Transcript [00:00] Hey everyone. So, two days ago Israel's [00:03] cabinet unanimously voted to formally [00:06] recognize the Armenian genocide, [00:08] something Israel had [00:10] deliberately avoided doing for decades [00:13] specifically to protect its relationship [00:16] with Turkey. [00:18] And the fact that they're doing it now [00:19] while everything else with Erdogan is [00:21] falling apart basically tells you where [00:24] this relationship actually stands. And [00:26] we'll come back to that at the end [00:28] because it's a pretty perfect bookend to [00:30] what I really want to talk about in this [00:32] video. But [00:33] this video, the idea for this video [00:35] actually started with a conversation I [00:37] had this morning. I ran into one of you, [00:40] an audience member, in my neighborhood, [00:43] who someone who watches this channel, [00:44] and he asked me a great question. He [00:46] said, "Why has Israel and Turkey's [00:48] relationship basically collapsed over [00:52] the last few years, over the last decade [00:54] or so?" And I said to him, "Look, [00:56] to really get [00:58] to really understand that you can't just [01:00] look at the headlines from the last few [01:01] years, you have to understand who [01:04] Erdogan actually is, where he comes [01:07] from, what he actually believes. So, [01:09] that's what we're going to do in this [01:09] video. We're going to So, that's the [01:11] question we're going to deal with. How [01:13] did Turkey-Israel relations get so bad? [01:16] So, let's start with Erdogan himself. [01:18] His backstory, honestly, explains a lot [01:21] more than people think. So, Erdogan grew [01:23] up in a poor religious neighborhood in [01:26] Istanbul called Kasimpasa. [01:30] Kasimpasa, I think is the correct [01:32] pronunciation. [01:33] It's not exactly a fancy part of town, [01:35] historically kind of a rough [01:37] working-class area. [01:39] And as a kid, he was actually a really [01:42] he was a really good soccer player, [01:44] footballer as you would say if you're [01:46] from from the UK or elsewhere. He was [01:48] really good. He was he was a striker, [01:51] scored a lot of goals. And by all [01:53] accounts, he had real talent and really [01:55] wanted to go pro. He he was a very [01:57] competitive player, but his father [01:59] who was a who was a devout Muslim, his [02:01] father was not into that. [02:03] And his father was not happy with him [02:05] being an athlete, and he used to beat [02:07] him for playing, so eventually that [02:09] ambition got knocked out of him. So, he [02:11] refocused on school, [02:13] uh went to study economics in college, [02:16] and during this period, his student [02:18] years, [02:19] he got pulled into the circles of [02:22] religious and intellectual thinkers [02:25] who were influenced by the Muslim [02:28] Brotherhood style political Islam. [02:31] Okay, that ideological foundation [02:34] which was formed pretty early in his [02:36] life, has never really left him. [02:39] And it's worth pausing on that for a [02:40] moment on for that on that Muslim [02:42] Brotherhood connection [02:44] uh because it it's a whole worldview. [02:48] The Muslim Brotherhood, going back to [02:50] its founding in Egypt in the 1920s, [02:53] looked at the collapse of the Ottoman [02:55] Empire and the abolition of the Muslim [02:58] caliphate that the Ottoman Empire [03:01] represented, [03:03] um that the end of the Ottoman Empire in [03:06] 1924, the founding of the Muslim [03:08] Brotherhood was just a couple years [03:09] later in response to it cuz they viewed [03:12] the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the fall [03:14] of the caliphate as a catastrophe, as a [03:17] moment that the Islamic world lost its [03:21] political unity and its protector. [03:24] And from the Muslim Brotherhood [03:25] perspective, what happened in Turkey [03:27] specifically [03:29] was a betrayal. [03:32] Um Ataturk [03:34] Kemal Ataturk who [03:37] brought Turkey into a secular, he wanted [03:39] to modernize and secularize Turkey, he [03:42] didn't just lose the Ottoman Empire, [03:45] they the Muslim Brotherhood saw it as [03:47] taking the heart of that empire and [03:49] forcibly secularizing it, which is true. [03:54] He banned religious courts, he closed [03:56] religious schools, he changed the [03:58] alphabet [03:59] and the call to prayer at one point. I [04:01] mean, he really it was very [04:04] drastic measures were taken in Turkey to [04:07] secularize and move away from Islamism. [04:10] And to the thinkers of the Muslim [04:11] Brotherhood, [04:12] this was a wound that needed to be [04:15] corrected. [04:17] So, the mission of the Muslim [04:18] Brotherhood is to bring back the [04:19] caliphate. [04:22] And