Transcript [00:00] Pickaxe Mountain. You've heard this name [00:02] now. It's uh becoming a player in the [00:06] narrative of this war and this war has [00:08] had lots of twists and turns and left [00:09] lots of different storylines. And we've [00:11] been hearing the name Pickaxe Mountain a [00:13] lot over the last couple of weeks. [00:15] Um and in this video we're going to [00:16] break that whole thing down. We're going [00:18] to talk about what Pickaxe Mountain is [00:20] uh and why it hasn't been attacked until [00:23] now and uh why it's becoming important [00:26] at this stage and we're also going to [00:27] get into what the Iranians are saying [00:29] about the possibility of Pickaxe [00:31] Mountain getting attacked. We're going [00:33] to get into all of it. [00:34] Stick around to the end of this video [00:36] because in the in the later part of the [00:37] video when we start talking about the [00:39] strategic thinking on both sides, on the [00:41] American side and on the Iranian side, [00:43] it's going to get really interesting [00:44] because the information about what [00:46] Pickaxe Mountain is you can find in a [00:48] lot of places. There's lots of articles [00:49] written about it. Uh but we're going to [00:51] go much deeper [00:52] in uh in this video. Okay, so so to get [00:55] us started let's uh let's start off with [00:59] this clip of President Trump. He was [01:02] asked about Pickaxe Mountain uh just the [01:05] other day uh in the press gaggle in the [01:07] Oval Office. Here we go. Well, not in [01:09] the Oval Office but in the White House. [01:13] >> Uh Haley Bull Scripps News. Thank you [01:15] for the question. Do you believe that [01:17] Iran has moved nuclear centrifuges into [01:20] Pickaxe Mountain? And when you say we're [01:22] not done yet, what is left to finish? [01:24] >> Well, I think that they [01:26] they may have. We don't have it on [01:28] record. W- All we do is read the fake [01:30] news. You know, we see the [01:32] the news is so wrong so many times. So [01:34] you know, maybe maybe this one they have [01:36] right. But it's okay. Uh it doesn't mean [01:38] anything unless they have the material. [01:41] You're talking about the centrifuges. It [01:43] doesn't mean anything unless they have [01:44] the material. They don't have We follow [01:45] the material. That's where the action is [01:47] and [01:48] uh [01:49] we'll be hitting that area very probably [01:51] pretty soon. And there's not a not a [01:53] thing they can do about it. You know, [01:55] And I wouldn't say that. [01:56] If I thought they could do something [01:58] about it, I would never say that, but [02:00] we'll be hitting that area pretty soon. [02:02] Uh and and very heavily. [02:06] >> Okay. [02:07] Now, this clip uh has a lot in it. Let [02:11] me just break down what we heard. [02:14] What we heard there [02:16] What we heard there was uh [02:19] Number one, he's she said, "Have they [02:21] moved material in?" And he said, "Well, [02:23] we just we just know what's in the [02:24] media." Yeah, right. We just know what's [02:27] We just know what's been reported in the [02:28] media. [02:29] Uh and also, you know, if it's just [02:31] centrifuges, but not the material, [02:34] then it doesn't matter because the [02:36] material is where the action is. By the [02:38] material, he means the uranium. Okay, [02:40] we're going to get into all of that [02:41] later. [02:42] Uh [02:43] What what has been moved into Pickaxe [02:44] Mountain is a very interesting question. [02:47] And then at the in the later part of [02:49] that clip in the in the at at the end of [02:50] that clip, he said, "We're going to hit [02:51] it very soon. We're going to hit it very [02:53] strongly very soon." [02:55] And I'm saying that even though you [02:57] usually don't, you know, telegraph what [02:59] you're going to do in advance, that [03:00] there's not a thing they can do about [03:02] it. So, I'm saying it anyway. Okay, keep [03:04] all of this in mind. It's all going to [03:05] come into play later on because as much [03:08] as it sounds like Trump is just, you [03:09] know, rambling or shooting from the hip, [03:11] there's actually a lot of uh there's a [03:14] lot in what he just said there. Okay, [03:15] we'll come back to it. We'll come back [03:17] to it. Now, for the rest of this video, [03:19] we're going to take a look at two [03:19] articles. One of them is by Ron [03:22] Ben-Yishai, uh who is uh one of the top [03:26] uh Israeli military correspondents. [03:28] Uh [03:29] He's one of the most He's one of the [03:30] best informed and the best analysts when [03:33] it comes to defense and military. [03:36] Uh he uh he writes for Ynet, which is [03:37] sort of a mainstream, maybe [03:39] left-leaning, [03:40] uh mainstream media in Israel, but he [03:42] doesn't really have a political axe to [03:43] grind. He's a uh he's really one of the [03:45] top uh one of the top journalists when [03:47] it comes to military and defense issues [03:49] in Israel. So, we're going to take a [03:51] look at an article that he wrote [03:52] extensively all about Pickaxe Mountain. [03:56] And then we're going to take a look at [03:57] what Iranian state media [03:59] is saying about the whole Pickaxe [04:01] Mountain situation. So, let's get to Ron [04:03] Ben-Yishai. You see the title of his [04:04] piece here. Why the US and Israel have [04:07] not struck Iran's Pickaxe Mountain? [04:10] Let's get right to it. The central [04:11] concern for nuclear experts as well as [04:13] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US [04:15] President Donald Trump [04:17] is that Iran could take the uranium it [04:19] still holds