going to [08:03] tolerate anything from them [08:05] um and within a few months [08:09] the war breaks out with the palestinians [08:10] the palestinian terrorist assault [08:12] that's commonly referred to as the [08:13] second intifada which was not an [08:15] intifada it was a terrorist war [08:18] um marked by the suicide attacks of [08:21] later one and into o2 [08:22] just we'll talk about that another time [08:24] in in detail and basically it's it's [08:27] it's kind of [08:28] culminating point with the passover [08:31] seder [08:32] attack in netanya at the park hotel [08:35] and then we launched an attack [08:39] i'll just point out that my parents who [08:40] live in netanya heard the explosion from [08:42] their sure [08:43] i'm sure um [08:47] and then we launched their our offensive [08:49] and and things changed but in any event [08:51] that's the period we're talking about [08:53] and [08:55] since that that broke out shortly after [08:58] the withdrawal from lebanon [09:01] we shifted that is the idf shifted its [09:03] infantry forces [09:04] into judea samaria and gaza because [09:07] that's where the attacks were coming [09:08] from [09:09] and the forces that were moved up to the [09:11] northern border were combat troops but [09:13] not not infantry and others people [09:15] whose trained job is not to hold [09:17] territory and defend territory [09:20] in that fashion tank units without the [09:23] tanks engineer units [09:24] very good soldiers but just it's not [09:27] what they were trained to do for a [09:28] living [09:29] and in the course of the next five six [09:31] years [09:32] uh a number of attacks one [09:36] notorious one already in the fall of [09:37] 2000 uh [09:39] near shabba farms mount dove [09:43] uh where stuff is is still going on [09:45] today the three soldiers whose [09:47] who were killed and whose bodies were [09:48] taken but they were considered alive but [09:51] even though we kind of knew if they [09:52] weren't um but we didn't respond [09:55] very very minor response and in the [09:58] course of those years [10:00] about two dozen israelis were killed by [10:02] hezbollah there was a lot of fire across [10:05] the border [10:06] and we essentially ignored it [10:10] and here i i want to make clear it was a [10:13] decision that i disagreed with i think i [10:15] mentioned last time i [10:16] actually wrote an article about called [10:17] ignoring the north it wasn't a stupid [10:19] decision i make a distinction between [10:21] decisions i don't agree with and stupid [10:22] decisions [10:24] it was a reasonable decision uh all the [10:27] action is in [10:28] judea summary in gaza it's much closer [10:30] to the population centers [10:32] that's where the focus needs to be that [10:34] was the way of thinking and the north [10:36] well look we already [10:37] we're out of the way hezbollah is just [10:39] being a slight irritant you know and [10:41] they're trying to draw us into a [10:43] conflict [10:43] you know they're trying to blow things [10:45] up so we're not going to we're not going [10:47] to give them the satisfaction of [10:49] responding especially since we don't [10:51] have the force to do it [10:53] and this isn't okay this is an important [10:55] point i think that's missed a lot of the [10:57] analysis of that period we just didn't [11:00] have the force [11:01] we weren't in a position to [11:02] simultaneously [11:04] run long-term operations in judea and [11:07] samaria [11:08] gaza and the northern border [11:12] okay without calling up reserves and [11:14] going into a full-scale [11:16] war kind of an operation but you can't [11:18] do that long-term in other words [11:20] anybody who's familiar with with the [11:22] israeli military knows [11:24] the reserves are the last ditch you call [11:27] up the reserves to fight [11:29] and go home so that's why they're [11:32] using souls to augment the regular army [11:35] so that's why the soldiers patrolling [11:37] the northern border during this time [11:38] period were not [11:39] really uh fully trained for what they [11:43] were doing [11:44] because it was kind of yeah the [11:47] appropriate troops [11:48] right right [11:52] okay now what changed what changed [11:56] things [11:56] there was the withdrawal from gaza [12:00] in the summer of o5 because by the fall [12:03] of o5 we had already moved [12:06] frontline infantry back up to the [12:08] northern border [12:10] okay i i don't want to go into the gaza [12:12] withdrawal here again that's a whole [12:13] story we can cover another time [12:15] i was i was very much involved in gaza [12:18] in those days including in the [12:19] withdrawal [12:20] but what's important to understand is [12:21] that that withdrawal freed up a huge [12:23] amount of infantry [12:26] and instead of engineering tank units [12:30] now we had the golani infantry brigade [12:33] and the paratroops the 35th [12:34] airborne brigade on the northern border [12:37] and all of a sudden christopher started [12:38] taking it on the chin [12:42] i'm talking about in the fall of o5 and [12:44] into o6 and they [12:46] hadn't fully internalized that there was [12:49] a change [12:50] in what had in our policies and they [12:53] kept escalating which ultimately led to [12:55] the war on o6 [12:57] now we'll talk about the 106 next time i [12:59] want to bring it back to where we are [13:00] today [13:02] what's