Transcript [00:00] But, the point is, if you're another [00:02] country on the planet and you're looking [00:04] at those three countries, Israel, the [00:05] most hated country in the world, by the [00:07] way, according to recent polls, and the [00:09] United States, which is not far from the [00:11] bottom, [00:12] and Iran, which country, right, looks [00:15] like it is the most responsible in terms [00:18] of its foreign policy, right? And it's [00:21] the Iranians, right? [00:26] >> Hello. [00:27] That is University of Chicago Professor [00:30] John Mearsheimer, one of the most cited [00:32] international relations scholars in [00:34] America, telling Tucker Carlson that [00:38] Iran is the most responsible actor in [00:41] the world right now. I want to spend [00:43] some time on this today because this [00:44] isn't just wrong. [00:46] It's wrong in a way that tells you [00:49] something very important about how [00:52] certain very smart people [00:54] go very badly off the rails. Now, John [00:58] Mearsheimer is not a fringe figure. He's [01:00] a serious academic. His 2001 book, The [01:03] Tragedy of Great Power Politics, is [01:06] genuinely influential. His theory called [01:08] Offensive Realism is taught in [01:11] universities around the world. The basic [01:13] idea [01:15] behind his worldview is that states are [01:18] constantly competing for power in an [01:21] anarchic world, [01:23] and that [01:24] ideology is mostly just noise. Like, [01:28] don't take ideology that seriously. What [01:30] matters is the distribution of power. [01:33] Okay, who has the military, who has the [01:35] economy, who has the geography. Now, [01:36] Tucker Carlson [01:38] and that whole camp treats Mearsheimer [01:41] like an oracle, like he's uh, you know, [01:43] he's it's gospel from the mountaintop [01:46] when Mearsheimer speaks. [01:48] And because of his academic credentials, [01:50] a lot of people who should know better [01:52] treat everything he says as [01:54] authoritative. But, here's what you need [01:56] to know before we go any further. [01:58] Mearsheimer has a track record, a long [02:00] track record of being wrong. [02:04] Wrong. He was I mean he he the stuff [02:06] that he said about [02:08] about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, [02:11] there's a lot of dispute about that, but [02:12] it's very reductionist [02:14] about [02:16] about how it was all the NATO countries' [02:18] fault. I mean again, there's some blame [02:20] to go around, but it [02:22] whatever it it it his theories [02:24] definitely gave cover for the Russia [02:26] apologists in the Russia-Ukraine war. [02:28] But he was he was wrong about [02:32] about Iran on multiple occasions, and [02:35] not just in the Tucker interview that [02:36] we're reacting to today, which just was [02:38] released in the last couple days. But on [02:41] the very first day of the 12-day war, on [02:44] June 13th, 2025, [02:47] and he had been predicting [02:49] in the lead-up to that war, he had been [02:51] predicting that it you know, there would [02:52] be all sorts of crazy escalation, and [02:55] the Russians and the Chinese would get [02:56] involved, and it would turn into this [02:57] massive World War. [02:59] Anyway, he said on June 13th, 2025, the [03:01] first day of the 12-day war, he sat down [03:03] with Judge Napolitano on the Judging [03:06] Freedom podcast, and I want to play [03:09] for you a clip of what he said there. [03:12] Okay, so let's pull that up. [03:16] This is again, this is from [03:18] This is from June 13th, the first day of [03:21] the 12-day war. Check this out. [03:25] >> I think the end result is you're going [03:26] to get a major war here. It's you know, [03:29] people who are talking about let's put a [03:32] damper on this, let's put an end to [03:33] this. I mean, I think this is [03:35] delusional. The Iranians simply have to [03:37] respond, and they have to respond in a [03:39] massive way, [03:41] and the Israelis will retaliate, and [03:43] then we're off to the races. And you [03:45] have 90,000 American troops. According [03:48] to Ritter, the vast majority of them are [03:52] personnel, not [03:53] frontline uh infantry who are almost in [03:57] a semicircle in that area. What happens [04:00] when some of them get killed? [04:03] >> Well, that will give us an incentive to [04:05] get deeply involved in the war. This is [04:07] what I was saying to you before. The [04:09] Israelis have a vested interest in [04:12] sucking us into the