Transcript [00:00] Hey everyone. So, six days from now on [00:02] October 27th, Israelis will go to the [00:06] polls. And every election season and [00:09] especially this one, I get the same [00:11] question mostly from my American [00:13] friends. And they say, "Pesak, why don't [00:16] Israelis just vote for the prime [00:18] minister? We vote for a president. Why [00:20] do you vote only for a party and then [00:22] you have to wait for weeks while the [00:24] politicians make deals to decide who [00:26] runs the country?" It's a little bit [00:27] confusing, especially to Americans. But [00:29] the question I want to deal with, like I [00:31] said in this in this video, is why [00:34] doesn't Israel directly elect its prime [00:36] minister? It's a great question and the [00:38] answer is one that people one that most [00:40] people do not know because Israel did [00:43] elect its prime minister directly three [00:46] times and it went so badly that the [00:48] Knesset scrapped the experiment after [00:51] five years. That's right, there were [00:53] three times in five years and went back [00:55] to the old system. So let's get right [00:57] into it. Uh so part one of this is to [01:00] understand how the system works. First [01:03] the basics. When an Israeli walks into [01:07] the voting booth, he doesn't vote for a [01:09] person. He drops a slip of paper into an [01:12] envelope with the letters of a party on [01:13] it. The whole country is treated as one [01:16] district as it were. Everyone votes. [01:18] It's all one pool of votes. and uh and [01:22] and the party that so for example a [01:24] party that gets 10% of the vote gets [01:26] roughly 10% of the 120 seats in the [01:29] Knesset. Now I made a video about how [01:30] this works but the best video that I [01:33] have seen explaining how the Israeli [01:35] electoral system works is it was done by [01:38] my son. I'm going to put it as the [01:39] pinned comment in this video. So if you [01:41] want to understand the whole system from [01:42] before the election through election day [01:44] till a coalition is built, watch my [01:47] son's video. It's outstanding. So, I [01:49] don't want to get into all the weeds [01:50] there. [01:52] Um, now [01:56] to govern, I'm just going to stick to [01:58] some of the basic points that we need [01:59] for the purposes of this topic. To [02:01] govern, you need 61 uh Knesset seats in [02:04] your coalition. And no party in Israel's [02:07] history has ever won 61 seats on its [02:09] own. Not even close. So the prime [02:11] minister is a person is whoever can [02:14] assemble a coalition of parties adding [02:17] up to 61 which means that small parties [02:21] hold the keys. If you're a party with [02:23] let's say six seats and a big party [02:25] needs your six seats to get to 61. You [02:28] can name your price. Now not entirely [02:30] name your price. There's other parties [02:31] or also other small parties that are in [02:33] there. But you demand certain [02:35] ministries, certain budgets that certain [02:37] laws will pass and those are the [02:39] conditions under which you will join the [02:41] coalition. And for decades, Israelis [02:44] complained about this. And in 1990, the [02:47] complaining turned into a movement. [02:50] Uh [02:52] so there's what was called the dirty [02:54] trick. In 1990, Israel had a unity [02:57] government and that meant that you had [02:59] the two large parties which were Likood [03:01] and the Labor Party uh were governing as [03:03] a unity government together. Yitsk [03:05] Shamir, the head of the Likud was prime [03:07] minister. Shimon Perez, the head of [03:09] labor was his partner and he was the [03:12] finance minister. And in March, the the [03:15] two fell out. Uh they had a they had a [03:17] falling out between them and Shamir [03:19] fired Perez and the labor ministers [03:22] walked out with him and Labor brought [03:24] down the government in a no confidence [03:26] vote 60 to 55 which by the way is still [03:29] the only time technically that an [03:31] Israeli government has been toppled by a [03:33] no confidence vote. Usually it gets [03:35] there's a vote to dis to dissolve the [03:36] Knesset or there's a resignation or [03:39] something like that. This is the first [03:40] time it was actually toppled in that [03:41] way. It was the only time. Sorry. And [03:44] then but what happened as soon as the as [03:46] soon as the the coalition fell apart, [03:48] Perez tried to build his own coalition [03:51] to build his own government by luring [03:53] away members of other parties. In other [03:55] words, people who got in on other [03:56] parties slates. One of the weird things, [03:58] one of the idiosyncrasies about Knesset [04:00] elections is that even though you get [04:01] elected on a party slate, once the [04:04] Knesset is seated, individual Knesset [04:06] members actually are they kind of own [04:09] their Knesset seat. they're not beholden [04:11] to their party and they can actually [04:12] defect and leave their party. And that's [04:14] happened a few times in Israeli history. [04:16] That's not our topic. But what happened [04:18] here in 1990 is that Shiman Perez tried [04:21] to build his own government by luring [04:24] away members of other parties. As I [04:25] said, uh he offered them cabinet posts [04:28] and money for their institutions. And [04:30] when Israel, a new government cannot [04:33] cannot be seated. You can't have a new [04:35] coalition. The coalition doesn't start [04:37] being a government. It doesn't have a [04:38] mandate to govern until the Knesset [04:41] approves it in a vote. Okay, so that's a [04:43] confidence vote, right? Perez thought [04:46] that he had 61 votes to seat himself as [04:49] prime minister. But on the day of that [04:51] vote, two members of Knesset from a [04:53] Karedi party who were supposed to back [04:55] him, they were part of the deal that he [04:57] made cobbling together his 61, they [05:00] didn't show up. So Perez had to call off [05:03] the vote and his government never took [05:05] office. and Yizak Rabbin, his own party [05:08] rival in the Labor Party, called the [05:10] whole affair the dirty trick. And the [05:12] public was disgusted by this. Uh both [05:15] parties were were bidding, meaning both [05:18] Likood and Labor, Shamir and Perez were [05:22] bidding and negotiating with all these [05:23] different defectors from different [05:25] parties. and ended up that there were [05:27] rallies and and the the public was [05:30] outraged and there was a demand by the [05:32] public at the time. Let us choose the [05:34] prime minister ourselves. That was the [05:37] that was the thought. So in March 1992, [05:41] the Knesset amended the basic law which [05:44] is sort of like constitutional law in [05:45] Israel. It's not exactly the same, but [05:47] that's not our topic. They amended the [05:48] law for seating a government. Uh, Prime [05:51] Minister Netanyahu, BB Netanyahu at the [05:54] time was had never been prime minister [05:56] yet. He was a young deputy minister and [05:58] he was one of the biggest supporters of [06:00] this law, this law to appoint the prime [06:03] min to vote for the prime minister [06:04] directly. So, but it so it passed and [06:08] starting in 1996, every Israeli would [06:11] get two ballots. One for prime minister, [06:13] head-to-head, winner take all and one [06:16] for the Knesset. Same as before. [06:20] Now, but here's the problem. The theory [06:22] was beautiful. The prime minister would [06:24] get his own direct mandate from the [06:26] people. He doesn't owe his job to a [06:29] little six seat party. He's going to be [06:31] and that'll make him stronger and more [06:33] stable. The small parties will be weaker [06:36] and the coalition will have more [06:38] stability. That was the theory. But let [06:40] me show you what actually happened. [06:43] So, just think about this from a voter [06:45] perspective. Okay? Under the old system, [06:47] let's say you're a traditional Sphartic [06:50] Jew, a traditional Sphartic voter, and [06:52] you want to vote for the sectarian [06:55] traditional Sphartic Party, Shas, which [06:57] still exists today. Okay, that's their [06:59] whole calling card that they represent [07:01] the Sphartic community. [07:03] So, you have to choose. [07:06] Are you going to vote for shas because [07:08] they represent your sectarian interests [07:11] or are you going to vote likud or labor [07:13] like one of the big parties because you [07:15] want to let's say are you going to vote [07:17] likude because you want a leak prime [07:18] minister you have one ballot and you [07:20] have one choice the same is true for a [07:22] lot of different people in different in [07:24] different sectors of the community but [07:26] now you have two ballots so you don't [07:28] have to choose anymore between [07:30] strengthening the governing party of [07:31] whoever you want to be prime minister [07:33] the let's say or voting with your with [07:37] your sector [07:38] with the two ballots [07:41] because you don't have to choose. You [07:42] can put Netanyahu in your prime minister [07:45] slip but you can still vote for Shas. [07:48] So the national vote [07:51] goes to prime minister. The sectoral [07:53] vote goes for Knesset and you're happy. [07:54] Now the same thing would happen on the [07:56] left. Someone could vote for Aaywood [07:57] Barak for prime minister but vote for [08:00] let's say merits which was a a far-left [08:03] party for the Knesset. [08:06] So what ended up happening so in 1996 [08:10] Netanyahu beat Perez and this was when [08:13] they were voting directly for prime [08:14] ministers. This is the first time we did [08:15] it and that was the first time that [08:17] prime that Netanyahu ran for prime [08:19] minister. I voted for him at the time. [08:21] Netanyahu beat Perez by about 30,000 [08:23] votes less than 1%. He was the first [08:26] directly elected prime minister of [08:27] Israel. But in the Knesset, Paris's [08:31] Labor Party was the biggest party. You [08:33] get this? Netanyahu won the prime [08:35] minister vote, but the largest party was [08:37] Labor. So the So what ended up [08:41] happening? It it it caused actually less [08:44] stability in the government. And even [08:47] though that election took place in 1996, [08:49] in 1999 we had another election. Ah [08:51] Barak wins 56% of the vote but his party [08:56] his party won Israel only won 26 seats [09:01] at that point that was the smallest [09:03] number ever for a ruling party. Remember [09:05] the prime minister traditionally is the [09:07] head of one of the largest or usually [09:09] the largest party. [09:12] 56% of the vote wanted Barack 56% of the [09:16] country wanted Barack and only about 20% [09:18] of the people voted for his party. [09:23] now and and look at the Knesset that he [09:25] got. The Knesset that he got had 15 [09:29] parties. Just to understand what this [09:31] means in earlier Knessets you'd have [09:33] seven, eight, nine parties. There were [09:36] 15 parties in the Knesset. [09:39] His own the biggest party [09:41] had 26 seats. The Likood had 19. Shas [09:46] had 17. Only two short of Likood. [09:48] They're nervous. Shasa is just a [09:50] sectarian party that represents sphartic [09:52] interests. [09:54] And then there were 12 more parties that [09:56] carved up the rest of the Knesset. 11 of [09:58] them had six seats or fewer. Two of them [10:01] had just two seats each. And every one [10:04] of them was a potential coalition [10:05] partner. And the guy, think about it, if [10:07] you're a if you're you won the election, [10:08] you have and and you only have 26 seats, [10:10] you got to get to 61. [10:13] And everyone that you want to have in [10:14] your coalition is going to have a price [10:16] tag. [10:18] Now put it together. In 1992, the last [10:21] election under the old system, Labor and [10:24] Likood, the two largest parties [10:26] together, had 76 seats. And that's why [10:29] they could have a unity government. Just [10:31] govern together. In 1996, the first time [10:34] it's direct direct elections for prime [10:36] minister, they have 66 seats. In 1999, [10:39] those two the two largest parties [10:41] together only had 45 seats. The two [10:44] parties that were supposed to be [10:46] strengthened by this new system lost [10:48] more than a third of their seats in [10:50] seven years. And Shas, as an example, a [10:54] sectarian party that had only six seats [10:57] in 1992, went up to 10 in 1996 and 17 in [11:02] 1999. [11:04] The reform that was supposed to weaken [11:06] the small parties made them stronger [11:07] than they'd ever been. [11:10] Which leads us to the problem that it [11:13] didn't solve the coalition issues. [11:16] Remember the whole reason behind this [11:18] was to have more stable coalitions. But [11:20] it was just the opposite because the [11:22] prime minister still needs the Knesset. [11:23] He needs 61 votes to pass the budget. [11:26] It's great that you elected him [11:27] independently and he's got a mandate [11:28] from the people, but he needs the [11:30] Knesset and the Knesset could still [11:32] bring him down. So Barack in 1999 put [11:35] together a coalition of seven parties. [11:38] Within about a year, almost nothing was [11:40] left of it. One partner after another [11:42] walked out from left and from right. And [11:44] finally in December 2000, not much time [11:46] after he was elected, Barack resigned. [11:51] Now [11:53] then we get the strangest election in [11:55] Israel's history. The strangest. [11:58] Remember [12:00] Barack just resigned December 2000 and [12:04] we're in a system where there's a [12:05] separate vote for prime minister and for [12:07] Knesset. So when the prime minister [12:08] resigned only his job went back to the [12:11] voters. The Knesset stayed exactly as it [12:14] was. So