happening today is again there [13:04] are parallels i don't want to say [13:06] exactly the same [13:07] but there are parallels first of all we [13:10] don't want a war we don't want an [13:11] escalation [13:13] why because we don't that's i mean [13:14] that's who we are we never we never want [13:16] an escalation we can avoid it [13:17] we're going to avoid it we're certainly [13:19] not going to do it just for the heck of [13:21] it [13:23] hezbollah is caught on the horns of a [13:26] dilemma [13:26] and i i just wrote an article about this [13:28] hopefully it'll be published the next [13:30] week or two and i'll [13:31] give references when when it comes out [13:34] uh but israel is caught on the horns of [13:36] a dilemma on the one hand [13:37] they don't want an escalation now either [13:41] on the other hand they have declared [13:44] that they will respond to israeli [13:46] aggression [13:47] and that includes the attacks that we're [13:49] doing against [13:51] their operations in syria meant to [13:53] bolster their forces in lebanon [13:57] okay it's a little bit a little [13:58] confusing perhaps but [14:01] their shipping weapons the iranians with [14:03] hezbollah are shipping weapons into [14:04] lebanon [14:05] we are interdicting those shipments in [14:07] syria we're causing them damage [14:10] and about a month ago he killed one of [14:11] their operatives not by [14:13] intent i mean i don't know whether we [14:14] knew he was there or not but he he [14:16] wasn't the objective he was [14:18] a bonus he was there when it was hit so [14:22] he was hit [14:22] yeah and he got killed now again i don't [14:25] know if we knew he was there we knew we [14:26] were going to kill him or not [14:28] but he wasn't the primary target of the [14:30] attack so that's what nasrallah has been [14:32] streaming about for the last few weeks [14:34] that he's going to take exactly exactly [14:36] because nasrallah has been saying [14:40] on and off indirectly for years and [14:42] clearly since the beginning of this year [14:45] that they will respond heavily to any [14:48] attacks against [14:49] their interests or people in lebanon or [14:52] syria and now he's put himself out [14:57] into an untenable position [15:02] because deterrence and here's the trap [15:05] we're deterring them [15:06] and they're deterring us [15:09] but deterrence doesn't work well [15:14] against someone who's trying to maintain [15:18] the status quo [15:20] deterrence works in order to maintain [15:22] the status quo [15:24] so trying to stop us from preventing [15:27] them from shipping arms into lebanon [15:32] is a very very poor use [15:35] of deterrence and it's virtually doomed [15:37] to fail and it is failing [15:39] now explain why is that okay why is it [15:44] because deterrence is a strategy is bet [15:47] i don't want to go into all the theory [15:49] but the terms as a strategy is basically [15:51] meant to freeze the situation [15:54] okay but we're not exactly freezing the [15:56] situation we're trying to prevent [15:58] them from increasing their arms and [16:00] therefore we're taking [16:01] aggressive action against theirs [16:04] and and they don't want to be [16:07] retaliating [16:08] or attacking us in response they if they [16:11] treat [16:12] what we're doing as as an offensive [16:15] then they have to escalate things [16:17] correct occurrence is a bad way to stop [16:19] us from doing this [16:21] right got it okay that's very [16:23] interesting but [16:24] but they're trying to apply it [16:25] nonetheless now [16:27] they don't want to do it in a way that [16:29] will lead to an escalation [16:35] which is why a month ago they launched [16:37] an attack against [16:39] our outpost on mount dove what they call [16:41] shabba farms [16:42] which failed miserably we also not [16:46] wanting to [16:46] escalate it did something which i [16:49] thought was a mistake but i [16:50] but i understand the rationale behind it [16:52] again i can disagree [16:53] and not consider it stupid uh we opened [16:57] fire on them we saw them coming we [16:58] waited till they crossed [16:59] the border we opened fire on them at [17:01] long range and chased them back [17:04] i personally because i'm just that kind [17:06] of guy [17:07] would have preferred to let them come in [17:08] a lot closer and kill them [17:10] but there were other considerations [17:13] they denied that it happened in other [17:16] words we gave them [17:17] a huge out to deny [17:21] all of it in other words no blood no [17:23] foul [17:25] in the interim their position in lebanon [17:28] is being threatened because of the [17:29] beirut blast [17:32] and other things but let's take the [17:33] beirut blast as a sort of [17:36] really how is that playing out what sort [17:37] of implications is it having are they [17:39] more and more are they political public [17:42] implications [17:43] yes there are a few of them one there [17:44] are more and more indicators that [17:45] hezbollah [17:46] was either indirectly or directly [17:48] involved in the blast [17:51] and it doesn't matter for our purpose it [17:53] doesn't matter which in other words [17:54] there was something hezbollah related to [17:57] it [17:57] whether they had control of the ammonium [17:59] nitrate or they had [18:01] weapons next to it or or whatever [18:06] their name is being associated more and [18:08] more with it [18:10] and leaving for a moment responsibility [18:12] in the grand sense which is also hurting [18:14] them [18:15] there's becoming a louder and louder [18:17] call than lebanon [18:18] for them to remove their missiles and [18:21] munitions and ordinance [18:23] from populated areas in lebanon because [18:26] it clearly endangers the population [18:28] now for them hiding their stuff in [18:30] civilian populated areas [18:32] is integral to their strategy because it [18:33] makes it much harder for us to strike it [18:37] so they're in a somewhat weaker [18:40] position remember the government resigns [18:43] uh [18:44] this is not the end of hezbollah don't [18:46] don't let's not currently [18:48] so currently there is no government in [18:49] lebanon it's a caretaker [18:52] okay okay but there let's let's just say [18:56] in pure simple relative terms hezbollah [18:59] today [19:00] is in a weaker position in lebanon than [19:03] it was [19:04] a month ago six weeks ago whatever [19:09] one of the ways that they [19:12] establish their importance is to show [19:15] that they are on the front line of [19:17] resistance against [19:18] israel so [19:21] having made the statement that he's [19:23] going to retaliate for what we did in [19:25] syria [19:26] he has to do it [19:29] but he has to do it in such a way that [19:31] doesn't lead to an escalation [19:34] so for example in the first attack [19:37] he's got a problem that i said he's got [19:39] a dilemma [19:40] okay in the attack on the hard dove [19:44] we chased them away there was no backup [19:47] in other words they didn't press the [19:48] attack they fled [19:51] in the announced attack last week [19:54] they opened fire we did whatever we did [19:58] firing back and they they fled they [20:01] didn't press the attack in other words [20:02] they don't want it to become [20:04] engagement reinforce reinforce [20:08] engage air strike tank strike anti-tank [20:11] anti-air um [20:16] what that means is [20:19] two things one is that we're likely to [20:22] see them keep trying until they succeed [20:25] what is the two because they're doing [20:26] about such a [20:28] minimal what i mean does succeed mean [20:30] that they get they get looking they [20:31] knock out a tank or they kill some [20:33] soldiers [20:34] got it [20:38] okay and they can declare victory [20:43] or they [20:46] more likely i mean if they keep trying [20:49] eventually they may succeed they're [20:50] likely eventually to succeed [20:53] uh but in the meantime because they're [20:55] doing it on such a minimal level [20:56] the odds of success of any given one of [20:58] those attacks are very very low [21:00] a combination of our very good [21:02] intelligence and the fact that they're [21:05] they're not trying to use [21:08] overwhelming concentration of force at a [21:10] particular point [21:11] which would increase the chances of [21:14] that specific attack working [21:18] means that we're likely we're likely to [21:19] be seeing sort of repeated failures now [21:21] the reason i say that this is similar to [21:23] what happened [21:24] in o6 is because there was a series of [21:27] repeated failures from the fall of 05 [21:30] until the attack in july 06 that started [21:33] the war [21:34] and each of those led to [21:37] not not in a linear fashion but in a [21:39] sort of [21:40] periodic fashion led to a slight raise [21:44] of the intensity of what they were doing [21:47] until they reached the point in the july [21:49] 06 attack [21:51] where it was a massive attack they came [21:52] across the border with a whole bunch of [21:53] guys [21:54] they took out two vehicles they killed a [21:56] bunch of soldiers [21:57] they blew up a tank that went after them [21:59] uh [22:00] when they grabbed the bodies in other [22:02] words that wasn't their original plan as [22:04] a matter of fact [22:05] nasrallah after the war said if i had [22:07] known that was going to be the israeli [22:08] response i never would have done the [22:10] thing in the first place [22:13] but here we are 14 years later [22:17] and no two situations are identical [22:22] and he could very well be sitting there [22:24] saying well i'm not going to do the same [22:25] i'm not going to make the same mistake [22:27] i made in july 06 but he can make a [22:30] different but [22:31] similar outcome mistake in the year [22:34] 2020. [22:35] so that's why i say there there are [22:37] certain parallels and the fact that we [22:40] are for our own reasons and i think [22:41] there are legitimate reasons [22:44] we're exacting and extracting minimum [22:48] punishment from them for their attempts [22:52] means that for them the cost of failure [22:57] is way way lower than the potential [23:00] value of a success [23:03] and that kind of a situation [23:07] is almost automatically one that leads [23:09] to escalation [23:11] right because there's because why [23:13] shouldn't they keep going [23:16] yeah but i would also imagine i would [23:18] also imagine that with them being [23:20] in a weakened state as you say they've [23:22] been weakened by the events of the last [23:24] month and by various developments in the [23:26] region [23:27] is there a fear that if they get [23:31] too weak they might get desperate and [23:34] then that gives them [23:35] incentive to go to go on the attack [23:39] um i wouldn't i wouldn't put