Videos > Israel Matters #14: The 2006 War with Hezbollah Part #1 Israel Matters #14: The 2006 War with Hezbollah Part #1 Pesach Wolicki 218 views • 6 likes 6 years ago • 37:07 min
Transcript [00:00] hello everyone welcome back to israel [00:01] matters once again [00:03] i'm rabbi pesach wiliki and with me is [00:06] defense [00:06] strategy military history expert [00:10] uh elliot shodhoff how you doing elliott [00:12] good how are you pesach [00:14] i'm doing well i'm doing well we have a [00:16] lot to talk about today continuing our [00:18] in-depth [00:19] uh history lesson about how we got to [00:22] where we are today [00:23] we got some wonderful feedback from the [00:25] last episode and i'll be sharing a [00:27] little bit of that but before we get to [00:28] that [00:29] as always or as usual i would like to [00:31] share a biblical insight [00:33] and this one i think will be especially [00:34] meaningful to our christian viewers [00:38] not all our viewers are christian but a [00:40] fair number of our viewers are christian [00:43] but to our jewish viewers as well it [00:44] should matter this is isaiah chapter 2 [00:47] verse 2 it shall be at the end of days [00:51] that the mountain of the house of the [00:53] lord will be established [00:55] at the top of the mountains and will be [00:57] elevated above the hills [00:59] and the nations will stream to it now [01:01] the [01:02] verses that follow this also talk more [01:04] about this [01:05] this mass pilgrimage of people from the [01:09] nations of the world [01:10] to jerusalem and to israel at the end [01:13] at the end times and they are all coming [01:15] to serve god to worship god [01:17] and this is very important the prophecy [01:19] it's repeated by other prophets as well [01:22] and as we know this is the first time in [01:24] history that there is [01:25] a mass pilgrimage of people from all the [01:28] nations of the world [01:29] coming to jerusalem to worship the god [01:31] of israel [01:32] so this is obviously talking about the [01:34] time period that we live in this has [01:35] never happened at any other time [01:38] and i wanted to focus on the word stream [01:41] that the verb used to describe this mass [01:44] pilgrimage in this particular verse in [01:46] hebrew is vinaharu [01:49] which means to stream which it's an [01:51] interesting verb because really what it [01:52] is [01:53] and in hebrew you can do this you can do [01:54] it in english too [01:56] but in hebrew it's very easy to do [01:58] within the rules of the language where [01:59] you take a noun [02:00] and turn it into a verb and the verb [02:04] just describes the activity of the noun [02:06] so [02:07] the word is nahar and that's the word [02:09] for river throughout the bible right [02:11] right from the beginning in genesis [02:12] where it talks about the rivers [02:15] flowing from eden they're all called [02:17] nahar [02:18] and this is a verb form of the word [02:20] river right or stream [02:22] so to stream to it literally to river to [02:25] it to flow [02:26] like a river more than like a stream [02:28] it's really not a brook [02:29] right yeah so [02:33] the description of the nations all [02:35] coming on mass to jerusalem [02:37] at the end times and using this verb to [02:40] stream i found interesting because [02:42] there's [02:42] many scenes in the bible or just or [02:45] prophecies in the bible that describe [02:47] masses of people gathering somewhere [02:49] happens all the time [02:51] and this is not a normal verb this is [02:54] not a conventional verb it could have [02:55] said they will gather or they will [02:57] travel it could have used a much more [02:59] conventional term [03:00] and the term to stream struck me that it [03:03] has [03:04] you know and here i'm not going too deep [03:06] just a very basic understanding of the [03:08] symbolism [03:11] water flows naturally water is not even [03:14] alive it's not animate [03:16] it just flows naturally and it never [03:19] stops [03:20] if there's a river flowing it's flowing [03:23] in the middle of the night [03:24] it's flowing early in the morning it's [03:25] 24 7. it's every day of the year [03:28] rivers flow in perpetuity [03:32] and again unconsciously i mean it's [03:35] beyond unconscious they're not even [03:37] animate [03:38] and i thought that that's part of the [03:39] image here that it's not just describing [03:42] masses of [03:43] of people mass masses of members of the [03:45] nations who are coming to jerusalem [03:48] but they're doing so it's not even [03:50] really a decision [03:52] it's a draw they're they're streaming [03:54] there they're [03:55] they're drawn by it it's almost like by [03:57] a gravitational [03:58] force that they're just drawn there [04:01] naturally [04:02] and it's also describing that this will [04:04] be a perpetual state of affairs this [04:06] will be an [04:06] unceasing