war. [04:14] Right? [04:16] What they want to do is get Americans [04:19] killed. Because if Americans get killed, [04:22] that guarantees that we come in. So, the [04:25] >> That's John Mearsheimer right at the [04:27] very beginning of the war. [04:30] Of the 12-day war. [04:32] Israel is trying to get Americans [04:35] killed. [04:36] You heard it here first. [04:39] So, I have three things to say about [04:41] what you just heard. First, he predicted [04:42] a massive Iranian retaliation. [04:45] Hezbollah fired zero missiles during the [04:48] 12-day war. Zero. Zero. [04:51] The Houthis fired, I think, two or three [04:54] during the entire 12-day war. [04:56] Um [04:58] He also said that it is really the [05:00] Israel strategy dependent on getting [05:02] Americans killed. Well, that didn't work [05:04] because zero American soldiers were [05:06] killed in the 12-day war. [05:08] Yeah, that's that's right. [05:10] Let me check that. Um yeah, zero. [05:13] And the third [05:15] the third thing he said there, this is [05:17] the one I want you to really sit with. [05:18] He said that anyone who thought that [05:20] this could be brought to a quick end was [05:22] delusional. That war ended in 12 days. [05:24] Now, you might think that the war we're [05:25] in now is an extension of it, but that's [05:27] only true because the Iranians spent the [05:29] intervening [05:31] you know, [05:32] eight months [05:33] rebuilding their ballistic missile [05:35] program, ramping up the speed towards [05:38] which they were running to a nuclear [05:39] weapon. That's why. [05:42] But, that 12-day war that he was talking [05:43] about, it ended very, very quickly. All [05:45] three predictions he made were wrong. He [05:47] made other predictions that were wrong. [05:49] During the course of the 12-day war, by [05:51] the way, and during the course of this [05:53] war from April from February 28th to [05:55] April 8th, [05:57] he was constantly saying that Israel was [06:00] suffering untold damage that they that [06:02] they just weren't telling people about, [06:04] which is absolute nonsense. [06:06] Absolute nonsense. Talking about how Tel [06:09] Aviv was was going up in flames and [06:11] getting decimated. And if you heard any [06:12] of those conspiracy theories during the [06:14] time where there was like [06:15] AI pictures claiming that Tel Aviv was [06:16] on fire, absolute nonsense. So, [06:18] Mearsheimer has a long track track [06:21] record of being wrong, especially about [06:23] the Middle East. Now, on his Substack, [06:25] right in the middle of that 12-day war, [06:28] he titled a post [06:30] Israel is not winning versus Iran. And [06:33] he warned that if Trump entered the [06:34] fight, he'd be, in his words, "Jumping [06:36] into the deep kimchi." That was the [06:39] cute phrase he used. [06:41] Uh saying that it would be like a [06:42] quagmire and it would be it would drag [06:44] in deeper. Now, within days, Operation [06:46] Midnight Hammer began. The B-2 bombers [06:48] struck Iran's nuclear facilities. Iran's [06:50] missile capability was reduced to [06:52] roughly 10% of what it was before. [06:55] And [06:57] that was it. No American soldiers [06:58] killed, no quagmire, no deep kimchi. [07:01] These were specific falsifiable [07:04] predictions [07:05] massive Iranian retaliation, [07:08] which there was not. [07:09] Uh [07:10] meaning there [07:11] I mean, they retaliated. It was a very [07:13] unsuccessful. Like almost almost all the [07:15] rockets they fired were intercepted. [07:18] Very very few casualties. Zero American [07:20] casualties. No prolonged major war. [07:23] And that was all his predictions about [07:25] the 12-day war. So, when Mearsheimer [07:27] sits down with Tucker Carlson and tells [07:29] you Iran is now stronger and Israel is [07:31] weaker than before this war, I need you [07:34] to keep that track record in mind. Now, [07:37] I want to go to the central claim of the [07:38] interview with Tucker Carlson. [07:41] Here's a Mearsheimer explaining why Iran [07:44] has the upper hand [07:47] right now. [07:53] >> The Iranians are now in the driver's [07:56] seat. The Iranians started this war on [07:59] February 28th [08:01] of this year in a much weaker position [08:04] than they are in now. They've actually [08:07] done quite well in the war. [08:10] Uh as we saw when they attacked Israel a [08:13] few days ago. Here you have a situation [08:15] where Israel did not attack Iran. Iran [08:18] felt that it was free to attack