Transcript [00:00] I want to read you a news item that came [00:02] out this week and then explain why it [00:05] tells a much bigger and frankly more [00:07] embarrassing story than it appears on [00:09] the surface. I'm just going to read [00:10] through the article. Bear with me to the [00:12] end. I'll explain everything and uh and [00:15] then yeah, I've got a a fair amount to [00:18] say about it. Let's just say that. All [00:20] right. Here is the article. [00:24] Um, yeah. Saudi Arabia pressures Trump [00:28] to scale back war on Iran. Saudi Arabia [00:32] is pressing the United States to scale [00:34] back to scale back its war in the Middle [00:36] East, fearing Iran could retaliate by [00:39] blockading the Red Sea and paralyzing [00:41] the kingdom's economy. Muhammad bin [00:43] Salman, the Saudi crown prince, wants [00:45] Donald Trump to lift his naval [00:47] quarantine, the blockade of Iranian [00:50] ports on the Persian Gulf and return to [00:52] negotiations. Gulf diplomats say the [00:54] Saudi lobbying reflects concerns in Riad [00:58] that Tehran would retaliate against the [01:00] US blockade by instructing the Houthi [01:03] allies in Yemen to seal its Houthi [01:07] allies in Yemen to seal the Babel Mandib [01:09] Strait, a Red Sea choke point through [01:12] which much of the kingdom's oil supplies [01:15] pass. Okay, so this is the Babel Mandib [01:17] Strait. Here's Saudi Arabia. Okay, [01:20] here's Saudi Arabia on the screen. [01:22] Right. This is Saudi Arabia [01:25] and the Baba Mandibra is down here and [01:29] they're worried that with the straight [01:30] of Hormuz closed, they're worried that [01:32] the Houthis are now going to close the [01:34] Baband Strait as well. Okay. The abrupt [01:38] shift by the Arab world's lone Iran [01:41] hawk, first reported by the Wall Street [01:43] Journal and confirmed to the Telegraph [01:44] by two Gulf officials, has emerged amid [01:47] amid growing regional anxiety about Mr. [01:49] Trump's handling of the war. There's the [01:51] Baband up straight. While Gulf states [01:54] had urged the US president not to go to [01:57] war, meaning the other Gulf states, [01:58] Saudi Arabia was in private at least an [02:00] exception. After last June's US air [02:04] strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities, [02:06] the crown prince is said to have [02:07] abandoned his previous restraint, [02:10] concluding that Tehran would only grow [02:13] stronger unless defeated on the [02:15] battlefield. [02:16] He reportedly joined forces with [02:19] Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime [02:21] minister, to seize what they cast as a [02:23] historic opportunity to inflict a [02:25] lasting defeat on Iran [02:28] and reshape the Middle East, a view not [02:30] shared by other Gulf states. Saudi [02:32] Arabia's greater tolerance for risk was [02:34] partly rooted in geography. Unlike its [02:36] neighbors, it has two coastlines, the [02:39] Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. After Iran [02:42] closed the straight of Hormuz, Saudi [02:43] Arabia rerouted much of its crude [02:46] exports from Ras Tanura on the Gulf to [02:49] the Red Sea port of Yanbu via its 750 mi [02:52] eastwest pipeline. In other words, the [02:54] other Gulf states, Bahrain, Qatar, [02:58] Kuwait, Emirates, right? They're all on [03:01] the on the the Straits of Hormuz is [03:04] they're much more dependent on the [03:05] Straits of Hormuz than Saudi Arabia is [03:07] because Saudi Arabia besides this [03:09] coastline also has the coastline on the [03:11] Red Sea. And even though their oil [03:13] fields are all mainly in this part of [03:17] the country, right, all the way on the [03:18] eastern side, that's where they mostly [03:21] are. They built a pipeline that goes all [03:23] the way across to Yanboo. Here's Yanboo [03:25] right here. This is Yanbu. [03:28] Okay, that's Yanbu. Okay, so they built [03:31] a a pipeline across to Yanbu and they [03:35] can get they can get their oil out that [03:37] way. More on that later. Exports are now [03:40] close to their pre-war level of 7 [03:42] million barrels a day, helping steady [03:45] oil prices and shield the kingdom from [03:47] the worst pain felt by the smaller [03:49] neighbors. The economies of Qatar and [03:51] Kuwait are forced to shrink by are [03:54] forecast to shrink by 14% this year, [03:57] while