flow in the way that a river [04:09] flows so i think that those two elements [04:12] of this of this image of the flowing of [04:16] a river that again [04:18] that it is a natural draw [04:21] and that it is in perpetuity are really [04:26] they give us a little more texture and a [04:28] little more depth to the image [04:30] and it's also very true to the [04:31] experience that i know elliot you and i [04:33] have both had a lot of interaction [04:35] with christian zionists and christian [04:37] pilgrims to israel [04:39] and we find that when when we talk to [04:41] them about [04:42] why they came to israel why are you [04:44] visiting israel [04:46] they talk about it as though it's just [04:48] the most natural thing that they were [04:50] drawn that it wasn't [04:51] you know it's it's kind of instinctive [04:54] and this to me is encap is captured [04:57] by this word naharu that they flow there [05:01] in a kind of natural way [05:03] so i just wanted to share that little [05:04] nuance from [05:06] can i add a twist to that that occurs to [05:09] me [05:10] rivers flow downhill by the by nature of [05:13] gravity [05:15] here we're talking about rivers going [05:17] uphill [05:19] by the nature of a spiritual gravity [05:22] ah that's true because jerusalem is a [05:24] high up place it says to the high [05:26] mountains right [05:26] that's true and rivers don't flow [05:28] towards jerusalem because [05:30] jerusalem is pretty much higher than [05:31] almost everything around it exactly wow [05:33] that's a cool idea so the nation's [05:36] flowing to jerusalem they're streaming [05:38] they're being drawn by this again the [05:40] gravitational force of the higher power [05:42] that's beautiful [05:43] oh cool nice all right right now i'd [05:46] like to share [05:46] an email that we got from one of our [05:48] viewers [05:50] uh and in this email he asks a question [05:52] about episode 13. [05:54] and i'm going to put that question to [05:56] you and elliot maybe [05:58] when you answer the question you can [06:00] then use that as a jumping off point to [06:01] get us back into our discussion because [06:03] it's very absolutely [06:04] here's what he writes uh and his name is [06:06] uh josh [06:08] he's a 20 year old student at american [06:10] university studying foreign relations [06:12] and national security [06:14] my kind of guy yeah and apparently he [06:17] met you once in one of his [06:18] one of his trips to israel and he writes [06:21] quote i'm a big fan of the series i [06:23] think that the logical way that you both [06:25] describe the incentives and pressures [06:28] upon leaders and states [06:29] goes deeper than the usual analysis from [06:32] westerners [06:33] inwards on the region this is one of the [06:35] reasons that i'm such a big fan [06:37] my only wishes for longer episodes sorry [06:40] josh [06:40] that's a you know that's a that's a [06:43] double-edged sword there's a lot of [06:44] viewers who uh [06:45] who we would uh don't want longer [06:47] episodes and we're going to keep it the [06:48] way we are [06:50] but i appreciate that i have a question [06:52] quote i have a question [06:53] regarding episode 13 josh writes elliot [06:57] you explained that nasrallah is in a [06:59] tight bind [07:00] because he promised reprisal for any [07:03] killing of hezbollah operatives [07:05] and since it happened last month he's [07:07] under pressure to execute a successful [07:09] attack on israel in some form [07:12] that was what we discussed last night [07:14] correct eliot you suggested that such an [07:16] attack [07:17] might take the form of a border raid to [07:20] blow up a tank or kill a few soldiers [07:23] obviously israel is aware of this [07:26] strategic game [07:27] you said yourself that this situation [07:29] could be dangerous [07:30] because nasrallah needs to claim some [07:33] sort of victory [07:35] it seems like until nasrallah won't stop [07:38] ordering small attacks until he gets a [07:40] win [07:42] and until then idf soldiers lives are in [07:44] acute danger [07:46] right in in other words what he's saying [07:48] is nasrallah has to get away he's going [07:50] to keep trying [07:51] he's got to keep hammering he's got to [07:53] keep firing in all directions up here [07:55] until he gets something that he could [07:57] that he could uh [07:58] wave in front of his his followers and [08:00] the media as a success [08:03] i uh josh continues i know that the odds [08:06] of a border raid [08:07] actually killing someone are low but [08:10] they aren't [08:11] nothing not to mention the killing that [08:14] killing of soldiers could lead to an [08:16] escalation [08:17] so why doesn't israel just lob nasrallah [08:20] a softball [08:21] that will take the pressure off him and [08:24] also [08:25] will make the soldiers safer i'm [08:27] thinking an observation post without [08:29] soldiers