Israel. [08:23] >> Okay, there's his argument. [08:27] So, [08:28] they fear they you know they they feel [08:31] that they're in the driver's seat. [08:33] Actually, you know what? Let me play a [08:34] little bit more of that clip. [08:35] Let's go a little further with it. [08:37] >> And Iran has made it clear it's more [08:40] than willing to go up the escalation [08:41] ladder with us and with Israel. They [08:44] feel like they're in the driver's seat. [08:46] >> There you go. They feel like they're in [08:47] the driver's seat. That's where I should [08:49] have stopped the clip. Iran in the [08:50] driver's seat. Now, let's test that [08:52] claim against what we actually know. [08:54] Since the beginning of this war, we've [08:55] seen the following documented. Iran's [08:57] missile launching capability is down by [09:00] over 90%. [09:02] Their navy is at the bottom of the [09:03] Persian Gulf, pretty much all of it. [09:05] Their drone manufacturing infrastructure [09:07] is being systematically destroyed. It is [09:09] basically destroyed. [09:11] Their leadership has been struck to [09:13] multiple layers deep. [09:15] And they're still [09:16] even in the last strikes, Israel took [09:18] out a few more. [09:19] Their manufacturing base for missiles [09:21] and drones pretty much annihilated by [09:23] their own account. [09:24] Now, Mearsheimer would say, and this is [09:26] a fair point, that Iran controls the [09:27] Strait of Hormuz and they have real [09:30] leverage. [09:31] But here's what he's missing. Iran [09:34] had [09:35] leverage over the Strait of Hormuz [09:36] before the war, too. But, it it no [09:39] longer has the military archi- [09:41] architecture that makes it a serious [09:43] regional power. [09:44] They're a nuisance right now, and this [09:46] needs to be solved, but the missiles, [09:47] the drones, the navy, the proxy network, [09:50] they're all either gone completely or [09:53] severely degraded. [09:55] So, confu- you know, what Mearsheimer is [09:57] doing here, let me let me put a [10:00] put my finger on the specific [10:02] intellectual mistake he's making or [10:04] deception. [10:06] He's confusing the fact that the [10:08] Iranians currently have one piece of [10:10] leverage. It's a good piece of leverage. [10:11] It's a strong piece of leverage, the [10:13] Strait of Hormuz. That's their leverage. [10:14] That's what this whole thing's now If [10:16] they didn't have that, they'd have zero [10:18] leverage in this. So, he's confusing [10:20] this one source of leverage [10:24] with overall strength, [10:26] and that's a fundamental analytical [10:27] error. You know, like if I'm fighting [10:28] someone much, much more powerful than [10:30] me, and they're on top of me, and [10:31] they're beating me, but like I start [10:32] biting their pinky, and it like really, [10:34] really hurts them, and they have to [10:35] like, you know, and and and if they if [10:37] they do if they make one false move, [10:38] I'll bite even harder, and maybe bite [10:40] their pinky off. I don't know why I [10:41] thought of that example. It's a bizarre [10:42] example. I'm just giving an example [10:44] where like I can inflict damage, and I [10:46] and the the other side doesn't want that [10:47] damage to happen, but that doesn't equal [10:49] winning. [10:51] They have they The Iranians do have a [10:53] piece of leverage, [10:55] but that doesn't mean that they're in [10:56] the driver's seat. [10:58] And [10:59] once we're speaking about the proxy [11:01] network, uh here's something that [11:03] Mearsheimer says that sounds bold, but [11:05] is actually [11:06] very [11:08] revealing, right? He said that you have [11:10] a situation where Israel did not attack [11:12] Iran, but Iran felt that it was free to [11:15] attack Israel, right? You Mearsheimer's [11:17] framing this as Iran being confident and [11:19] in control. [11:21] Right? Look at this this is this what [11:23] Mearsheimer just said. Right? [11:25] This is Iran, you know, Iran felt free [11:28] to attack Israel. [11:30] Now, what was he talking about? He's [11:31] talking the attacks of last week [11:33] where Israel attacked the Dahieh Beirut [11:35] and Iran felt free to attack Israel and [11:37] he's making it seem that that's because [11:40] of like that you see how how strong Iran [11:42] is and how confident they are. They can [11:43] just go ahead and attack Israel. You [11:45] know why they did that? [11:46] He he he just doesn't understand what's [11:48] going on