Saudi Arabia still faces still a [04:00] painful but more manageable contraction [04:02] of 3%. Yet that resilience could unravel [04:06] if the Houthis, the Iranbacked militia [04:08] controlling northern Yemen, resume [04:10] attacks on commercial shipping in the [04:12] Red Sea or attempt to control the Babal [04:15] Mandem. Okay, that's what they're [04:16] worried about. So the the Saudis are [04:18] worried about the Houthis disrupting [04:21] shipping, resuming their attacks on [04:23] shipping in the Bab al-Mandde Strait. [04:26] Even a single successful strike could [04:28] deter ship owners from sending tankers [04:30] to Yanbu, potentially triggering turmoil [04:33] in global energy markets. Around 2thirds [04:37] of Saudi crude exports are bound for [04:39] Asian refineries under long-term [04:41] contracts. Rerouting them north via the [04:44] Suez Canal is largely impracticable. [04:47] Super carriers, specifically very large [04:50] crude carriers, sit too deep in the [04:52] water to transit fully laden and [04:54] alternatives could add up to 29 days to [04:57] each journey. Let me explain this [04:59] paragraph very easily, quickly. Okay, [05:01] here's here's here's the way it works. [05:03] So, the Saudis have two ways to get oil [05:06] out. most almost all the oil two-thirds [05:07] of the oil the Saudis produce goes out [05:10] to the Arabian Sea out towards Asia. [05:12] Okay. So one way to get it out there is [05:15] through the straits of Hormuz. Right. So [05:18] that means uh that means that you put it [05:21] that you put it here. It goes through [05:23] the straits of Hormuz. It comes out here [05:25] through the straits of Hormuz and out [05:27] into the Arabian Sea. The other way is [05:28] to send it through the pipeline to Yanbu [05:31] all the way across and then and then the [05:33] tankers fill up here or here really and [05:37] they go down south through the Babamando [05:40] straight and out to the straits of [05:41] Hormuz. Now and then as the article just [05:43] said um moving the oil up through the [05:47] Suez Canal and then and then out through [05:51] the Mediterranean [05:53] and then around the bottom of Africa and [05:56] then out to the Arabian Sea. [05:58] Right? Moving it around this way is [06:00] impractical because number one, the Suez [06:03] Canal is too shallow. The the tankers [06:05] can't travel through there full. And [06:07] also, it would add something like 29 [06:09] days to go all the way around Africa to [06:11] go back out to Asia. Okay, so that's [06:14] that's what that paragraph was about. [06:16] We'll get into all of this in a few [06:18] minutes. How serious the Houthi threat [06:20] is remains unclear. Iran has previously [06:23] hinted it could activate its allies with [06:26] a single signal. But as we've seen, the [06:29] proxies haven't been that active in this [06:31] war. Not not not all of them. That has [06:33] been Iraqi a little a little bit also, [06:37] but the Houthis haven't done a whole [06:38] lot. They've been they've they've poked [06:40] their heads out of the out of the you [06:42] know out of their hole in the ground a [06:43] little bit, but they haven't been that [06:44] active. The Houthis have a history of [06:47] such attacks. Between 2023 and last [06:49] year, they carried out 190 attacks on [06:52] commercial vessels, sinking two and [06:56] capturing a third. Okay, sinking to and [06:59] capturing a third. So, that was their [07:01] big success. Um, but that's enough. [07:04] That's enough to deter shipping. Red Sea [07:06] traffic fell by more than 60%. [07:09] Their firepower has since been degraded [07:11] by hundreds of US and British air [07:13] strikes on missile sites with the Royal [07:15] Navy escorting dozens of vessels through [07:17] the straight under fire. Israeli [07:20] strikes, meanwhile, eliminated much of [07:22] the Houthi high command, including an [07:24] attack last August that killed 12 senior [07:26] figures, among them Ahmed al-Rawi, the [07:29] Houthi prime minister. Even so, some [07:31] analysts believe the group retains cap [07:34] the capability to mount a disruptive [07:36] maritime campaign. But whether it would [07:38] heed a request from Iran is uncertain, [07:40] meaning it's not so clear the Houthis [07:42] would even listen if the Iranians told [07:44] them to start closing the straits of the [07:47] Baba