Israel held an election for [12:17] prime minister only. No Knesset [12:19] election. Ariel Chiron who at the time [12:22] was leading the Likood party beat Barack [12:25] with 62%. [12:27] 62% the biggest margin ever on and it [12:30] was the lowest turnout of any election [12:32] ever. And then Chaon walks into the [12:35] Knesset that was elected when Barack got [12:37] elected, the one where the Likud only [12:39] had 19 seats. [12:42] So what happened a month after he won, [12:46] Chaon pushed to repeal this new law, the [12:49] law of directly electing the prime [12:51] minister. It passed 72 to 37. [12:54] Overwhelming support to repeal this law. [12:57] So think about this. Ariel Chiron, the [13:00] man who had just won the biggest direct [13:03] prime minister election landslide in [13:05] Israeli history, killed the direct [13:07] election of prime minister [13:11] in 2003. We're now back to one ballot. [13:15] And what happened? The LI could doubled [13:18] to 38 seats. Shas drops from 17 to 11. [13:23] Voters now again had to choose and many [13:26] came home to the big parties. So that's [13:28] the answer to the question. Israel [13:30] doesn't have direct elections for prime [13:32] minister because we had them and they [13:35] made the problem we were meant that they [13:37] that they were meant to solve even [13:39] worse. Now I have a lot more to say uh [13:42] we're going to deal with another issue. [13:44] Uh so stick around. But before we do [13:46] that I want to uh you know we're talking [13:48] about elections and we have a really [13:50] exciting event coming up this coming [13:52] Sunday all about elections. We have a US [13:54] election happening a week after the [13:56] Israeli election. And these elections [13:58] are going to have massive implications [14:00] for Israel in the Middle East and the [14:02] world. Uh so we're host we're hosting a [14:04] webinar this coming Sunday, 2:00 p.m. [14:06] Eastern time, 8:00 p.m. in Israel. 6 [14:08] hour time difference because Israel's [14:09] changing its clocks and America is not. [14:12] So we have uh at 2 p.m. Eastern time, [14:14] 8:00 p.m. in Israel. Two elections, two [14:16] nations, one critical moment. And we [14:19] have a phenomenal panel. Doc uh we have [14:21] Dr. Gotti Ta a lecturer at Hebrew [14:23] University and very well-known and [14:25] important public intellectual in Israel. [14:27] Uh Mark Zel, the chairman of the GOP in [14:30] Israel. Uh Jonathan Shanzer, who is the [14:33] executive director of the Foundation for [14:35] Defense of Democracies. Uh Will [14:38] Chamberlain from the Article 3 Project, [14:40] a very important uh conservative voice [14:43] in America today. And Dr. AJ Noly, [14:46] professor at Regent University's [14:47] Robertson School of Government. They [14:49] will all be on a panel discussing the [14:51] implications of this historic election. [14:54] And if you cannot make that time, if [14:56] you're not available at the time of the [14:58] airing, you should still register for [15:00] the webinar because by registering, you [15:01] will automatically receive an email with [15:05] a link to watch the full webinar after [15:07] it airs. Immediately after it airs, [15:09] you'll get that email auto uh [15:11] automatically. So whether you can make [15:13] the time or not, make sure that you're [15:14] registered for this for this really [15:16] exciting webinar we have coming up. You [15:18] can click the link in the description of [15:20] this video or you can scan the QR code [15:23] that is on your screen and uh and and [15:26] you don't want to miss this. So make [15:28] sure that you're signed up for the [15:29] webinar. All right. [15:31] Now, there's a second half to this story [15:34] because while Israel was [15:39] while Israel was trying to fix the [15:42] fragmentation [15:43] issue of all the small parties having [15:45] too much power, we were trying to fix it [15:47] by having direct elections for prime [15:48] minister. It was also trying to fix it [15:51] from from the other side of things, from [15:53] the bottom as it were. Meaning fixing it [15:55] by direct elections for prime minister, [15:57] which didn't work, was an attempt to fix [15:59] it from the top. Think of it that way. [16:01] But they were also trying to fix it from [16:03] the bottom by raising the bar to get [16:05] into the Knesset. One way to deal with [16:07] small parties having too much power is [16:09] make it harder to get into the Knesset. [16:11] So that's the electoral threshold. And [16:13] again, watch my son's video about how it [16:15] works. He explains this there very well. [16:17] So