near hardove [08:31] or maybe an unmanned vehicle allowing [08:34] hezbollah to shoot a rocket at something [08:36] that doesn't have humans in it [08:38] might seem to me like it would be [08:40] beneficial to both sides here meaning [08:42] allow him to claim victory over [08:44] something that we don't really care [08:45] about [08:46] i would love for you to weigh in on this [08:48] and tell me where i miscalculated [08:52] so first of all um thanks for the [08:54] question [08:56] uh you haven't miscalculated as a matter [08:58] of fact this week [09:00] chris bella posted a video [09:03] showing israeli soldier dummies in other [09:06] words mannequins dressed as israeli [09:08] soldiers [09:10] in certain positions apparently trying [09:12] to do just that [09:14] uh we also did it in the past there was [09:17] a hizballah attack that we [09:19] kind of set up for them to hit an empty [09:22] outpost and empty vehicles but was the [09:25] goal of those [09:26] what josh is suggesting it was close [09:30] in other words we knew an attack was [09:31] coming let's go say this [09:33] the the one that happened in the past we [09:35] knew the attack was coming to this [09:36] particular place [09:38] and we just let them hit an empty [09:41] empty outpost and with with missiles [09:44] um and it was in a place that was not [09:46] near any population so it was a [09:48] it was a very controlled sort of event [09:51] and did it have the result that [09:52] josh is describing where nasrallah then [09:54] declared victory [09:56] yes and no and here's here's the catch [09:59] we being israelis uh and and [10:02] i say that sort of cynically but also [10:05] because [10:06] of what israel is that we have we can't [10:08] keep stuff [10:09] that secret because too many people know [10:12] too many secrets [10:14] um we were very quick to [10:18] publicize how how we got you [10:21] so we took a lot of the um the joy of [10:24] victory [10:26] out of it we we basically made him look [10:28] like an idiot which defeats the purpose [10:30] which defeats the purpose now that's [10:33] almost built in and this [10:35] this is maybe the flaw in the in the [10:37] strategy [10:39] uh look if there's an attack on one of [10:43] our outposts [10:44] we must announce clearly [10:47] whether anybody was there or not [10:50] i mean that's just that's the nature of [10:52] israel that's not something that [10:54] can be kept a secret and the idea that [10:56] there were vehicles there [10:57] without anybody there is is a very quick [11:01] recipe to the story getting out [11:02] that the whole thing was a setup so [11:06] the fact that they publicized this week [11:09] that we had dummies in an outpost [11:13] means that they will they for whatever [11:15] reason [11:16] will not be satisfied with that kind of [11:18] an attack [11:20] there's an added call it a downside [11:24] to allowing them to do something like [11:26] this and i'll uh i'll start with with [11:28] an elliot an elliott law and that is [11:31] that any strategy whether it's military [11:33] political [11:34] or whatever the more it looks like a [11:37] rube goldberg [11:39] you know contraption the more likely [11:42] it'll fail somewhere along the way [11:47] okay which is the basic rule of kiss [11:49] keep it simple stupid [11:51] uh every every step that leads to [11:54] another step [11:56] and of course with rube goldberg it's [11:57] all inevitable in the in the real world [12:00] every one of those steps has other [12:02] alternatives that can take you off in a [12:04] different direction [12:05] so to leave it out there just like that [12:08] and say okay we [12:10] it it will suffice and we'll sort of [12:12] wink at you and you'll sort of wink at [12:13] us [12:14] today that's not going to work social [12:16] media is too [12:18] too strong on that uh [12:21] transparency openness too strong on that [12:24] he's got to declare something more than [12:27] a hollow i fired a couple of missiles [12:31] they've done that already [12:34] and they missed so hitting something [12:37] empty and missing are pretty much the [12:39] same [12:39] so is josh correct in saying that the [12:42] lack of success [12:44] at a retaliatory strike by nasrallah [12:49] could lead to an escalation because he [12:51] has to keep trying [12:52] yes we we talked about this look there's [12:54] a basic rule and it's not mine it goes [12:56] back [12:57] centuries but most commonly quoted [13:01] was uh chief of the german general staff [13:03] in in the 19th century von mulke uh [13:06] no no plan survives the first contact [13:09] with the enemy [13:10] in other words once the shooting starts [13:12] this idea you know going back to the [13:14] rule goldberg [13:15] the idea of this will lead to this will [13:17] lead to this will lead to this [13:19] doesn't work that way a stray round a [13:22] missed shot [13:23] um even