Mandib Strait because they don't [07:48] want to incur the wrath of the [07:50] Americans. That is the view among [07:52] remnants of the Southern Transitional [07:54] Council, the STC. We're going to learn a [07:57] lot more about them soon. a UAE backed [08:00] secessionist movement in southern Yemen. [08:02] For more than a decade, the STC was seen [08:06] as the most effective force countering [08:09] the Houthis on the ground. They weren't [08:10] just seen as, they really were the most [08:12] effective force. But Saudi Arabia, [08:14] backing a rival militia, forced the [08:17] movement to dissolve in January after [08:20] crippling it with air strikes that [08:22] halted an STC offensive in eastern [08:24] Yemen. The decision left a strategic [08:27] void that may be returning to haunt [08:29] Riad. That is correct. The Saudis [08:31] attacked a group that was fighting [08:33] against the Houthis, even though the [08:35] Saudis are also against the Houthis. [08:38] We'll explain everything in a few [08:39] minutes. Stay with me. Senior figures in [08:42] the now largely underground movement, [08:44] the STC, said that while they did not [08:47] know if the Houthis were planning to [08:48] resume attacks, they're almost certainly [08:51] capable of doing so. The STC president, [08:54] Amar Albid, his special representative [08:57] said, quote, "The conditions for a [08:59] resumption of strikes on shipping, [09:01] meaning by the Houthis, are now more [09:03] permissive than at any point since 2023. [09:06] The ground force architecture that [09:08] previously constrained their coastal [09:10] operations has been removed. If they [09:13] were to act, if the Houthis were to act, [09:15] the ability to respond from inside Yemen [09:17] simply does not exist the way it did." [09:20] Whether the crown prince of Saudi [09:22] Arabia, who once preached moderation [09:24] towards Iran in an effort to present the [09:26] Middle East as a beacon of stability, [09:28] now regrets his earlier hawkishness [09:30] remains unclear. Across the region, the [09:33] Gulf States bet on on Mr. Trump appears [09:37] to be souring. Welcoming his return to [09:40] the White House, they ramped up oil [09:41] output. They pledged trillions of [09:43] dollars in US investment. They hosted [09:45] him lavishly. And in Qatar's case, they [09:47] even gave him a luxury Boeing 747 to [09:50] replace Air Force One. Such Laress was [09:52] meant to secure American protection and [09:56] guarantee stability. Instead, some [09:58] officials grumble. Mr. Trump has set the [10:01] Middle East on fire. There will be no [10:03] rupture. The crown prince will not admit [10:06] to buyer's remorse in public, but Saudi [10:08] Arabia's Iran policy is likely to pivot [10:11] towards caution. Officials say the [10:13] kingdom could absorb one blockade, it [10:16] has bocked at a second for fear it might [10:18] trigger a third at a cost too high for [10:22] even the mightiest prostate of them all. [10:25] Okay, that's the article. Now, let me [10:28] explain. [10:30] Okay, so let's pull up the map. Let's [10:32] leave that up here now uh because that [10:34] will be much more [10:37] uh helpful. Okay, let's leave the map up [10:39] there and we'll explain what the heck is [10:43] going on with this situation because [10:45] it's nuts. Here we go. [10:49] Okay, so Saudi Arabia has one of the [10:53] most expensive American equipped [10:56] militaries on the planet and it's [10:58] lobbying Washington to back down to [11:02] deescalate and to negotiate rather than [11:06] doing something about the Houthi threat [11:07] itself. Let me explain. Okay, here's the [11:10] question I want to answer in this video. [11:13] Why? If the Houthis are threatening to [11:16] close a waterway that Saudi Arabia [11:19] depends on for its economic survival, [11:21] why doesn't the kingdom just do [11:22] something about it with all that [11:24] military uh equipment and capability [11:26] they have? The answer involves a decade [11:30] of catastrophic strategic mistakes, a [11:32] falling out with their closest ally, and [11:35] a trap that the Saudis essentially set [11:37] for themselves. Okay, let me walk you [11:40] through the whole thing. First, you need [11:41] to understand the physical geography [11:43] because it's the foundation of [11:44] everything else. Saudi Arabia's oil [11:47] fields