enriched 60%, enriched at [04:22] 60% and raise it to weapons-grade levels [04:24] using a relatively small number of [04:27] surviving centrifuges. If Tehran does so [04:30] and there are indications that this is [04:31] its intention, it could possess enough [04:34] fissile material for more than one [04:35] atomic bomb one once weapons-grade [04:38] material is available, the path to [04:40] assembling a nuclear weapon becomes [04:42] relatively short. So, he opens the piece [04:44] not by talking about Pickaxe, but by [04:45] laying the predicate for the whole [04:47] discussion, which is [04:49] the big concern on the nuclear side of [04:51] things is that we know that Iran has [04:53] has a stockpile of uranium enriched at [04:55] 60% [04:57] and that means that if they can get some [04:58] centrifuges working and they can get the [05:00] uranium to where the centrifuges are [05:01] working, they could actually have a [05:04] nuclear bomb fairly quickly. [05:07] And but it it it's not just having a [05:09] nuclear bomb as we'll see, highly [05:11] enriched fissile material could also be [05:13] used in a radiological or dirty bomb, a [05:17] missile warhead or aerial bomb carrying [05:20] such material could scatter radioactive [05:23] contamination across a wide area when it [05:25] strikes the ground or even if it's [05:27] intercepted [05:29] potentially making the area [05:30] inaccessible, which means that even [05:32] without getting to the point of an [05:33] actual nuclear weapon that could create, [05:35] you know, a nuclear explosion [05:37] a dirty bomb using this material could [05:40] could be very devastating. Okay, so [05:43] they're meaning the big concern is if [05:45] the uranium gets to where the the [05:47] centrifuges are and the centrifuges can [05:49] operate that they could do something [05:52] they could really rush [05:54] to some kind of dirty bomb or nuclear [05:56] weapon and then that changes everything. [05:59] Okay, that's the concern. [06:02] That is why the new network of [06:03] underground tunnels and production halls [06:05] Iran has spent years excavating [06:08] beneath the site known as Pickaxe [06:09] Mountain has become a focus for Israeli, [06:12] American, and Western intelligence [06:14] agencies. facility lies about 1.5 km [06:17] south of the Natanz uranium enrichment [06:20] and nuclear production complex. [06:22] Excavation began in 2020 and the site [06:25] soon drew intelligence and scientific [06:27] attention because its intended purpose [06:29] remained unclear. [06:31] Iran may plan to turn the tunnel system [06:32] into an enrichment facility and transfer [06:35] advanced centrifuge arrays there from [06:37] the original Natanz site to protect [06:40] them. Alternatively, the complex could [06:42] be intended for work related to [06:44] assembling a nuclear weapon. There's [06:46] still no definitive answer. Let's let's [06:48] let's just sum this up very briefly. [06:51] When they start excavating deep into [06:52] this massive granite mountain, we're [06:54] going to find out more about the [06:55] geological nature of it, [06:58] they start excavating into that, it's [07:00] not because they're looking for a place [07:01] to, you know, store some school buses [07:03] or, you know, it obviously has some mi- [07:06] high, you know, highly sensitive [07:10] security purpose because it's very [07:12] difficult to do, to dig these [07:14] underground tunnels into a mountain like [07:15] that. And they're and they start So, [07:18] back in 2020, [07:19] Western intelligence notices that they [07:21] that Iran starts excavating under, you [07:24] know, digging tunnels underneath this [07:25] mountain only a kilometer and a half [07:27] away [07:28] from Natanz and Natanz is a massive [07:32] uranium enrichment and nuclear [07:34] production complex. [07:35] Okay, so right near Natanz, they're [07:36] digging this underground facility. What [07:38] do they want to do with it? But they're [07:39] not sure what it was for. Is it a place [07:42] to Is it Are they going to make another [07:44] uh uh [07:44] uh [07:45] uranium enrichment facility? Are they [07:47] going to use that as the place where [07:49] they're going to assemble a nuclear bomb [07:51] like once they do everything else [07:52] everywhere else cuz the the thing you [07:54] want to protect the most is once you're [07:56] assembling a bomb cuz you have to the [07:57] Iranians know that the Israelis and the [07:59] US have great intelligence. So, if [08:01] they're going to actually assemble a [08:03] bomb, if they're going to get to that [08:04] stage and they were close, they had 60% [08:06] enriched uranium, they need a facility [08:08] where they can do it securely. [08:10] Okay? Maybe that's what they're doing. [08:11] They didn't know. [08:13] Okay. There's still no definitive [08:15] answer. [08:16] Geologically, Pickaxe Mountain is [08:18] composed of igneous rock, primarily [08:20] granite, according to a Wall Street [08:22] Journal report published Tuesday. [08:24] Its tunnels lie between 100 and 135 m [08:27] underground. [08:30] Hold on. [08:32] Here we go. Just jumped on me. [08:35] Um making them almost completely [08:37] resistant to conventional aerial [08:39] bombardment. Both the depth and the [08:41] hardness of the surrounding rock [08:43] resemble the characteristics of Iran's [08:46] Fordow enrichment plant. You might [08:48] remember Fordow, you remember that name? [08:50] Both Natanz and Fordow were hit in [08:53] Operation Midnight Hammer at the end of [08:55] the 12-day war at the end of Israel's [08:57] Rising Lion operation last summer. [08:58] That's the 12-day war. US B-2 bombers [09:01] and