with precision weapons we've [13:28] seen it we [13:28] we had a missile a few weeks ago that we [13:31] fired at gaza we [13:32] fired at gaza and it landed in the [13:34] kibbutz in israel [13:36] um happens [13:39] doesn't happen often but it happens and [13:43] every time one of these events occurs [13:45] there's always a chance [13:47] that it will lead to inadvertent [13:50] escalation [13:52] and i use the word inadvertent rather [13:53] than um than [13:55] unintentional escalation is always [13:57] intentional it's just not always [13:58] the intent to escalate in other words [14:01] the decisions are intentional they're [14:02] not accidental [14:04] but inadvertent in the sense [14:07] that neither side woke up that morning [14:09] looking to start a war [14:12] and that's always a possibility [14:15] it's very very hard to uh [14:18] to anticipate that sort of thing i think [14:21] that actually segues [14:22] well into what i wanted to talk about [14:25] today which is the war in 2006 [14:27] because nobody woke up that morning [14:30] looking to start a war [14:33] yeah this takes us back to where we left [14:34] off last time exactly [14:36] okay now just just a few [14:39] words of preface to it through that year [14:42] to i mentioned this last time starting [14:45] in the fall of 05 and all through the [14:47] year of 06 [14:48] uh hezbollah was taking a beating along [14:50] the border now when i say a beating i [14:52] mean [14:52] they were launching all sorts of [14:53] operations that were that were being [14:55] thwarted [14:56] because we had moved frontline infantry [14:58] units the [14:59] paratrooper brigade and the golani [15:01] infantry brigade [15:02] up to the lebanese border and all of a [15:04] sudden they were not they were not [15:06] facing [15:07] the troops who very good good guys [15:11] but who were not trained in [15:14] high-level infantry operations ten crews [15:17] that were pressed into infantry [15:18] engineer units and the like [15:23] they became more and more intent [15:27] on a successful operation and we knew [15:29] that it included trying to grab [15:31] soldiers and here i want to make very [15:34] clear i don't use the word kidnapped i [15:36] think we talked about this already i'll [15:37] say it again [15:38] soldiers serving in the line are not [15:39] kidnapped they're captured [15:43] but still captured is captured and this [15:44] is an operation and it's an act of war [15:47] and and all of that and we knew it we [15:50] saw [15:50] we saw these things coming we saw them [15:52] in may we saw them in june [15:56] for the previous number of years [16:00] this scenario had been played out [16:04] in our war games in other words this was [16:07] not [16:08] news this was not surprise and [16:11] by the early summer of 2006 [16:15] we had gotten it down to the point where [16:17] in june [16:19] we had a war game in the north [16:23] that was so accurately predictive of [16:26] what actually happened [16:28] in the war in terms of what they did [16:32] that when the war broke out during the [16:34] first week [16:35] we were joking that nasrallah must have [16:38] gotten his hands on the war game [16:39] and using it as his plan for the [16:41] scenario [16:45] it was that that accurate [16:51] on that morning and here i'll tell you [16:53] uh [16:54] sort of an interesting aside when you [16:56] live through historical events when you [16:57] participate in them [16:59] you don't remember the date you remember [17:00] the days of the week [17:04] so i know it's july something but it was [17:06] a wednesday [17:10] uh wednesday morning they launched the [17:12] attack i was actually giving a lecture [17:14] to a group [17:14] near the dead sea totally [17:18] it was just another wednesday and i got [17:21] a [17:21] an sms and i said to the group listen [17:24] i'm sorry i have to make a phone call i [17:26] think a war has just broken out [17:28] and they looked at me like i was i'm [17:30] sorry i'm serious i called him [17:32] sure enough and this was the very very [17:34] this was like 10 o'clock in the morning [17:35] very very beginning of it can i ask who [17:38] the call was from [17:39] from the army the sms was from the army [17:42] and i called my units just to check in [17:45] where are you and [17:46] how soon how quickly i'll come back to [17:48] that because [17:49] part of the story of the war is that [17:52] while nasrallah played according to the [17:53] war game of june [17:55] we didn't [17:58] and that was one of our failings [18:04] they had sent this is we know in [18:05] retrospect they sent [18:07] a large group of fighters across the [18:10] border [18:12] they were waiting in ambush [18:15] two vehicles of a reserve unit that was [18:18] on its last day of duty and they know [18:20] that too [18:21] they keep track it's not that difficult [18:23] they know when [18:24] new units