are in the east of the country. I [11:49] mentioned that before, the eastern [11:51] province sitting on the Gulf. Now, [11:53] normally tankers load up there and they [11:56] head through the straight of and they [11:58] head through the straight of Hormuz. [12:00] Okay? [12:02] So, they load up here and they head out. [12:05] They load up in the Sa on the east coast [12:07] of Saudi Arabia and they head out [12:08] through the straits of Hormuz. That is [12:09] the usual route that they take, okay, [12:14] into the open ocean, right? And that [12:16] takes them out to Asia. But Saudi Arabia [12:18] also has a second route that's a [12:19] transparen pipeline that carries oil [12:22] westward all the way across the Arabian [12:25] desert to a port called Yanbu on the Red [12:28] Sea coast. So tankers load up at Yanbu [12:32] and they head south through the Red Sea [12:34] exit to u through this narrow straight. [12:39] So they right they they uh Yanu is out [12:41] here right there right near Medina on [12:44] the coast. Uh so the the pipeline [12:47] carries the oil from the east all the [12:49] way to Yanbu. The tankers load up and [12:50] then they head south through the Bob [12:53] Elmande Strait. Okay, that's the other [12:55] route for Saudi oil. [12:58] Okay. And then they head out to Asia [13:01] from there. [13:02] The pipeline was built precisely as a [13:05] backup, as a way of keeping oil flowing [13:07] if the straight of muz was ever to be [13:08] threatened or blocked as it is now. But [13:11] here's the problem. Right now, the [13:12] straight of form moves is being [13:14] disrupted by the current US naval [13:16] blockade as part of the broader [13:18] confrontation with Iran. So Saudi Arabia [13:20] has been forced to lean heavily on that [13:23] backup route. They've ramped up the [13:25] amount of oil going through that [13:26] pipeline. Yanboo exports have surged [13:29] from under a million before the war, [13:31] under a million barrels a day to around [13:34] uh four million or even up to seven [13:35] million. I mean, they're ramping it up [13:37] now. And this happened kind of [13:38] overnight. And the only way out for [13:41] those tankers is through Babel Mandeb [13:43] southward, which is controlled on the [13:45] Yemen side by the Houthis, right? [13:49] Because the Houthis [13:51] control this part of Yemen. They control [13:55] this coastal region down into here. [13:59] Okay. So that puts the Saudis kind of at [14:02] the mercy of the Houthis. Now rerouting [14:04] the oil around Africa by going out [14:07] through the Suez Canal out north through [14:10] the Suez Canal is not really an option. [14:14] In other words, you might ask yourself, [14:15] well, wait a second. Why can't the [14:16] tankers fill up here at Yanbu and head [14:19] north, go through the Suez Canal [14:22] and and then they could head out into [14:25] the Mediterranean, go around Africa, [14:30] right? Come around the bottom and head [14:31] out to the Indian Ocean and head head [14:34] eastward that way. And you could avoid [14:36] Baba Manddev altogether because the oil [14:37] is coming across and up. Why can't they [14:40] do that? And the answer is that it's [14:42] very impractical. [14:44] Okay, for for a couple of reasons, for [14:47] two reasons really. So, one of them is [14:49] that the [14:52] hold on a second. One of them is that [14:54] the is that the uh is that the tankers [14:57] it would take way too long and the other [14:59] thing is that this is that the Suez [15:01] Canal is too shallow for full tankers to [15:04] pass through. So, it's not really a [15:05] workable solution. [15:07] So, bottom line is this. Saudi Arabia [15:10] through a combination of circumstance [15:12] and American pressure ended up in a [15:15] position where this one hostile militia [15:19] in Yemen, the Houthis, [15:21] controls the tap on their own economy. [15:25] And that militia, that hostile militia [15:27] happens to answer at least partially or [15:30] mostly to Iran. And that's the trap. [15:32] Now, let me explain how Saudi Arabia [15:35] built this trap for itself. And this is [15:38] where it's just such foolish policy. So [15:41] let's go all the way back to 2015. The [15:43] Houthis or this Shia movement. They [15:46] sweep down from northern Yemen. [15:49] They sweep southward and they seize the [15:53] capital city of Sana. Let's