specialized munitions were required [09:03] to damage Fordow's underground [09:05] facilities and bury uranium enriched to [09:08] 60% that had been stored there. [09:11] The name Pickaxe Mountain is itself a [09:13] translation. Its Persian name Kuh-e [09:15] Kolang refers to a pickaxe or hoe, [09:19] apparently reflecting the difficulty of [09:21] excavating the mountain even in ancient [09:24] times. Despite modern equipment and [09:26] reported Chinese expertise, tunneling [09:29] through it remains highly complicated. [09:31] So, you have this It's a very It's a [09:33] granite igneous rock granite mountain, [09:37] very, very hard rock. [09:39] And [09:40] and its tunnels are between 100 and 135 [09:43] m underground. [09:46] Okay, so they are So, you can't just [09:48] bombard them from the air. [09:50] The underground facility was not [09:52] attacked in June 2025 because it was [09:55] empty or nearly empty, and its intended [09:57] role had not been established. [10:00] After operation After operation Rising [10:02] Lion, I mean, you might say, "Well, why [10:03] not destroy it anyway?" We'll see soon [10:06] why not. [10:07] It's not such a simple matter. Okay, [10:09] well, this will all become very clear as [10:10] we keep reading. Okay, but just bear in [10:12] mind [10:13] they they start digging the facility in [10:15] 2020. Even in June 2025 when when [10:18] Midnight Hammers happening and the [10:19] Americans are hitting Fordow, and [10:21] Natanz, and Isfahan, these other nuclear [10:23] facilities, this Pickaxe Mountain place [10:25] is just basically empty tunnels. [10:29] After operation Rising Lion, [10:32] however, Iran began moving centrifuges [10:35] and other equipment from Natanz to the [10:38] Pickaxe the Pickaxe Mountain tunnels, [10:41] along with machinery recovered from [10:43] other nuclear sites that had been [10:44] bombed. [10:46] The transfers did not begin immediately. [10:48] Iran first needed time to clear the [10:50] entrances to damaged tunnels at Natanz, [10:52] Fordow, and Isfahan. [10:54] Only several months later in the fall of [10:56] 2025 did it begin secretly transferring [10:59] surviving or lightly damaged centrifuges [11:03] to Pickaxe Mountain. [11:05] Okay, now we're getting the plot. [11:08] Back in June 2025 [11:10] 12-day war, Pickaxe Mountain's an empty [11:12] bunch of tunnels. [11:14] It could be that it was originally meant [11:16] for whatever, enrichment or or or [11:18] assembling a bomb, we don't know. [11:21] But after the Midnight Hammer attacks on [11:24] the main the three main nuclear [11:25] facilities, Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan, [11:29] it then takes the Iranians a little [11:31] while to excavate the entrances to those [11:34] places so that they can get out what's [11:36] inside. And inside there's all this [11:38] damaged equipment. So, they just [11:39] basically say, "Okay, take everything [11:42] that we can salvage [11:43] and and get it over to pickaxe and put [11:45] it in the tunnels of pickaxe where it [11:47] will be safe. [11:48] Okay? Meaning a [11:50] a [11:51] just maybe a junkyard or maybe a storage [11:54] facility. They're They're moving the [11:55] equipment, whatever they could whatever [11:57] could be salvaged, they're moving it [11:59] into pickaxe. [12:03] Iran attempted to conceal the activity [12:05] from satellite sensors and other [12:06] intelligence systems operated by Israel [12:09] and the United States, but apparently [12:10] with limited success. [12:12] Even so, the site was not attacked [12:14] during Israel's Roaring Lion operation, [12:16] that is [12:17] uh or the American Epic Fury campaign. [12:19] That's the same operation. That's [12:21] February 28th to April 7th. That's what [12:23] we call the the first stage of this war. [12:25] So, they didn't attack it then, either. [12:28] They'd already been The [12:30] Let's follow the timeline. The Iranians [12:31] had already been We knew that they were [12:33] moving stuff in there [12:35] in late 2025, but we still didn't attack [12:38] it. [12:40] Okay, we still didn't attack it in the [12:42] first stage of this war. Why not? [12:45] Okay? [12:48] One likely reason is that the facility [12:51] was still not being used for actual [12:53] nuclear activity, [12:55] such as uranium enrichment or weapons [12:57] design, [12:59] and served only as a storage location. [13:01] Another equally important reason is that [13:03] seriously damaging the mountains' [13:05] tunnels would require an exceptionally [13:07] large operation that only the United [13:09] States could carry out. [13:12] Only the US Air Force possesses the [13:14] roughly 10-ton GBU-57 [13:17] bunker-busting bomb, which can penetrate [13:19] approximately 60 m of hard rock. Now, [13:22] remember we mentioned that these tunnels [13:24] are are between 100 and 135 m [13:26] underground. [13:27] The United States also operates the [13:29] stealth B-2 bombers capable of carrying [13:31] several of the weapons. [13:33] During the June 2025 midnight hammer [13:35] operation against Fordow and other [13:38] underground nuclear facilities, the [13:39] United States deployed [13:42] seven B-2 bombers [13:44] carrying 14 highly precise [13:47] bunker-busting bombs. Each weapon was [13:49] dropped into the crater created by the [13:52] bomb before it allowing the strikes to [13:55] reach an estimated depth of 80 to 100 m. [13:58] You follow this? Meaning they would drop [14:01] a bomb [14:02] it wouldn't go it wouldn't go down far [14:04] enough and then they would drop another [14:05] one into that crater to keep penetrating [14:07] deeper and deeper. [14:09] The shocks created around Fordow damaged [14:13] its highly sensitive centrifuge systems [14:15] and rendered them unusable. [14:19] The attack was one of the largest [14:21] operations conducted by the US Air Force [14:23] since World War II. Seismic stations [14:26] near Fordow recorded tremors equivalent [14:28] to a magnitude 4.3 earthquake. [14:31] The damage affected not only the rapidly [14:34] spinning centrifuges but also the [14:35] carefully leveled foundations on which [14:37] they stood. US and Israeli intelligence [14:40] agencies therefore concluded that Fordow [14:42] had been taken out of service [14:44] even if it was not completely destroyed. [14:47] Let's understand this now again. [14:49] >> [snorts] [14:49] >> You might still be wondering, why didn't [14:50] they attack it yet? Why didn't they [14:52] attack it it between February 28th and [14:54] April 7th when all that intense bombing [14:56] and the Israelis and the Americans, you [14:58] know, epic fury, why didn't they attack [15:00] Pickaxe Mountain yet? Well, think about [15:02] it this way. It said here that they [15:04] didn't attack it his his first one [15:07] likely reason is that it was still not [15:09] being used for actual nuclear activity, [15:11] but you might be asking, well, so what? [15:12] All the equipment is there. Understand. [15:17] Put yourself into the into the shoes of [15:19] the [15:20] of the Americans and Israelis and you're [15:22] watching everything Iran is doing. [15:24] And you see them getting all the damaged [15:27] stuff out of these other sites. [15:30] If you let on too early [15:36] that you know what Pickaxe Mountain is, [15:40] then you can't inflict maximum damage on [15:42] your enemy. Meaning, if you see them [15:43] moving all of this equipment from all [15:45] these other sites and they're putting it [15:46] all in Pickaxe Mountain, [15:48] why bomb Pickaxe Mountain before they're [15:50] done? [15:52] If you bomb it before they're done [15:54] moving everything in, [15:56] then maybe the main stuff that you [15:58] really want, maybe the enriched uranium, [15:59] maybe [16:00] you don't know what else is going to go [16:01] in there yet. And it's not yet a threat. [16:04] They haven't repaired these damaged [16:07] centrifuges. We don't know [16:09] The best thing to do, especially because [16:11] it's such a complex operation, as we'll [16:12] find out, is just watch and prepare [16:15] plans for how you're going to deal with [16:17] Pickaxe Mountain. You can already start [16:18] preparing. [16:19] But the best thing to do is just observe [16:21] what they're doing. [16:24] Okay. [16:29] The bombers flew directly. Now, he's [16:30] talking about how Midnight Hammer ran, [16:32] because in we have In order to [16:34] understand like when we're when we're [16:36] watching the news today, and everyone's [16:38] like that news clip of Trump, "Oh, we're [16:40] going to attack Pickaxe Mountain." Let's [16:42] He's now going to go through what [16:44] happened in Midnight Hammer, so that we [16:45] can understand what an operation against [16:47] Pickaxe Mountain would have to look [16:49] like. [16:50] The bombers flew directly from a base in [16:52] Missouri and returned there, spending [16:54] more than 30 hours in the air. A [16:56] separate deception operation sent seven [16:59] other advanced B-2 bombers toward Guam [17:02] in the Pacific Ocean, apparently to make [17:04] Iran believe the attack would come from [17:06] that direction. No less important, [17:09] however, was the effect on the American [17:11] weapons stockpile. The operation So, we [17:15] described the operation before that they [17:16] would drop one of these bunker buster [17:18] bombs, it would go only so far, and then [17:20] they would have to drop another one into [17:22] the crater created by that one, etc., to [17:25] get all the way down. [17:27] So, what was the effect on the [17:28] Americans' weapons stockpile? The [17:30] operation used 14 of the roughly 20 [17:35] heavy bunker busting bombs the United [17:37] States reportedly possessed. The [17:39] Americans only had 20 of these things. [17:41] And they used 14 in Midnight Hammer, [17:44] nearly exhausting the available supply. [17:47] That suggests an attack on Pickaxe [17:49] Mountain would be at least as [17:51] complicated and perhaps more so. [17:54] Before Midnight Hammer, the Israeli Air [17:56] Force cleared a route for the American [17:58] bombers by destroying Iranian air [18:00] defenses on the way to Fordow, Natanz, [18:02] and Isfahan. Even then, the United [18:04] States deployed an escort force of 125 [18:08] aircraft, including F-22 stealth [18:12] fighters, electronic warfare aircraft, [18:14] and other platforms protecting the B-2s. [18:18] So, there's the seven B-2s, [18:21] plus 125 other aircraft that were all in [18:24] this mission together. [18:26] A strike on Pickaxe Mountain would [18:28] likely require Oh my gosh, why does it [18:31] do this? [18:34] A strike on Pickaxe Mountain would [18:35] likely require the same capabilities, [18:37] including Israeli assistance. [18:40] For now, therefore, the main [18:42] consideration for Israel and the United [18:44] States remains one of cost versus [18:46] benefit. This is one of these websites [18:47] with lots of pop-ups constantly, so it's [18:49] always shifting around on me. [18:51] Okay. [18:52] So, you see how complicated a strike on [18:54] Look, when we say "Yeah, yeah, how come [18:55] they haven't hit Pickaxe yet?" Oh, Trump [18:56] said, "Yeah, we're going to hit [18:57] Pickaxe." Understand, we're talking [18:59] about a massive, massive complicated [19:02] operation. [19:05] You know, when you think about you know, [19:06] think about Midnight