are coming in when units are [18:26] going out it's observable [18:28] reserve units when they start packing up [18:31] you know they're packing up [18:34] last patrol of the duty [18:39] they didn't follow procedures precisely [18:42] the two vehicles were too close to each [18:44] other [18:44] and they were attacked these are things [18:47] that we know [18:49] we also knew pretty quickly that both [18:51] soldiers whose bodies were taken [18:54] goldwasser and regev were killed on the [18:56] spot [19:00] and due to a whole bunch of operational [19:04] mess-ups at that point and a lot of it [19:06] had to do with complacency [19:08] being lackadaisical and that's part of [19:10] what happens when you're in the line [19:12] um i say that critically [19:15] but after three weeks you get bored [19:18] and you get sloppy and sloppy gets gets [19:21] people killed [19:22] and that's not not about these [19:24] particular guys it's [19:25] it's a general rule uh a tank was sent [19:28] after them the tank [19:30] followed a predicted path it went over [19:33] a what could euphemistically be called [19:36] an improvised explosive device it was [19:38] about a ton of explosives [19:40] blew up underneath it killed the four [19:42] guys in the tank [19:44] and the israeli government made what i [19:46] thought was a good decision [19:48] and that is enough is enough we're going [19:49] to go to war with these guys [19:51] that was possibly the last good decision [19:54] the government made for the next five [19:55] weeks [19:58] now [20:02] as i said there was a plan there was an [20:04] order [20:05] uh if i if we were talking now 15 years [20:08] ago [20:09] i wouldn't be able to tell you i can [20:10] tell you now it was called [20:14] defend the land or shield of the land [20:18] uh and it was a detailed operational [20:21] plan of what to do under these [20:22] circumstances [20:25] the chief of staff at the time general [20:27] don khaled [20:28] had been commander of the air force and [20:31] he made a decision that morning [20:34] that the war was going to be won from [20:36] the air [20:38] and he basically never [20:41] initiated the operational plan that had [20:44] been [20:45] prepared and practiced for years [20:49] now on the one hand i can appreciate [20:54] an air force guy wanting to win the war [20:56] from the air [20:57] as a matter of fact it's never been done [20:59] this would be a nice time [21:00] to try and i can tell you that [21:03] as somebody in the ground forces and who [21:06] hangs out mostly with ground forces [21:07] people [21:09] we love the idea of winning the war from [21:10] the air [21:12] we think it's a terrific idea it means [21:14] that we can either stay [21:16] home or sit back on the base and drink [21:18] coffee [21:19] and let those [21:22] wonderful amazing guys in their flying [21:25] machines take care of it i hear some [21:26] planes going on [21:27] going overhead now on cue above my house [21:33] the problem is it doesn't work now as [21:36] far as i'm concerned [21:38] at that point he had not yet [21:41] made a critically failed decision [21:45] but he was about to because what he [21:48] didn't do what he [21:49] should have done this is wednesday [21:51] wednesday afternoon [21:53] is that he should have called in the [21:55] heads of the ground forces [21:58] and the commander of northern command [22:00] and said to them essentially this [22:03] gentleman we're going to win this war in [22:06] three days from the air [22:08] but just in case we don't [22:13] on friday early afternoon [22:16] we're all going to meet here in my [22:18] office and [22:20] in my opinion it's going to be to raise [22:23] a toast [22:24] to shabbat and victory [22:28] but if not you are going to present [22:32] the fully updated operational plan for a [22:35] ground offensive [22:36] that will begin next week [22:41] he didn't do that and that was the [22:43] failure [22:45] the air force performed brilliantly and [22:48] the ground forces officer pains me to [22:50] say that [22:50] but brilliantly they had what was called [22:53] a [22:54] bank of targets in other words a list of [22:56] critical targets that everybody had [22:58] calculated [22:58] that if you knock out all of these [23:00] targets collapses [23:03] and within 48 hours the bank was [23:06] destroyed in other words every [23:08] every target on the list was destroyed [23:11] and rockets increased [23:14] and at this point what [23:18] should have happened didn't and what did [23:21] happen [23:22] was very human but still very wrong what [23:24] do you do [23:25] if you're convinced that you can win the [23:27] war from the air [23:28] and all you need to do is knock out this [23:30] list of targets [23:32] and you knock out the list and the war [23:33] isn't over [23:35] put up put together a new list [23:39] i guess if you've if you've already corn [23:42] if you've