here. [11:50] They attacked Israel because they [11:53] miscalculated and thought that because [11:56] Trump had told the Israelis that he [11:58] wanted [11:59] that he wanted things kept quiet and [12:02] that he didn't want Israel to be [12:04] attacking Beirut, that if he attacked [12:07] Israel Israel would then have its hands [12:09] further tied by America and not be able [12:11] to retaliate. And sure enough, Trump did [12:13] ask Netanyahu not to attack not to [12:15] retaliate, but the Israelis did. [12:18] So, it was just a miscalculation on the [12:19] Iranians' part that they felt free to [12:21] attack Israel. They are they are scared [12:23] out of their minds about the possibility [12:25] of losing their grip on Lebanon. [12:28] So, they took action there because they [12:29] want to connect Lebanon to the [12:31] negotiations that they're having with [12:33] Trump so that they can use that [12:35] connection to get Israel to be pressured [12:38] to back off as part of the the MOU that [12:41] they're signing with Trump. That's what [12:42] it's about. It's not about being, you [12:45] know, strong and in the driver's seat [12:47] that they can go ahead and attack Israel [12:48] with impunity. That's got that's got [12:50] nothing to do with anything. Now, if [12:52] Iran is so strong and so dominant and in [12:54] the driver's seat where have the proxies [12:56] been? Like they you know, the Houthis [12:57] sort of like, you know, launched one [12:58] missile sort of symbolically. They're [13:00] not they're not closing the Bab [13:01] al-Mandab Strait. The Iraqi militias are [13:03] doing nothing. Iraqi [13:06] Iranian [13:07] uh uh proxies in Iraq have been [13:11] not a peep out of them lately. [13:12] And Hezbollah is on the run. [13:16] I mean [13:17] it's [13:19] During the 12-day war in June [13:22] During the 12-day war in June, let's go [13:23] back to that. I mentioned this earlier. [13:25] Hezbollah [13:26] was that was built [13:28] for decades specifically to come to [13:31] Iran's aid if Iran was ever attacked and [13:33] also to fight on behalf of Iran did [13:35] nothing. They did not fire a single [13:37] missile at Israel. The Iraqi Shiite [13:39] militias at the time, a few drones. [13:42] The Houthis, [13:44] two or three ballistic missiles. That's [13:45] it. [13:48] This is not a [13:50] The axis of resistance is not in a [13:52] strong position. [13:55] And he's he's making it seem like Iran's [13:57] network is so strong and look how bold [13:59] they are, look how strong they are. They [14:00] went ahead and attacked Israel last week [14:01] even though Israel didn't attack them. [14:04] They're They're making moves on the [14:05] chessboard, but what is the evidence [14:08] that they are strong? [14:10] Their entire regional strategy, this [14:12] ring of fire, this proxy network has [14:14] been so degraded [14:17] that it's all on the run or keeping its [14:19] head down. [14:21] And Mearsheimer looks at Iran attacking [14:22] Israel while Israel hadn't attacked Iran [14:24] yet and reads it as Iranian strength. [14:29] I read it as desperation. [14:34] Now we get to the part of the interview [14:35] that I think is the most important. I [14:36] think it's the most revealing about why [14:38] Mearsheimer gets all of this so wrong [14:41] here. So, let me pull up this next clip. [14:46] I think it is this one. [14:51] Yeah. [14:52] >> Yeah. [14:52] Well, as you know, we like to portray [14:55] other countries as irrational and crazy. [14:58] A second coming of Adolf Hitler. [15:00] >> Completely. [15:00] >> Uh and [15:01] >> theocracy where they throw gays off [15:04] buildings or something. It's like [15:06] >> But the truth is if you look at Iran [15:10] today and you look at the United States [15:13] and Israel today, which of those three [15:15] countries looks like the responsible [15:18] stakeholder in the international system? [15:20] >> Yeah, of those three countries, which is [15:23] you know [15:24] which seems the least [15:27] unreasonable? Which [15:29] This country seems like it has more [15:30] blasphemy laws than Iran sometimes. I [15:33] mean, it's crazy the number of things [15:34] you can't say in the United States cuz [15:35] you can't Certain words are literally [15:37] verboten. Certain interpretations of [15:39] history are crimes. Those aren't [15:41] blasphemy laws? Yes, they are. [15:45] That's I mean, that's just true. [15:47] But [15:48] >> there's much truth in that. But the [15:50] point is, if you're another country