Hammer, like a [19:08] massive operation here to destroy [19:10] Pickaxe. [19:12] And that's why it's not so simple to [19:14] say, "Oh yeah, they should have just [19:15] destroyed it in epic fury." Unless you [19:16] know that it is absolutely the right [19:19] timing and the right thing to do, you [19:20] don't do it. [19:22] Now he's going to go through a number of [19:24] different conditions that need to be met [19:26] in order to carry out such a mission. [19:29] According to the Wall Street Journal, [19:30] Pickaxe Mountain is not currently being [19:32] used for active nuclear work. It served [19:35] only as a storage site for centrifuges [19:38] and other equipment that has not been [19:40] installed or maintained in a way that [19:41] would allow it to be used in the near [19:43] future. [19:45] To reproduce the effect achieved against [19:47] Fordow last year, four basic conditions [19:50] would need to be met. [19:53] First, intelligence agencies would need [19:55] evidence that Iran had moved its [19:57] stockpile of uranium enriched to 60% [19:59] into the facility and it and had [20:01] installed and activated at least some [20:03] centrifuges and other equipment even on [20:05] a trial basis. [20:08] Think about it. If And that's what Trump [20:11] meant in that clip. That's why I said to [20:12] you, I pointed that out when we watched [20:13] the clip. When Trump says, "We care [20:15] about the material. Without the [20:16] material, it doesn't matter." He's [20:18] absolutely right. If it's just a bunch [20:20] of broken centrifuges that are being [20:22] stored there to be repaired or whatever, [20:25] that's not a threat. There's no reason [20:27] to do this massively complicated and [20:29] expensive and and risky operation where [20:32] you really only get one shot at it. [20:34] There's no point in doing that if it's [20:36] not if you haven't if the uranium is [20:38] somewhere else and maybe there's some [20:39] other centrifuge fuses somewhere else. [20:41] So, unless it's actually [20:45] somewhat operational, [20:48] that they've moved the uranium there [20:50] and installed and activated at least [20:52] some centrifuges, [20:54] there's no reason to hit it yet. Second, [20:57] they would need sufficiently detailed [20:59] intelligence on the precise location of [21:02] the centrifuge production and operation [21:04] operating halls to strike them [21:06] accurately. And we're going to learn [21:07] more about that in a moment. They have [21:09] to know exactly [21:12] exactly [21:14] where the centrifuges are. [21:16] And the other equipment is, you'll see. [21:19] Third, [21:21] the US defense industry would need to [21:24] replenish an adequate stock of GBU-57 [21:27] heavy bunker-busting bombs. [21:29] And the fourth condition is that the US [21:31] Air Force would need to complete the [21:33] planning and logistical preparations for [21:35] an operation at least as complex as [21:37] Midnight Hammer. That would take time [21:40] and cost a great deal of money, and [21:41] that's probably already happening. So, [21:42] you think So, look at all these [21:44] different factors that are that are at [21:46] play here. [21:48] Collecting intelligence on the facility [21:50] is unlikely to be easy. [21:52] To achieve meaningful damage, now here [21:54] we go. This gets into how precisely [21:57] they need to to hit. [22:00] What they what I just said before about [22:02] how they have to know exactly where the [22:03] centrifuges are. Look at this. To [22:05] achieve meaningful damage, planners [22:07] would need to know exactly where the [22:09] centrifuges had been installed and [22:10] calculate the bombs' impact points to [22:13] within one or two meters. We're talking [22:15] about [22:17] you know, a meter is is just under 3 ft. [22:22] So, like like 5 and 1/2, 6 ft, perhaps [22:24] even less. [22:26] One or two meters, 1 meter is is 3 ft. [22:30] It's just I'm sorry, just over 3 ft. A [22:32] meter is just over 3 ft. [22:35] Right? [22:37] So, [22:38] one to two meters is like [22:41] just a couple feet. [22:43] Perhaps even less. They have to know [22:44] exactly. It can't even be enough to know [22:46] the general area in the mountain where [22:48] the centrifuges are. They need to know [22:49] exactly where they are. [22:51] Why? [22:53] The weapons would have to strike the [22:54] same area in succession, [22:57] penetrate the granite, and damage the [22:59] centrifuge halls and underground [23:01] installations, rather than merely shake [23:04] the mountain. In other words, this would [23:06] be a one-time operation requiring [23:08] precise timing. You see the way that the [23:11] centrifuges in Fordow [23:13] were damaged in Midnight Hammer, they [23:16] weren't hit directly. The impact was [23:19] close enough to them that the damage [23:22] that the that the shaking, the tremors [23:24] rendered them inoperable. [23:27] But you have to be very close because of [23:29] this igneous granite rock, [23:33] they have to be close enough [23:35] within a meter or two [23:37] to make sure that they damage the [23:39] centrifuges enough. [23:42] Meaning if it's if it's even 10 ft away [23:45] where your bunker buster hits and the [23:46] centrifuge is 10 ft away, [23:49] it's not going to it's not going to be [23:50] rendered inoperable. [23:52] It would need to take place just before [23:54] Iran began producing weapons-grade [23:56] fissile material, but not so early that [23:59] the strike failed to cause a meaningful [24:01] delay in the nuclear program, right? Cuz [24:03] if if the if the fissile material, if [24:05] the uranium is not in there, [24:09] and you know, and [24:11] and you strike and you didn't [24:13] and the 60% uranium is not damaged or [24:16] somewhere else, [24:18] then you've wasted it. [24:23] Israeli and American intelligence and [24:25] military officials had preferred to keep [24:27] those calculations secret. [24:29] Several days ago, however, Trump said [24:31] during an interview on a popular podcast [24:33] that the United States was indeed [24:35] planning to attack Pickaxe Mountain. The [24:37] pickaxe was out of the bag and the [24:38] secret was no longer secret. There's [24:40] still no public evidence [24:42] that Iran has installed the centrifuges [24:44] stored in the mountain's tunnels for [24:46] operation. Satellite images, however, [24:48] show Iranian work around the tunnel [24:50] entrances and elsewhere to reinforce and [24:52] harden them, allowing continued access [24:55] even if the area is bombed. At the same [24:57] time those entrances would be difficult [24:59] for ground forces to reach if the United [25:01] States decided on an operation to [25:03] destroy the facility's contents [25:05] or potentially remove [25:10] or potentially remove enriched uranium [25:12] stored there. [25:13] That's it. That's the piece. [25:15] Okay. So now we understand why this, you [25:18] know, the answer to the question that he [25:20] raised at the beginning of the article, [25:21] why the US and Israel have not struck [25:23] Pickaxe Mountain, [25:24] it's starting to make more sense now. [25:27] All right? [25:28] That, you know, we can see why they why [25:30] they haven't done it. Here's a little [25:31] picture of Pickaxe Mountain. [25:34] Okay. That's this piece. [25:41] A lot of coughing today. Okay. [25:43] Now [snorts] [25:44] Now [25:45] the Iranian state media 2 days ago ran [25:49] this on the front page of WANA as a [25:51] cover story. Mount Kolang, that's [25:54] Pickaxe Mountain, a second Fordow or [25:57] Trump's exit from the war. And this is [26:00] Iranian state media piece of analysis of [26:03] the situation. [26:06] 2 days before Donald Trump publicly [26:07] mentioned [26:09] Mount Kolang for the first time, the [26:11] underground site had already become a [26:12] recurring subject of Western media [26:14] reports, [26:16] satellite imagery and security analysis. [26:18] The sequence raises an important [26:20] question. Is Washington preparing public [26:22] opinion for a military strike or is it [26:24] already constructing the narrative of [26:26] one? [26:27] Now notice what they're doing. Their [26:29] framing of this is [26:32] that [26:35] the fact that it's being talked about [26:38] by President Trump [26:41] and that even before he started talking [26:44] about it, the media was talking about [26:46] it. Remember Trump even said in that [26:47] interview this, you know, when when the [26:49] when the when the sorry, in that press [26:51] conference, [26:52] That press gaggle, when the reporter [26:54] said, "Have the Iranians Have the [26:56] Iranians moved stuff?" And he says, [26:58] "Well, you know, we're just getting what [26:59] You know, whatever we We're just seeing [27:00] whatever we see from the fake news, [27:02] right? We're just watching the media. [27:03] The media has been talking about it." [27:05] So, the Iranians here are saying, "Hmm, [27:08] >> [clears throat] [27:08] >> why is Trump and the media talking about [27:10] it?" Even though they've been talking [27:12] you know, the fact that they've been [27:13] talking about it is a co- [27:15] is what they want to analyze. [27:17] The question matters because Trump's own [27:20] remarks revealed no a notable [27:22] contradiction. [27:24] He said Washington had no verified [27:26] intelligence [27:29] He said that Washington had no verified [27:31] intelligence [27:34] indicating that Iran had transferred its [27:37] centrifuges to Mount Kolong, yet in the [27:39] same breath insisted that the facility [27:41] would be struck soon and very hard. [27:44] In military practice, publicly [27:47] announcing the timing and target of an [27:49] operation before it takes place is [27:51] highly unusual. Unless the objective [27:54] extends beyond the operation itself. [27:56] This is actually a smart thing. Not [27:57] everything they say is false. There's [27:59] some excellent analysis in this piece. [28:01] But you see the direction they're [28:02] headed. They say, "Hmm, [28:04] >> [clears throat] [28:06] >> it's one thing for there to be a [28:08] military target. It's another thing for [28:11] Trump to telegraph in advance that [28:13] there's this military target. [28:16] And if he's telegraphing in advance, [28:19] then there must be some other objective [28:21] of the operation here. [28:23] Why is he Meaning, they want to analyze [28:25] why is Trump telegraphing? Why is he [28:27] talking about it? And remember Trump [28:29] said in that gaggle, you know, it [28:31] doesn't even There's not a thing they [28:32] can do about it. And usually I wouldn't [28:34] say it in advance, but I'm saying it in [28:35] advance. So, they're trying to figure [28:37] out what game is Trump playing by saying [28:40] in advance that they're going to strike [28:41] it. [28:42] But also like he also said there's no [28:44] verified intelligence. Like think about [28:46] the clip we just saw. Let's go over the [28:48] clip again [28:49] and think about what we read in Ron [28:50] Ben-Yishai's piece. [28:53] Trump is asked, is there nuclear [28:54] activity going on there or is there or [28:56] is there material there? And he says, [28:57] "Look, if it's just centrifuges and they [28:59] don't have the uranium, then that's no [29:01] big deal and you know, and because where [29:03] the action is, we want to hit it." Which [29:05] is what Ron Ben-Yishai also said in that [29:06] article, that [29:08] you want to hit it when you get the [29:09] maximum effect. [29:12] So, [29:15] they're saying, "Wait a second, this is [29:16] confusing." [29:18] If you have no verified intelligence [29:20] that there's centrifuges there [29:23] or that they're doing anything, you're [29:24] just getting it from the media, why are [29:25] you also saying we're going to attack [29:26] that place very hard soon? [29:30] So, they're looking at it as a [29:31] contradiction. It's Trump confusing [29:33] them. [29:35] At least three competing explanations [29:37] have emerged to account for the sudden [29:38] prominence of Mount Kolah. [29:41] So, now they're going to present three [29:42] possible explanations [29:44] for what what's going on here. [29:49] The first argues many but again, for the [29:51] sudden prominence of Mount Kolah. They [29:52] They want to say, "Why is everyone [29:53] talking about it now? Why is Trump [29:55] talking about it now?" [29:56] Three possible explanations. The first [29:59] is that the United States is genuinely [30:01] seeking to eliminate what it sees as at [30:03] least one of the last critical [30:04] components of Iran's nuclear program. In [30:07] recent weeks, Western media have [30:08] published satellite imagery and reports [30:09] emphasizing the site's fortification, [30:11] portraying it as one of the US's US [30:13] military's most significant potential [30:15] targets. From this perspective, striking [30:17] Mount Kolah would simply continue the [30:19] strategy previously applied to other [30:20] Iranian nuclear facilities. In other [30:22] words, one possible explanation, very [30:24] simple, we can put in one sentence, is [30:25] that this is just another target in the [30:28] list of targets and that's what it's [30:30] about. It's a major target, it's hasn't [30:32] been hit yet and that's why they're [30:33] talking about it. [30:34] But this doesn't fully answer the [30:35] question, why is Trump revealing it? [30:38] The second narrative, however, [30:40] has um well, I'm going to jump down to [30:42] what I bolded here. The second narrative [30:44] is is the issue of [30:47] that that Trump might have some goal [30:49] that is not a military goal. [30:53] Does Trump need a military victory or a [30:55] political one? In recent weeks, the US [30:57] president has repeatedly insisted that [30:59] operations against Iran are not over, [31:01] while also claiming that even if the [31:03] United States withdrew from the region [31:04] today, rebuilding Iran's capabilities [31:07] would take 20 to 25 years, then making [31:09] it again sound like [31:11] sound like a contradiction. Like on the [31:13] one hand, he says, "Oh, yeah, we're just [31:14] getting started. We're going to hit them [31:15] harder. It's going to get worse for [31:16] them." And then he also says, "Well, you [31:18] know, we could leave tomorrow and and [31:20] and we basically won." [31:22] Such rhetoric sounds less like a [31:23] battlefield commander [31:25] uh than of a president [31:28] seeking to explain to the American [31:30] public why the conflict continues and to [31:32] ensure that if he eventually chooses to [31:33] end it, he could present that decision [31:35] as a success. Within that framework, [31:38] Mount Cylon could serve the same purpose [31:40] that certain symbolic operations have [31:42] served in previous wars. A high-profile [31:45] military action that creates the [31:47] conditions for declaring mission [31:49] accomplished, even if the underlying [31:51] strategic balance has changed very [31:53] little. [31:54] This is fascinating. So, they're saying [31:55] a second possibility of why it's being [31:57] talked about [31:59] So, possibility number one is it's going [32:00] to get struck and it's and it's going to [32:02] get struck because it's just another [32:03] target on the target list. It's part of [32:05] the escalation. [32:07] Possibility number two is it's going to [32:10] get struck, but the reason that Trump is [32:12] talking about it is that he's looking [32:14] for an off-ramp and he's looking for a [32:16] way to bring the war to a to an official [32:19] conclusion where he can declare victory. [32:22] So, if you spin up all of this chatter [32:25] about Pickaxe Mountain and the media [32:27] starts talking about it, "Oh, Pickaxe [32:29] Mountain, are they going to hit Pickaxe [32:29] Mountain?" And you know, and and [32:31] President Trump, have you decided to hit [32:33] Pickaxe Mountain yet? And you know, and [32:34] then and so if this if this buzz goes [32:37] around and and you you build this [32:39] narrative of how important it is [32:41] and then [32:42] the United States goes in with this big [32:44] dramatic [32:45] event and strikes Punggye-ri Mountain [32:47] then Trump can stand up at the mic the [32:49] next [snorts] morning and say we've hit [32:50] Punggye-ri Mountain [32:52] we've destroyed their nuclear program. [32:54] We're done. Our work here is done. [32:56] Mission accomplished and walk away. And [32:58] what they're saying is that that might [33:00] be so but even if the underlying [33:02] strategic balance has changed very [33:03] little and they're right. The underlying [33:06] balance would kind of not change very [33:07] much at all. [33:09] Because the regime those guys would [33:11] still be in charge of the regime. Who [33:13] knows what other equipment and [33:15] facilities they have. [33:17] It won't change the strategic balance. [33:20] Very interesting. That's the second [33:21] possibility. A third scenario is even [33:23] more complex. Over recent months Western [33:26] media