already painted yourself into [23:44] the corner that the only way you're [23:46] going to [23:47] win the war is from the air and that's [23:48] your only option then that's what you do [23:51] right well the the perspective is i was [23:54] right [23:55] i just didn't hit hard enough [23:58] right whatever if force doesn't work use [24:02] more force [24:04] and and just pound them that much more [24:06] and they will collapse [24:07] and the more targets that got destroyed [24:10] the more rockets were being fired elliot [24:13] let me interject the question here just [24:14] to kind of [24:15] as i'm not a military man okay i'm just [24:18] digesting everything you're saying [24:20] when someone says like even though [24:22] there's a war game battle plan [24:24] that that has been that has been [24:26] practiced and [24:28] and uh you know it includes this this [24:31] the ground forces and then when the [24:33] when the chief of staff says no no we're [24:35] not going with that we're going to win [24:36] it from the air [24:38] isn't there it sounds to me again as [24:41] someone who thinks more politically and [24:42] less militarily [24:44] it sounds to me like what he's saying is [24:45] you know [24:47] we're going to go to war but we don't [24:49] really want to go to war [24:51] that's right therefore what we're going [24:52] to do is we're going to do this in the [24:53] way that produces the least amount of [24:55] casualties as possible [24:57] and we'll just do everything from the [24:59] air and you know we don't really want to [25:00] conquer territory anyway [25:02] so we're kind of going to war but we can [25:05] do that we can win this war without [25:07] really going to war [25:08] that's what it sounds like to me we're [25:09] going to do it on the cheap [25:12] is that an accurate assessment what i'm [25:14] saying that's perfect a perfectly [25:15] accurate assessment as a matter of fact [25:16] there was a congressman whose name [25:17] escapes me at the moment [25:19] who said something very similar to [25:21] general patton in the summer of 1944. [25:24] he was visiting the front and he said [25:25] you know general this is going to be the [25:28] last war that's fought with people [25:30] from now on it's all going to be [25:31] technology [25:33] and patton in his usual flowery language [25:36] which i'll [25:38] censor down slightly [25:41] turned to him and said you know it's [25:43] slbs like you that have been getting [25:44] soldiers killed [25:45] ever since there's been warfare [25:47] [Laughter] [25:51] okay the idea that you can do it cheaply [25:54] is a recurring it's an understandably [25:58] and that's why i say before it's [25:59] understandable it was an understandably [26:01] recurring theme that never works [26:08] and so an important question yes sorry [26:10] to cut you off again important [26:11] question in the great historian [26:14] barbara tuchman uh in her book the march [26:17] of folly [26:18] yes she she defines folly [26:22] as when not anything that that ends up [26:25] failing [26:26] is not necessarily folly because there's [26:28] all kinds of things that can happen but [26:29] she defines folly [26:31] as when a decision is made by a leader [26:33] and at the time [26:35] there was prevailing wisdom that was [26:37] expressed [26:38] that said this is the wrong move and [26:40] they do it anyway [26:43] were there naysayers who looked at [26:45] hallows in the eye and said this is the [26:47] wrong [26:47] move okay so the answer first of all the [26:50] answer to questions no but i'll [26:51] let me come back to that a moment [26:52] there's another component to folly that [26:54] she puts in that's very important [26:56] and that is that it's a policy that [26:59] follows over [27:00] a number of successive generations of [27:02] leadership [27:04] in other words folly is not just a bad [27:06] decision [27:07] it's a it's a long-standing bad policy [27:10] so vietnam was folly because it went [27:14] essentially from eisenhower but through [27:17] kennedy johnson and nixon [27:19] or the peace process with the [27:20] palestinians fair enough for example in [27:22] other words it's already [27:23] i mean we're already how many we're [27:25] about that's right okay we're almost 30 [27:26] years in [27:27] that's right okay so that [27:30] that's the the call of the call of the [27:33] tuckman [27:34] version of einstein's definition of [27:36] insanity [27:37] which is doing the same thing over and [27:39] over again expecting different results [27:42] here he had a different combination and [27:44] and i [27:45] it doesn't in that sense doesn't fall [27:48] into her [27:49] folly definition it's almost the inverse [27:51] of her folly definition [27:52] and that is how did we get to where we [27:55] were [27:56] that there was nobody to call khaluts [28:01] to task on this and the answer is [28:03] because