on [15:53] the planet and you're looking at those [15:55] three countries, Israel, the most hated [15:58] country in the world, by the way, [15:59] according to recent polls, and the [16:02] United States, which is not far from the [16:03] bottom, [16:05] and Iran, which country, right, looks [16:09] like it is the most [16:12] responsible in terms of its foreign [16:14] policy, right? And it's the Iranians, [16:17] right? [16:20] >> Yep. [16:22] Iran is the responsible one. [16:25] Now, I want to explain to you why a [16:26] serious, intelligent man can look at the [16:28] world and say something like that. [16:30] And what's wrong with the [16:33] intellectual framework that gets him to [16:35] that point? See, Mearsheimer [16:38] is a structural realist. His entire [16:40] theory rests on the premise [16:43] that ideology doesn't really matter that [16:45] much. That states act rationally to [16:47] maximize their security and their power. [16:50] That's the lens through which he sees [16:51] everything. [16:53] NATO, Russia, Israel, Iran. [16:56] Now, that framework works for a lot of [16:58] countries. [17:00] For a lot of countries, a lot of [17:01] countries, that is what they do. [17:04] We've talked about this on this channel [17:06] when we've talked about the whole issue [17:07] of nuclear weapons. [17:09] Right? That when people say, "Hey, [17:11] what's so wrong with Iran having a [17:12] nuclear weapon? Oh, what is cuz they're [17:14] a Muslim country? Just cuz they're bad [17:15] actors?" I mean, North Korea has a [17:17] nuclear weapon, Pakistan has a nuclear [17:18] weapon, Russia has a nuclear weapon, you [17:19] know? [17:20] Another bad actor gets a nuclear weapon, [17:22] what what's the big deal? Because [17:24] it it's a blind spot about Iran. It's [17:26] assuming that Iran also [17:29] acts rationally to maximize their [17:31] security and power. The problem is, [17:33] that's not the way the Iranian regime [17:35] works. I've been saying this for months. [17:37] I brought in serious experts on this [17:39] channel, on the Israel 365 news channel. [17:40] By the way, if you're not subscribed [17:42] there, please go to the Israel 365 news [17:43] channel and and subscribe there. [17:46] We talked to Mordechai Kedar right at [17:47] the beginning of the war, one of the [17:48] leading scholars of Islam and the Middle [17:51] East around. [17:53] The Iranian regime is not a conventional [17:56] nation-state. [17:57] They're not pursuing rational national [18:00] security geopolitical interests. [18:02] They are Twelver Shiites. They have an [18:05] apocalyptic [18:06] eschatological [18:08] theology that governs their decisions. [18:15] They their theology, they believe that [18:17] we're living in the end times and that [18:18] the hidden Imam, who's been hidden for [18:21] centuries, is about to return and that [18:23] the regime's role is to hasten his [18:25] return. [18:27] That's why they absorb devastating [18:29] military strikes rather than capitulate [18:31] to American demands. That's why they [18:32] fund proxies across the region at [18:35] enormous cost to their own people's [18:37] welfare [18:38] and even to the stability of their own [18:40] regime. [18:42] They are on a mission. [18:44] It's a religious mission. [18:46] This is why they've maintained death to [18:48] America and death to Israel as their [18:50] governing policy principle for 47 years. [18:54] When Mearsheimer strips all of that out [18:55] and just says, "No, no, no, no, no, they [18:56] don't really mean that. Let's just look [18:58] at the distribution of power and the [18:59] rational actor model." [19:01] He's using a tool built for, I don't [19:03] know, analyzing, you know, [19:06] the dynamics of World War I and and and [19:08] Europe or or or I don't [19:11] a game of risk. [19:14] He's pointing that at a regime that [19:15] thinks it is fulfilling divine prophecy. [19:19] Of course, he gets the wrong answer. So, [19:21] when he says Iran looks like the [19:22] responsible stakeholder or whatever [19:24] terminology he just used there, what he [19:25] really means is [19:27] if Iran were a normal secular state [19:29] rationally pursuing its interests, its [19:31] foreign policy would make a certain kind [19:33] of sense, but it is not. [19:36] And that one category error is the [19:38] source of almost every wrong conclusion [19:40] he reaches. This is a guy who has said [19:41] that it's no big deal really if Iran [19:43] gets a nuclear weapon. [19:45] Which is also