zoom in now [15:56] on Yemen. Okay. So here's Yemen. Here is [15:59] Sana. Okay. So they capture they the [16:01] Houthis start up here and they come down [16:03] and they capture Sana. And then they're [16:05] headed further south and they're [16:08] advancing on the port city of Aden which [16:11] is all the way down here at the bottom. [16:12] Okay. So they're they're going to cut [16:14] off and they're going to control the [16:15] entire [16:17] mouth of of the Red Sea and the entire [16:20] Baba Mandab straight on all sides and [16:21] that would be incredibly strategic for [16:24] the Houthis and the so so the Saudis [16:27] panic and they get a coalition of Gulf [16:29] states together and they launch military [16:32] uh strikes, a military intervention to [16:34] push the Houthis back. Now they had [16:36] American planes, American bombs, [16:38] American intelligence and logistics [16:40] support. They had the backing of the [16:42] internationally recognized official [16:43] Yemen government. They had overwhelming [16:47] uh air superiority. And seven years [16:50] later, after a war that killed at least [16:53] 377,000 [16:54] people, most of them civilians, Yemeni [16:57] civilians, it created one of the worst [16:59] humanitarian catastrophes on Earth. The [17:01] Houthis still controlled Sana. It was a [17:04] total failure. They still controlled the [17:06] Red Sea coastline. They actually [17:08] expanded their capabilities. drones, [17:10] ballistic missiles, anti-hship weapons, [17:12] which were largely supplied by Iran. [17:15] Saudi Arabia eventually sued for peace [17:18] in 2022 [17:20] and the Houthis were not defeated. [17:25] Okay, so all of this firepower, all of [17:27] this weaponry, the Houthis were not [17:30] defeated. They weren't weakened into [17:32] irrelevance. They actually emerged from [17:33] the war uh stronger. They were battleh [17:36] hardened. They were they they now were a [17:38] regional force to be reckoned with and [17:40] they had ability they showed their [17:42] ability to strike targets deep inside [17:44] Saudi Arabia and the UAE. So when people [17:47] ask why the Saudis don't just fight, the [17:49] answer is they tried for seven years [17:51] with American weapons and they lost. [17:55] Now there's another dimension to this. [17:57] Stay with me. This is it's going to get [17:58] even more interesting. There's another [18:00] dimension to this problem in Yemen. So [18:02] to understand this situation, you need [18:04] to understand that Yemen is not a [18:06] two-sided conflict. It's not Houthis [18:08] versus the recognized government, okay? [18:11] And it never was. There are essentially [18:13] three main political military blocks and [18:16] they do not get along. First, you have [18:19] the Houthis. That's this Shiite [18:21] Iranianbacked [18:23] movement. We know about them. They [18:24] control the North and the Red Sea coast. [18:27] They're the primary threat to the Baba [18:29] Straits. Second, we have the recognized [18:32] government, the internationally [18:33] recognized government of Yemen. It has [18:35] its main military component, which is a [18:38] party called Isla. But here's the thing, [18:42] these are who the who the Saudis back. [18:45] They back the government and Isla, but [18:48] they are a Sunni Islamist group. They're [18:50] aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood. [18:52] That means they're aligned ideologically [18:55] with ISIS, al Qaeda, [18:57] Turkey, those groups. Okay? the more [18:59] Islamist hardline groups. Now, that [19:01] might sound weird to you because the [19:02] Saudis are anti-Muslim Brotherhood in [19:05] Saudi Arabia, but that's just another [19:07] one of these contradictions of the [19:08] Saudis. So, so Saudi bottom line, Saudi [19:11] Arabia backs uh Isla, Sunni, Islamist, [19:17] and the which is the actual recognized [19:22] government in Yemen. Then there's a [19:24] third group and this is crucial and it [19:26] was mentioned in the article I read. [19:28] This is the Southern Transitional [19:30] Council, the STC. Now the what what is [19:33] the STC exists because they want to [19:37] restore an independent South Yemen which [19:41] existed as a separate country until [19:44] 1990. Let me explain this very quick. Um [19:48] this is what Yemen looked like until [19:50] 1990. Okay, it was two countries. There [19:52] was the People's Democratic Republic of [19:54] Yemen in the south, otherwise known as [19:56] South Yemen, and the Yemen Arab Republic [19:58] in the north. And the STC's goal is to [20:02] reinstate that division. The Saudis are [20:05] opposed to that because they view a [20:08] separated Yemen as more of a threat than [20:11] an Islamist Yemen that is unified and [20:14] weak. Okay? They're worried about this. [20:17] So, they oppose the STC. [20:20] Okay? and the SDC are secular. They're [20:24] nationalists. They're secular. They're [20:26] explicitly anti-Islamist. [20:28] And they were backed and built up by the [20:30] UAE. [20:32] The UAE. So the UAE is backing STC while [20:36] the Saudis back the government. And [20:39] critically, here's the critical part of [20:42] the STC. The STC was by far by far the [20:46] most effective fighting force against [20:48] the Houthis until the Saudis attacked [20:50] them. And this is where the Saudi story [20:53] gets completely self-defeating and so [20:56] foolish it's idiotic. [20:58] So Saudi Arabia and the UAE generally in [21:01] the world are allies. They're both [21:03] members of the anti- and even in Yemen, [21:05] they're both members of the anti-Huty [21:07] coalition. But the problem is that [21:09] they've been running conflicting foreign [21:11] policies in Yemen. They're backing [21:13] conflicting groups. The UAE does not [21:16] share Saudi Arabia's preference for [21:18] Islamist aligned governments. The UAE [21:20] actively opposes the Muslim Brotherhood. [21:22] So the UAE built up the STC as its [21:25] proxy. It wants a secular STC in there [21:30] who are also capable and they're also [21:31] very effective at fighting the Houthis [21:34] and they're also effective at fighting [21:35] Isla who the UAE does not like because [21:37] they're much more strident in their [21:39] opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood. [21:41] Saudi Arabia resented this. The STC [21:44] threatened the unified Yemen that they [21:47] want. The SDC's territory in the south [21:50] that they were holding was also [21:52] encroaching on areas that Saudi Arabia [21:55] considered its own sphere of influence, [21:57] particularly a region called Hadramat, [22:00] which borders Saudi Arabia and sits on [22:03] most of Yemen's oil reserves. Okay, let [22:05] me show that to you on the map. [22:08] That is here. Okay, so in Yemen, there's [22:11] this whole section here, which is [22:14] roughly this area called Hadramat. It's [22:17] not going to be me. It's not going to be [22:18] listed on a map because it's a region. [22:20] But this region of Yemen right here, [22:24] which borders on Saudi Arabia, has a lot [22:26] of oil there. The Saudis did not want [22:28] that going independent, and that was [22:30] being controlled by the STC. So, what [22:33] did the Saudis do? This is where things [22:36] just get so foolish. In December of 2025 [22:40] and January of this year, just a few [22:41] months ago, Saudi Arabia launched [22:44] military strikes against the STC. [22:48] Okay, so here's Saudi Arabia just a few [22:50] months before this war with Iran breaks [22:52] out launching very strong military [22:56] strikes, brutal military strikes against [22:59] the most effective anti-Huti ground [23:02] force in Yemen because the SDC was far [23:04] more effective at fighting the Houthis [23:06] than the uh official government army is. [23:12] So these strikes by Saudi Arabia against [23:15] the STC a few months ago, they took away [23:17] the STC's territory, they forced the [23:20] movement basically to dissolve itself or [23:22] go underground and it basically it it [23:25] pushed the UAE's influence out of the [23:27] country. So Saudi Arabia was, you know, [23:29] that's what they were trying to do. But [23:31] they prioritized their rivalry with the [23:33] with the UAE over the strategic [23:36] importance and the need to counter the [23:38] Houthis. And the consequence is that the [23:41] STC, as I quoted in that article, their [23:45] own representative said that the ground [23:47] force architecture that previously [23:50] constrained the Houthis coastal [23:52] operations has been removed. Right? You [23:54] took away the the ones who were going to [23:57] who you took away the only effective [23:59] force against the Houthis. If the [24:01] Houthis were to attack the