there was a prime minister [28:05] who had virtually no military experience [28:09] a defense minister who had even less [28:11] military experience than the prime [28:12] minister [28:14] so the only guy in in the triumvirate of [28:17] real decision making who knew anything [28:19] was the air force guy of a military that [28:22] is primarily a ground forces military [28:25] and how did that happen is a an [28:28] interesting [28:28] sequence of events that's germane to all [28:30] of this and i'm glad you asked the [28:31] question because [28:32] i wanted to get to this was appointed by [28:36] ariel sharon [28:39] when ariel sharon was prime minister his [28:41] defense minister was shalom [28:45] now ariel sharon you can like him you [28:48] cannot like him you can like his [28:50] policies you could not like his policies [28:52] ariel sharon was a world-class military [28:56] genius [28:58] nothing you can do about it he was on a [29:00] historic level yeah [29:01] yeah world-class historic level okay [29:05] uh and he knew it as most geniuses do [29:10] show um fuzz was a former chief of staff [29:12] he had been a paratrooper [29:14] in other words a ground forces officer [29:17] okay uh so both of them with a great [29:20] deal of ground force experience sharon [29:22] starting out in special forces [29:24] paratroops ultimately becoming [29:26] one of the great armored commanders as [29:28] well [29:29] uh in in 1973 [29:33] and as i said mufas ultimately chief of [29:35] staff in other words [29:36] a guy two two men two generals [29:40] with a huge amount of ground forces [29:44] fighting experience and i don't know [29:47] this for sure but i can guess [29:49] uh and i've studied chevron a bit he [29:51] probably thought to himself i don't [29:54] need another ground forces general at [29:56] the table [29:59] we've got all all we need of that very [30:01] interesting speculation that's [30:03] that's actually that's a very [30:04] interesting speculation [30:06] uh where i really don't have [30:09] knowledge is air force now the navy has [30:12] its own [30:13] sort of sphere but the the air force [30:15] ground force [30:16] sort of interactive connection is [30:18] critical [30:19] and my guess is and it's it's an [30:21] educated guess but it's a guess [30:23] that he said you know what this guy [30:26] will give us something that we don't [30:29] have at the table [30:32] and if khalooz had come to sharon [30:35] in other words that sharon been prime [30:36] minister and said hey eric i'm going to [30:38] win the war from the air [30:40] sharon would've said have a seat have [30:42] some more coffee [30:43] we'll get to you when we need you [30:47] the problem with the almart's [30:50] parrots triumvirate [30:55] is that a they had no knowledge [30:56] whatsoever in other words this was the [30:58] only professional among the three of [30:59] them [31:02] and parrots in particular [31:07] was incapable as defense minister [31:11] and here i should just mention to our [31:12] american audiences the israeli prime [31:14] minister is not the commander-in-chief [31:16] as the american president is [31:20] okay the orders to the military go [31:23] through the minister of defense [31:25] so the the civilian position [31:28] that commands the military is the [31:31] defense minister [31:32] not the prime minister [31:35] and here you have a defense minister who [31:37] was incapable [31:40] of calling these people to order he [31:43] asked some [31:43] interesting questions along the way [31:45] apparently and i from reading from [31:47] reports [31:48] but he accepted whatever answer they [31:49] gave him because he wasn't in a position [31:51] to [31:52] to do otherwise and again that that [31:56] very enticing and [31:59] is a very bright guy he's very [32:01] articulate he's sharp [32:03] um i'm sure he made a very convincing [32:07] argument [32:08] listen we're going to go in we're going [32:09] to beat him up for three days [32:11] and it's going to be over by shabbat [32:14] and they said wow great and i mean he [32:17] commanded the air force who should know [32:18] better [32:20] and there we are you could also see the [32:22] argument being made [32:23] israel's greatest advantage [32:27] was in the air correct she's like let's [32:30] just play to our strength [32:32] right except that you've got to play to [32:33] your strength against [32:36] your target right okay [32:39] and against a quasi-gorilla [32:43] light infantry force the air force [32:46] is the least suited [32:51] for for victory critical victory [32:55] they are suited to they can inflict [32:57] damage and they can [32:59] as i said they did they took they took [33:01] out 50 [33:02] of the rocket capability within 24 hours [33:05] they did tremendous a tremendous job of [33:08] taking out targets [33:10] okay the problem is that an f-16 isn't [33:13] terribly effective