have steadily elevated Mount [33:27] Kumgang's profile and Trump has now [33:29] translated that media narrative into [33:32] political messaging. Such an intense [33:34] focus may represent more than [33:36] preparation for an attack. It could [33:38] itself be part of a deception campaign. [33:42] History offers many examples of military [33:44] operations in which the true objective [33:46] lay somewhere other than where public [33:48] attention had been deliberately [33:49] directed. For that reason some analysts [33:51] suggest that the emphasis on Mount [33:53] Kumgang could be intended to divert [33:55] attention from other possibilities [33:57] including special operations, limited [33:59] strikes elsewhere or intelligence [34:00] activities. The this possibility cannot [34:03] be confirmed or dismissed outright. One [34:05] point however is clear. When the [34:07] president of the United States publicly [34:08] discusses a military operation before it [34:10] occurs, he's no longer speaking only [34:13] about a military target. He's also [34:15] shaping how the operation will be [34:16] perceived by domestic audiences, allies [34:19] and adversaries alike. In other words, [34:22] by talking about it Trump is already [34:25] setting the precedent [34:27] for whatever he's deciding to actually [34:29] do. [34:30] Fascinating. [34:32] And they're right about that. [34:34] And now Tehran's response. [34:36] Ebrahim Rezaei, a member of the Iranian [34:38] Parliament's National Security Foreign [34:40] Policy Commission, argued that a US [34:42] attack could provide compelling grounds [34:44] for changing Iran's nuclear doctrine. [34:48] Okay, this is code for this is a threat. [34:52] Because remember, the official doctrine [34:54] is that the Ayatollah gave a fatwa that [34:56] they're not supposed to create a nuclear [34:57] weapon. Yeah, right. But now they're [34:59] saying, well, you know, we might [35:01] actually uh change that if we're really [35:03] so under attack. [35:06] Other Iranian commentators have also [35:07] raised the possibility of withdrawing [35:09] from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation [35:11] Treaty or increasing uranium enrichment. [35:20] This is why the central question may not [35:21] be whether the United States is capable [35:23] of striking Mount Qolang. The more [35:24] important question is whether Trump [35:26] needs a military target or a political [35:28] narrative that allows him to bring the [35:29] war to a close. [35:31] If the latter is true, then Mount Qolang [35:34] may represent less a nuclear facility [35:35] than the final card the White House [35:37] hopes to place on the table before [35:39] returning to diplomacy. A card whose [35:41] true value lies not in the scale of [35:43] destruction it produces, but in the [35:45] story that can be told afterwards. [35:48] And to close this out, let's watch my [35:50] favorite clip of President Trump from [35:52] over 10 years ago when he was first [35:54] running for president. [35:55] His very first foreign policy address, [35:59] April of 2016. [36:03] >> And then there's ISIS. I have a simple [36:06] message for them. [36:07] Their days are numbered. I won't tell [36:11] them where and I won't tell them how. [36:14] We must [36:15] >> [applause] [36:20] >> We must, as a nation, [36:23] be more unpredictable. We are totally [36:25] predictable. We tell everything. We're [36:27] sending troops, we tell them. We're [36:29] sending something else, we have a news [36:31] conference. We have to be unpredictable. [36:35] And we have to be unpredictable starting [36:38] now. [36:40] >> There you have it, folks. [36:42] Unpredictability. [36:44] That is the Trump doctrine. It is a It [36:46] is not [36:48] I've said this many times. The [36:50] unpredictability, the misdirection [36:51] plays, the mixed messaging. Oh, we don't [36:53] really know what's there. We don't have [36:54] any verification. Yeah, we're going to [36:55] hit it pretty hard very soon. In the [36:57] same 60-second clip, Trump is [37:00] bamboozling his enemies. Look at that [37:03] piece in Iranian state media, where [37:05] they're trying to analyze, why is Trump [37:06] talking about this? Is it cuz of this? [37:07] Is it cuz of this? Is it cuz of this? [37:09] So, they're trying to sound smart, like, [37:10] well, there's a few different [37:11] possibilities for why he's doing this. [37:13] But, what it really shows you is that [37:15] he's completely bamboozled them. If [37:16] we're confused about what Trump is going [37:18] to do, remember, the enemy's also [37:20] confused. So, that it So, this is very [37:22] interesting. Uh Bottom line is this. An [37:25] attack on Pickaxe Mountain is a very [37:27] significant uh operation. [37:31] And it has to be done at exactly the [37:32] right timing for it to be worth doing. [37:35] On the other hand, that analysis that [37:36] they that the Iranians had, that second [37:38] option, is very realistic. I could see [37:40] that happening. Not that I'd be happy [37:41] about it, where Trump might be ginning [37:44] up all of this attention on Pickaxe [37:46] Mountain, and then when he attacks [37:47] Pickaxe Mountain, that's his off-ramp [37:49] where he can declare the war a victory. [37:52] Uh I doubt that that's what's happening, [37:54] but it's very interesting. It could [37:55] happen. It could be that way. We don't [37:57] know. Anyway, that's all I think you [37:59] need to know and more about Pickaxe [38:02] Mountain. I know this video went a [38:03] little long, but I hope it was worth it. [38:05] Please drop a comment. Let me know what [38:06] you thought. And I'll see you in the [38:08] next one.