the way it works is in Israel, [16:19] there's a minimum share of the vote that [16:21] a party needs to get any seats at all, [16:24] okay? To get into the Knesset. [16:28] So, um, in the very first election in [16:32] Israel's history in 1949, there was [16:34] effectively no threshold. You just [16:36] needed enough votes for one seat. Take [16:38] all the votes, divide them by 120. Um, [16:41] and and if you get in, you get in. Okay? [16:44] You needed enough votes. It was less [16:45] than 1%. And then immediately for the [16:48] 1951 election, it was set at 1%. You had [16:52] to get 1% of the total votes cast. and [16:54] it stayed at 1% for 40 years. And then [16:58] ahead of 1992, the same time as the [17:01] direct election reform, they raised the [17:04] threshold and it went up to 1 and a [17:06] half%. And that year it had real [17:09] consequences. A right-wing party, the [17:12] party fell just short of the threshold [17:14] and its votes were were wasted. And that [17:17] meant that's what allowed Yeetsak [17:19] Rabbin's labor-led block to end up with [17:22] a narrow blocking majority and they [17:25] formed a government and what led that [17:27] led to the Oslo Accords which of course [17:30] changed the history of Israel uh in so [17:33] many ways. So it has massive hada party [17:36] gotten in we wouldn't have had Oslo it [17:38] would be a different history. Uh in in [17:41] 2004 the threshold was raised again to [17:44] 2%. And that was first used in 2006. And [17:48] then in March 2014, there was a law that [17:50] was pushed by a Victor Lieberman who's [17:52] currently the head of the Israel Betenu [17:54] party. Uh he pushed this law that raised [17:57] it to 3.25% [17:59] 3 and a/4%. Uh which is the equivalent [18:02] of about four seats. The minimum number [18:04] of seats you can get now is four, but [18:06] you have to cross three and a quarter% [18:08] of the total votes and then you get in [18:10] with four seats. And that's where the [18:12] threshold stands today. [18:15] Now notice the pattern. Notice the [18:18] pattern again. Many people believed that [18:20] raising the threshold was uh was aimed [18:24] at knocking the Arab parties out of the [18:26] Knesset. Because the Arab parties, if [18:28] you go back historically, had lots of [18:30] little parties uh and their and their [18:33] own leaders, the the Arab party leaders [18:34] said, "Oh, this is just designed to get [18:36] rid of us." Because there was a number [18:37] of different small Arab parties. So [18:40] instead instead what happened was four [18:42] Arab parties four small Arab parties who [18:45] agree on almost nothing there's [18:47] Islamists there's communists and [18:49] nationalists they merged into what's [18:52] called the joint list and in 2015 they [18:55] won 13 seats and that joint list became [18:58] the third largest party in the Knesset [19:01] right so instead of it minimizing their [19:04] power or getting rid of them it actually [19:06] increased their power because the [19:08] because of the in internal vote sharing [19:10] of running as one list. [19:13] Um so that was a result that people did [19:16] not intend. Another unintended [19:18] consequence [19:19] now in 2022 [19:22] which is the last election the one [19:23] that's just that the election cycle [19:26] before this one the government that is [19:28] now finishing up its term. The two [19:31] blocks were nearly tied in votes. The [19:33] Netanyahu block beat the other side by [19:35] about 30,000 votes. But Merritt, a [19:38] left-wing party, missed the threshold by [19:42] only 4,000 votes. They missed it by a [19:44] couple percentage points or like I mean [19:48] fractions of percentage points. Ballad, [19:51] an Arab party that was not part of the [19:52] joint list, also missed it. So there was [19:55] about 300,000 votes that went to parties [19:58] that did not get in. Most of them were [20:00] on the anti-Netanyahu side. Netanyahu [20:03] meanwhile had made sure that almost [20:05] every vote on his side landed in a party [20:08] that would clear the threshold and the [20:10] result was 64 seats to 56. a tie in the [20:15] vote became a clear majority in the [20:16] Knesset meaning again in the in the raw [20:19] voting it was much closer election than [20:21] the coalition Netanyahu ended up having [20:24] with various parties coming and going [20:26] but throughout these last four years [20:28] this is a very rare government that went [20:31] all the way to term [20:33] so that's what the threshold does it [20:35] doesn't just keep tiny parties out but [20:37] it also affects who ends up governing so [20:41] where