against [33:14] an infantry squad that's properly [33:17] scattered and [33:18] dug in right [33:21] it's kind of like using a sledgehammer [33:23] against the mosquito [33:28] and the rockets keep coming [33:31] now at the same time we're convinced [33:33] there's going to be victory here i'll [33:34] just tell you my personal story [33:35] that wednesday i didn't get called up [33:39] on thursday i called the army and said [33:41] no what's the story [33:43] they said no we've decided not to call [33:44] up reserves now calling up reserves was [33:46] integral to the original plan [33:50] i said okay so what does that mean well [33:51] we're not calling up reserves [33:53] okay thursday at about seven o'clock in [33:56] the evening [33:57] i get a call come quickly [34:02] so get into uniform my stuff is already [34:04] ready zip over to my base [34:06] where i meet my immediate commander very [34:08] close to this day dear friend [34:11] um and i s he's walking and also i say [34:14] all right you're great they called us up [34:16] who else is coming he said nobody i said [34:17] what do you mean nobody he's no they [34:18] just called up you and me i found [34:20] out later that he convinced them to call [34:22] up the two of us [34:23] so there would at least be somebody [34:25] there to like man the phones [34:29] we got to our war room it was locked [34:31] nobody had the key i kicked in the door [34:33] and that's how we began the war thursday [34:35] night [34:37] on friday around noon they sent us home [34:40] the war was over [34:43] and on saturday the north got blasted by [34:46] a massive barrage of katushas [34:50] and at 11 o'clock saturday morning i was [34:51] back on my car back on my way to the [34:53] army [34:54] and through that personal story you can [34:56] get an idea [34:57] of how little is understood [35:00] on the higher levels of what was going [35:03] on [35:04] and at the same time how confident [35:05] overconfident they were [35:07] that it was all going to be over in a [35:08] couple of days wow elliot [35:10] you know this is it it'll be a bit of a [35:12] cliffhanger but i think we should stop [35:14] here and pick up the story [35:16] at this point because this is a war yes [35:18] we've just had [35:19] the beginning what went wrong in the [35:21] beginning and [35:22] i also want to end on a note that that [35:25] when [35:25] we go back to the question that are [35:29] that our friend josh asked [35:32] it sounds like the way this started [35:34] where there's all these little [35:35] skirmishes and nasral is not being [35:37] successful in the skirmishes and he [35:38] keeps trying and keeps trying and that [35:40] leads to the escalation [35:42] there is at least in potential a serious [35:45] parallel [35:46] yes what's going on now and the and the [35:48] fear that this could escalate to that [35:50] same point [35:51] so let's leave it on that note we will [35:53] resume next week where we left off [35:58] one one teaser for next week when the [36:00] war is over [36:01] nasrallah said if i had known that had [36:03] been was going to be the response i [36:04] never would have done it in the first [36:05] place [36:08] which is interesting okay so we'll come [36:10] back to that as well because [36:13] that's part of the ongoing story elliot [36:14] once again thank you so much and thank [36:16] you to all of you [36:17] folks our viewership is growing and it's [36:20] thanks to you for obviously spreading [36:22] the word and sharing it around please [36:24] continue to do so [36:25] i know that you who are viewing it know [36:27] how valuable these videos are [36:29] and i will restate feel free to email us [36:32] elliott showdown gmail.com [36:34] elliott.shoutout for elliott showed up [36:36] on gmail it doesn't matter if you [36:37] include the period [36:39] uh or my name pesachwiki gmail.com or [36:41] find us on facebook [36:43] and if any of you would like to schedule [36:46] for a [36:47] for a group that you have whether it's [36:49] at school josh or whether [36:50] it's at a group that you have at your [36:52] synagogue or church [36:54] or just a group of people who are [36:55] concerned about israel if you'd like to [36:56] have [36:57] your own briefing please be in touch [36:59] with us and we'll be happy to [37:00] accommodate [37:01] god bless everyone and let's remember to [37:03] keep praying for israel
Rabbi Pesach Wolicki opens with a Biblical message from Isaiah 2. Elliot responds to a viewer's question and proceeds to take us back to the summer of 2006. Why did Hezbollah's attacks escalate into a war? Why didn't Israel stick with their original battle plan? Elliot draws on his personal involvement in the events to shed light on this important chain of events - events that may foreshadow what is happening right now on Israel's northern border.
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