something that's been [19:46] echoed by Tucker, who's his acolyte. [19:50] Now, let me I I I want to end on what I [19:51] think is the most tendentious claim [19:54] in this entire interview. [19:57] And it has to do with Israel. The they [19:59] he's talking about at the beginning of [20:00] this clip is Israel. And this is just [20:02] like [20:04] whatever. [20:05] Listen to this. [20:07] >> I mean, if you want to think about what [20:09] this war means to the Israelis, right? [20:11] They would have They were so much better [20:13] off with the JCPOA. [20:14] They were so much better off with the [20:16] deal that they would have gotten on [20:17] February 27th. Now they're in a [20:20] situation where I don't think they're [20:23] going to get a nuclear deal. I may be [20:25] wrong. I don't think they're going to [20:27] get a nuclear deal. And the Iranians, as [20:30] we both know, have a lot of highly [20:32] enriched uranium up to 60%. They can [20:35] easily turn into weapons-grade material [20:38] and build the bomb. [20:39] And the Israelis have just demonstrated [20:41] that they don't have the capability, and [20:44] we have just demonstrated that we don't [20:45] have the capability to go in there and [20:48] get that weapons-grade material and shut [20:51] down their nuclear enrichment capability [20:53] forever. [20:54] So, it is possible that the Iranians may [20:58] get a bomb. [20:59] >> All right. [21:00] So, Mearsheimer's conclusion is that [21:02] Israel would have been better off [21:04] with the JCPOA. That's the Obama nuclear [21:07] deal. [21:08] And that Israel has demonstrated that it [21:10] lacks the capability to solve the [21:12] nuclear problem. [21:13] And that Iran may still get the bomb. [21:15] And therefore, therefore, Israel is [21:18] worse off. This is the big mistake here. [21:20] Because you could argue this point like [21:22] maybe Iran will still get the bomb. [21:25] And does Israel have the capability on [21:27] its own to solve the nuclear prob- [21:28] problem? Um you could debate those [21:30] points, but he's his his conclusion from [21:33] all of this is that Israel is worse off [21:35] now than before this war. [21:38] Now, I'm not necessarily thrilled with [21:40] how things have gone. You know my [21:42] feelings about the ceasefire and about [21:44] where these quote-unquote negotiations [21:46] and Trump's desire for a deal are going [21:48] and and whatever happened and that how [21:50] some of the objectives of this war seem [21:52] to have fallen by the wayside. Okay, [21:54] that's a whole other issue. But to claim [21:56] that Israel is worse off now than before [21:58] the war started? [22:00] So, let's take these points one at a [22:02] time. First, the JCPOA. The JCPOA was [22:04] not going to prevent Iran from getting a [22:06] bomb. It was at best a delay mechanism. [22:09] That's That means really the structure [22:11] of the deal. [22:12] It had certain time [22:13] commitments. [22:16] It was a delay mechanism. And it was a [22:18] delay mechanism that Iran was already [22:21] violating in in terms of weaponization [22:23] work. [22:25] And inspections and everything else. [22:26] That was the whole problem with it. It [22:27] was not really enforceable. [22:29] It was a terrible deal. The idea that [22:31] Israel was better off with the JCPOA [22:34] is like some kind of weird nostalgia for [22:36] a deal that wasn't working. [22:39] Uh [22:41] negotiated with this regime whose word [22:43] is meaningless anyway. It's not a [22:44] serious strategic argument. Like I I [22:46] don't know how an intelligent person [22:47] makes that argument. Second, [22:50] he says here that Israel has [22:51] demonstrated that it lacks the [22:52] capability of dealing with uh you know [22:54] with Iran's nuclear problem. Okay, [22:55] Israel Iran's missile production is down [22:57] around 10%. Remember, Israel also took [23:00] over They destroyed all of Iran's air [23:03] defenses. And by the way, in this last [23:04] little round last week, that one day [23:06] back and forth, Israel destroyed the new [23:09] air defenses that Iran was was [23:11] installing since the ceasefire. [23:14] Iran has no air defenses. Israel has [23:16] freedom of operation over their skies. [23:20] Their navy is gone. [23:23] The B-2 bombers [23:24] decimated their main nuclear sites. [23:27] Their proxy network is [23:29] is on the run, degraded. [23:33] Mearsheimer's conclusion is that Israel [23:35] lacks the capability. Israel has the [23:36] capability. Israel has diplomatic [23:38] constraints put on it [23:40] because of of American interests and [23:42] other there's there's [23:45] there's diplomatic issues, [23:47] geopolitical issues that stand there, [23:48] but Israel's capability? [23:52] Left to its own devices, if America just [23:53] walked away and said, "Israel, do exact [23:55] do whatever you want in Iran." [23:57] As you wish. [24:01] Israel has the capability. [24:03] What he's really saying is this. Here's [24:04] what Mearsheimer is saying. He's saying [24:06] a cleaner, negotiated solution would [24:08] have been preferable. Maybe, okay, [24:10] that's a fair debate to have. But a [24:12] negotiated deal might have been better [24:14] is not the same as Iran is now stronger [24:16] and Israel is weaker. [24:20] Or that there's other I mean, you could [24:22] argue that there's other ways we could [24:23] have gone about this. [24:25] I mean, like maximum sanctions, the kind [24:28] of sanctions like much stronger [24:29] sanctions that would actually like [24:30] strangle the regime completely without [24:32] firing a shot. [24:34] Maybe you could you could make some [24:35] argument that there's other ways to have [24:36] gone about this. [24:38] But he's actually arguing that Iran is [24:40] now stronger and Israel is now weaker. [24:42] That's the whole That's the thrust of [24:44] all these clips I've played to you. And [24:45] that's the thrust of this whole [24:46] interview with with Tucker Carlson. It's [24:49] bizarre. [24:51] Here's what I think is actually true. [24:54] Iran's capacity to threaten Israel has [24:56] been [24:57] monumentally degraded. I mean, degraded [25:00] in the extreme. [25:01] Israel is so much safer [25:04] now than it than it's been in a long [25:05] time. Again, there's a lot of anxiety in [25:07] Israel about where this is going and [25:08] will they be able to rebuild themselves. [25:10] And then there's the whole issue of the [25:11] Iranian people. We need to get rid of [25:12] the regime. That's all true. [25:15] But to argue that Israel's weaker now? [25:18] The nuclear question remains unresolved. [25:21] It's true. [25:22] But unresolved is not the same as Iran [25:24] winning. [25:26] The regime has [25:28] their missiles are are a fraction of [25:30] what they were. [25:32] They've no navy. They the the proxy [25:34] network is [25:36] beaten back. [25:40] And the population is starting to stir [25:42] up again and we know whose side they're [25:43] on. They were cheering the Israelis [25:45] bombing them. [25:46] So let's bring this whole thing home. [25:47] Let's close out this video. John [25:49] Mearsheimer [25:50] is obviously a very intelligent person, [25:52] a brilliant man. Look at He rose to the [25:54] highest heights of academia, University [25:56] of Chicago. [25:58] Known worldwide. [26:00] But the tool that he invented to the one [26:03] tool he uses to analyze all geopolitics [26:06] doesn't work everywhere. [26:08] His realism strips out ideology. [26:11] It strips out the unique character of [26:14] specific regimes and it treats the [26:17] Islamic Republic of Iran as if it's just [26:19] another [26:21] state rationally pursuing its interests [26:23] on a map. [26:26] That's that's an error that is not a [26:28] minor one. [26:30] It it it blinds him. [26:33] On June 13th, 2025, the first day of the [26:35] 12-day war, he told us there would be [26:37] massive Iranian retaliation, Americans [26:40] would get killed, and anyone who thought [26:42] this would end quickly was delusional. [26:45] He was wrong about everything. [26:49] And he was wrong about everything like a [26:51] week and a half after he said it. [26:53] And now he's sitting with Tucker Carlson [26:55] and he's telling us that Iran is the [26:56] responsible actor, that it's in the [26:59] driver's seat, and that Israel is weaker [27:01] than before the war. [27:04] The people who are going to understand [27:05] this war correctly are the people who [27:06] take seriously what the Iranian regime [27:08] actually is, not just where it is on the [27:11] map and how many, you know, and like [27:14] looking at it as every other state. [27:19] Anyway, and this is this is the guy. [27:21] This is the guy that Tucker Carlson [27:22] looks at as his as his great as his [27:24] great mentor on on geopolitics. [27:28] I hope this made some sense. [27:30] And uh hope you appreciate it. Please [27:32] keep watching. [27:33] And uh [27:35] see you on the next one. God bless.