it in [23:42] absolute terms again i would put it in [23:43] relative terms [23:45] the weaker they get the more incentive [23:48] they have [23:49] i built that into what i was saying [23:52] before about the value of success [23:54] in other words okay the weaker they [23:57] are the higher the value success is [24:01] and if the if the cost of failure is [24:04] minimal [24:05] then you just keep trying now [24:08] what we've done and again because we [24:10] don't want an escalation [24:12] is that we've essentially limited the [24:14] cost [24:15] of failure to them to whatever they have [24:18] invested [24:20] okay i'm using economic terms is the [24:22] best way to understand this in terms of [24:24] deterrence [24:25] okay if they've invest if they invest [24:27] five guys and [24:29] we don't kill them then their total [24:32] cost is zero but let's say we kill the [24:34] five guys they [24:35] they send in they have [24:38] calculated a certain value and they lost [24:44] it in order [24:46] to make deterrents really work properly [24:50] we should then extract an additional [24:53] cost [24:56] that makes them lose beyond their [24:59] calculation [25:00] every time they try it now the problem [25:03] with doing that we tried to do it with [25:05] this last [25:07] event [25:10] the problem with doing that is that if [25:12] you do it at too low level you gain very [25:14] little from it [25:15] and you also run the risk of escalating [25:18] so [25:19] there are all sorts of sort of different [25:20] value vectors [25:23] built into this uh that basically makes [25:26] us very passive [25:27] legitimately and makes them marginally [25:31] active but that module can always blow [25:33] up in everybody's faces [25:35] wow so this is a real this is a real [25:38] chess game i mean uh and and you've [25:40] really mentioned [25:45] you know the management of the tension [25:48] that everyone's involved in yeah [25:52] so i guess within the israeli brain [25:54] trust there must [25:55] really be a lot of pushing and pulling [25:59] about like what the right amount of [26:01] response is when it comes to [26:03] when it comes to these hezbollah actions [26:07] right but again as long as they have [26:12] their weapons and and munitions uh in [26:14] civilian areas [26:16] taking out let's say a missile [26:19] storehouse [26:20] that happens to be in the backyard of a [26:22] family of you know [26:24] parents and three kids and the house [26:26] blows up [26:28] um we've inadvertently created a [26:31] situation that they [26:32] they will feel honor and reputation [26:35] bound to respond to [26:37] and then it's anybody's guess where that [26:38] ends [26:40] well all right i think we should we [26:43] should call it a day [26:44] at this point and resume the story next [26:47] week [26:47] i just want to also uh add in that for [26:50] the dedicated viewers who do [26:53] who do watch these videos and have been [26:55] gaining from them [26:57] a lot of the people who watch these are [26:59] part of [27:00] groups sometimes church groups sometimes [27:02] just [27:03] local groups in their town of people who [27:06] are supportive of israel and concerned [27:08] about these things [27:09] and if any of you who are watching are [27:10] interested in [27:12] doing a live zoom briefing [27:16] a talk with elliott or something with [27:18] myself just be in touch with us [27:20] we are more than we're more than happy [27:22] to do that [27:23] so i know that there are people for [27:25] example we have friends in south dakota [27:27] who watch these and they [27:28] and you have a group and they they're [27:30] part of a group there the interfaith [27:32] friends of israel if you're interested [27:34] in a briefing be in touch with us or the [27:36] people who are in texas [27:37] in your various groups who are there who [27:38] are watching us if you want to have [27:40] elliott [27:41] on you know live and get a group [27:44] together get a zoom meeting together [27:46] where this is what we want to be doing [27:47] we want to be spreading more [27:49] more information more knowledge more [27:51] truth at this time [27:53] and uh you know don't just uh don't just [27:56] be satisfied with watching these once a [27:57] week get us more involved [27:59] and we're more than happy to share these [28:00] messages and share this information [28:03] more and more widely so thank you very [28:05] much for watching again and please [28:07] share this tell people about it send us [28:10] your questions and comments [28:11] you can email either elliott showdown [28:14] gmail.com or paceoffwelickygmail.com or [28:17] just put a comment in the facebook [28:19] post or on the youtube post of the video [28:22] and we'll we will respond we'll be more [28:24] than happy to respond to those comments [28:26] and questions [28:27] god bless all of you and thank you for [28:28] watching we'll see you again next week [28:30] on israel matters
In this episode, Rabbi Wolicki shares an insight about the moon as a traditional symbol of the people of Israel. Then, Security and Defense expert Elliot Chodoff uses the history and current situation on the Israel - Lebanon border to explain the delicate dance of deterrence and posturing that Hizbollah engages in with Israel. The good news is that the bad guys are getting weaker!
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