are we now. [20:46] So, we're 6 days out and once again, the [20:49] number everyone in Israeli politics is [20:51] watching is 3.25. [20:55] parties are mer you know we had parties [20:57] that were merging before they had to [20:58] submit their lists and they signed [21:01] surplus vote agreements and then you [21:04] have the you know the larger parties [21:05] pleading with the voters not to vote for [21:08] parties that might not get in like we [21:10] have over winter's ama Israel party that [21:13] has been you know originally they were [21:15] polling above the line now they seem to [21:17] be polling below it there's a few [21:19] there's a number of small parties and [21:22] whether or not these parties get close [21:24] uh and get in or get in or get close and [21:27] fall short could have major impact. It [21:29] could be like it could be the reverse [21:31] from coming from the right. It could be [21:32] the reverse of what happened to the left [21:33] in the last election. And the direct [21:36] election idea has never fully died. [21:39] People still bring up this idea of [21:41] direct election for prime minister back [21:42] in 2019 [21:44] where we had the deadlock where we had [21:46] three three elections in a row because [21:48] they couldn't form a government. um uh [21:51] Shas and the Likud party floated a [21:54] one-time prime minister direct election [21:56] idea between Netanyahu and Gance. Didn't [21:59] go anywhere. In 2021, Netanyahu backed a [22:02] bill for a snap election for prime [22:04] minister alone. Uh but the critics [22:08] having lived through this, the critics [22:10] all said that this would just leave the [22:12] prime minister without a Knesset [22:13] majority. It's not going to help [22:14] anything. These laws did not pass. [22:16] Everyone learned the lesson. [22:18] So the bottom line is this. [22:21] Israel does not elect its prime minister [22:23] directly because it tried it already. [22:27] Between 1996 in 2001, voters split their [22:30] tickets between prime minister and [22:32] Kesset. The big parties shrank, the [22:35] small parties grew, and three prime [22:38] ministers in a row in a short amount of [22:40] time. It was only five years and there [22:41] were three different prime ministers. [22:43] They could not hold a government [22:45] together. The Knesset then repealed the [22:47] law overwhelmingly [22:50] and the threshold story teaches the same [22:52] lesson, right? Every time Israel has [22:54] change the rules to engine to engineer a [22:57] more stable result, voters and parties [23:00] adapted. That's what happened. So the [23:03] bottom line is that in a parliamentary [23:05] system, the prime minister does not [23:06] govern because he's directly chosen. He [23:09] governs because he has a coalition of 61 [23:12] in our system. Um, that's the way it [23:15] works. And Israel's divisions, [23:17] religious, secular, Jewish, Arab, left, [23:19] right, Ashkanazi, [23:22] they they're all still there. [23:25] Um, and and they they still affect how [23:28] people vote, but there's a lot less [23:29] parties uh [23:32] who are gunning for their votes as there [23:34] were before the threshold was lowered [23:36] and before and when there was direct [23:38] election for prime minister. combination [23:39] of a low threshold and a recollection [23:41] for prime minister produced the chaos [23:43] that I described to you back in the late [23:45] 90s. So on October 27th when you see the [23:49] results come in and the [23:52] and the coalition math starts happening [23:54] and you hear about the negotiations and [23:56] I'll cover all of that, you'll know why [23:58] it works this way and and uh and the [24:01] history behind it. So I hope you found [24:02] this uh video uh interesting. Make sure, [24:05] by the way, that you are checking out [24:06] all the content we're putting up at [24:08] Israel 365 News YouTube channel. Look [24:10] for that new YouTube channel, Israel 365 [24:13] News, because we're putting up content [24:14] every day. Fascinating interviews and [24:16] analysis that are going up there as [24:18] well. You don't want to miss that stuff. [24:19] Um, and of course, continue to watch [24:22] this channel. And please share this [24:23] video. Um, and let me know what you [24:25] thought of my new uh graphics. I'm I'm [24:27] I'm starting to play with this more to [24:29] have slides throughout the video. Let me [24:31] know if it's helpful. Let me know if you [24:32] like it. I'm going to try to incorporate [24:33] this into more videos if if you find it [24:36] helpful. All right, thanks for watching. [24:37] God bless.