Red Sea [24:03] shipping, the ability to respond from [24:05] inside Yemen simply does not exist the [24:08] way it did. End quote. That's what the [24:09] guy said. He's right. Saudi Arabia [24:12] destroyed the goalkeeper and now is [24:15] worried about the Houthis scoring and [24:17] complaining, "Oh my gosh, the Houthies [24:18] are going to score. You killed the [24:19] goalie." [24:21] Okay, so given all of this, [24:24] given that the Baba Mandib is now an [24:26] existential problem for Saudi Arabia and [24:29] given that the Houthis are rattling [24:30] their sabers, why won't Saudi Arabia [24:33] just use that American supplied [24:35] military? So, I believe that there's [24:36] four reasons. Okay, so I believe the [24:39] question I opened the video with, why [24:41] are the Saudis not just doing something [24:42] about the Houthis themselves? If they're [24:44] so worried about the Houthis closing [24:46] Babe, you got all this weaponry. Go [24:48] ahead, fight them. So, I believe there's [24:51] four reasons. Number one, they already [24:53] know that it doesn't work. Seven years [24:56] of war proved that the Houthis cannot be [24:57] defeated by air power alone. And Saudi [25:00] Arabia has no appetite. When I say no [25:03] appetite, they have no appetite for the [25:06] ground campaign that would actually be [25:07] required. Number two, the Houthis can [25:09] shoot back. This isn't a one-sided [25:11] equation. The Houthis have demonstrated [25:14] repeatedly that they can hit targets [25:16] deep inside Saudi Arabia. Oil [25:18] facilities airports cities whatever. [25:20] Now, one of the reasons Saudi Arabia [25:22] made peace in 2022 was that Houthi drone [25:25] and missile strikes on Saudi [25:26] infrastructure were becoming [25:28] economically uh intolerable. [25:31] So they don't want to reopen a war with [25:33] the Houthis. Okay. So number one, number [25:36] one is that they tried this and failed. [25:39] Number two, the Houthis have a lot of [25:41] capabilities and they don't want to [25:42] reawaken that. Kind of the same as [25:44] number one. [25:46] Number three, the political optics are [25:49] brutal. The Houthis have been very smart [25:52] uh about framing their actions. All of [25:55] this disruption disrupting global [25:57] shipping since 2023. They've been [25:59] framing the whole thing as solidarity [26:02] with the Palestinians, as resistance [26:03] against the American and Israeli [26:05] imperialism. And that framing has real [26:08] resonance across the Arab and Muslim [26:09] world. Saudi Arabia, which positions [26:12] itself as guardian of of Islamic [26:14] interests, can't easily be seen leading [26:17] a war against a group that has [26:19] successfully wrapped itself in the [26:21] Palestinian flag. The domestic and [26:23] regional politics are very [26:24] uncomfortable. Saudi Arabia's population [26:26] is much more Islamist than their ruling [26:29] classes. So number four, final reason [26:33] why I believe they're not attacking the [26:35] Houthis is that they've been outsourcing [26:37] the problem for too long. When the [26:40] Houthis started attacking Red Sea [26:42] shipping in late 2023, it was the [26:44] Americans and the British warships, as [26:46] we mentioned in the article, that [26:47] responded. Okay, it was the you had uh [26:51] this operation by the by the Royal Navy [26:53] where they were escorting ships through [26:55] the strait and they were striking Houthi [26:57] launch sites and then the Trump [26:59] administration came in and they launched [27:01] a major bombing campaign in 2025. [27:03] Hundreds of strikes over a couple [27:05] months. It ended in a ceasefire in which [27:08] the Houthis agreed to stop targeting [27:10] American ships specifically not all [27:12] ships just American ships. The Houthis [27:14] were not defeated by any stretch of the [27:16] imagination. the campaign simply ran out [27:19] of steam. [27:21] So, so Saudi Arabia has been perfectly [27:24] happy to let Washington [27:26] uh absorb the costs of all these risks [27:29] and deal with the Houthis. The problem [27:30] is that the of the Americans don't have [27:32] unlimited patience and the current [27:34] administration is more interested in a [27:36] deal with Iran than in indefinite [27:38] military commitment in the Red Sea. [27:41] Okay. Now, before we go on, let me This [27:43] is a good place to point out uh to [27:45] remind you that if you're not subscribed [27:48] to all my content, please do so. Please [27:50] go make sure that you go to Israel 365 [27:53] News YouTube channel and make sure that [27:55] you're subscribed to that channel and [27:56] that you're catching all the videos we [27:58] put up there. These are there's a lot of [28:00] phenomenal interviews that we do uh and [28:03] um and deep dive uh analytical pieces, [28:06] some videos that are a bit similar to [28:07] what's on this channel. I want to draw [28:09] your specific attention in the playlist [28:11] section on the Israel 365 news channel [28:14] to a playlist called Israel, the rise of [28:16] a regional superpower, which is a [28:18] six-part series where I lay out the [28:21] entire kind of architecture of how the [28:24] Middle East looks in the post October [28:26] 7th world uh with, you know, [28:28] highlighting Israel's changing role uh [28:31] regionally and even globally. Okay. So, [28:33] that's so make sure that you make sure [28:37] that you got all that and that you're [28:38] subscribed to everything so you don't [28:40] miss anything. Especially, you know, for [28:41] a video like this, it uh it fits into [28:44] all of that. Like, you really want to [28:46] understand how the whole Middle East is [28:47] kind of mapped out these days. Make sure [28:49] that you are subscribed to Israel 365 [28:52] News and that way you're getting all of [28:53] my content that's being uploaded on a [28:55] regular basis. Now, let's go back to the [28:58] news item that we started with and let's [29:00] put this whole thing together. [29:02] Saudi Arabia is now lobbying the Trump [29:05] administration to end the Hormuz [29:07] blockade and return to negotiations with [29:09] Iran. The reasoning is almost painfully [29:13] transparent. If Washington backs down [29:15] from its maximum pressure on Iran, maybe [29:18] Tehran will tell the Houthis not to not [29:22] to disrupt shipping in Babel Mandeb. But [29:24] think about what that means. Saudi [29:26] Arabia, which was privately pushing for [29:29] a hardline on Iran as recently as a few [29:31] months ago, which were reportedly [29:33] coordinated with Israel on the view that [29:36] Tehran needed to be confronted, is now [29:39] pleading for deescalation because the [29:41] alternative is that its oil stops [29:43] moving. This is not really a negotiating [29:45] position. It's a country that has [29:47] maneuvered itself into a corner. [29:51] Um, sorry. It's it's maneuvered itself [29:53] into a corner, eliminated its own best [29:56] options, and is now hoping that American [29:58] diplomacy will extract it from a crisis [30:01] of its own making. They set a trap for [30:04] themselves. Let me bring this all [30:05] together. Saudi Arabia has one of the [30:07] world's largest military budgets. Okay? [30:09] It's equipped almost entirely with [30:11] American hardware. It faces a threat [30:13] from the Houthis, this Yemen militia. [30:18] And this threat is to close the waterway [30:20] that the entire export economy or a lot [30:23] of it right now depends on. And its [30:27] response is to ask Washington to please [30:29] negotiate more gently with Iran. Why? [30:33] Because it fought the Houthis for seven [30:34] years and couldn't beat them because [30:36] direct confrontation would invite [30:38] missile strikes from the Houthis on its [30:40] own infrastructure. And they're afraid [30:41] of that. Because it destroyed the one [30:43] effective ground force that could have [30:45] protected the Straits, the STC. in order [30:48] to win this rivalry with the UAE. [30:52] And because it's grown so accustomed to [30:55] outsourcing security to the United [30:56] States that it's lost the strategic [30:58] habit and will to defend its own vital [31:02] interests. The Houthis The Houthis [31:04] haven't even closed the straight yet. [31:05] They simply threatened to. And that [31:08] threat alone has been enough to send [31:10] Riyad running to Washington. That's the [31:12] state of Saudi strategic power in 2026. [31:16] Right? There's no lack of weapons. [31:18] There's no lack of money. There's a [31:20] failure of strategy, of will, and of [31:24] judgment. And it's been compounded over [31:26] an entire decade, one bad decision at a [31:31] time. [31:32] Thanks for watching.