Turkey became ground zero for this. [04:25] So, you have to understand that Erdogan [04:27] grew up in that ideological milieu, [04:30] um influenced by that thinking. [04:33] And a lot of his trajectory in his [04:35] career makes a lot more sense. He's not [04:37] just a conservative politician who [04:39] happens to be religious, who you know, [04:41] who who likes bashing Israel right now. [04:43] He genuinely sees himself as reversing a [04:47] historical tragedy, as undoing what [04:50] Ataturk did and restoring Turkey to [04:53] something like its Ottoman era role [04:56] as the center of the Muslim world. So, [04:58] that's the lens for everything that [04:59] follows, the Islamization at home in [05:01] Turkey, the neo-Ottoman foreign policy, [05:04] and his statements to that effect, even [05:07] the way he talks about Jerusalem and the [05:09] Palestinian cause [05:11] as things that he's personally here to, [05:14] you know, to you know, to defend. [05:17] So, in the 1990s, Erdogan becomes mayor [05:19] of Istanbul. [05:21] And credit where it's due, he was [05:22] actually a very effective, hard-working [05:24] mayor, is very popular. He won against [05:27] all odds, beating the entrenched secular [05:29] establishment parties. [05:31] Uh he beat them fair and square, and the [05:33] people who worked with him at the time [05:35] describe him as one of the most diligent [05:37] mayors Istanbul ever had. He was again [05:39] genuinely popular, not just with [05:41] religious conservatives, [05:43] but with regular people who noticed that [05:45] the city was functioning better. He was [05:46] effective. So, he was a very popular [05:49] mayor of the biggest city in Turkey. [05:51] And this is also interestingly an era [05:54] where Israel-Turkey relations were at [05:56] their peak. They were at their warmest. [05:58] If you talk to Israeli diplomats who [05:59] were active back then, they'll tell you [06:01] it was a real strategic partnership. [06:03] There were joint military exercises. The [06:05] Israeli Air Force trained in Turkish [06:07] airspace. There was intelligence [06:09] sharing, weapon sales, there was [06:12] tourism, [06:13] uh [06:14] cultural exchanges, museum exhibits [06:17] going back and forth. I mean, we had [06:19] really good relations with Turkey, which [06:21] is what my neighbor was asking me about [06:22] this morning. [06:24] And Erdoğan himself, even as mayor, [06:27] wasn't making waves on foreign policy. [06:30] He had warm personal interactions with [06:32] Israeli officials and with uh and with [06:34] Turkey's Jewish community. [06:36] No one was worried about Erdoğan at that [06:40] point. [06:41] But then, something happened in 1998. [06:45] That's where things take a take a bit of [06:46] a turn. Erdoğan [06:48] uh was at a political rally and he [06:50] recited a nationalist religious [06:54] poem [06:56] at this political rally. [06:58] And he got charged with inciting [07:00] religious hatred [07:02] and actually did jail time [07:06] for a few months. [07:07] And under Turkish law at the time, a [07:09] criminal a criminal conviction like [07:12] this, according to Turkish law, if you [07:14] have that criminal conviction, [07:16] you are permanently barred from holding [07:18] office. [07:19] But, instead of this ending his career, [07:23] it became kind of like a martyrdom [07:25] story. And he came out of prison even [07:27] more popular than when he went in. [07:29] His party then found a legal path around [07:31] the restriction, and he was a more [07:33] popular more a stronger political figure [07:36] than ever before. [07:39] And people who study Erdoğan closely [07:40] point to this period as the moment that [07:43] his his resentment towards Turkey's [07:46] secular establishment, particularly the [07:48] military, which has always positioned [07:51] itself as the guardian of Turkish [07:53] secularism, [07:54] uh that this is where um [07:57] this is the point where where Erdogan's [07:59] resentment towards them really hardened [08:01] and became kind of more personal. [08:04] That's what the people who study him [08:05] tend to say. [08:06] He He then founded a political party [08:09] uh in 2001 called the AKP, the Justice [08:12] and Development Party. [08:15] And the Justice the AKP combines [08:17] conservative political Islam with uh [08:21] economic reform messaging. And remember [08:23] he was a very popular, very successful, [08:25] very effective mayor of Istanbul. [08:28] And the AKP came into power in 2002. [08:32] A lot of people saw what he did in [08:33] Istanbul and they said, "Hey, you know, [08:34] even if I'm not so Islamic, [08:36] you know, he's [08:38] um [08:39] he's effective, [08:40] he's a good leader, [08:43] and uh and the economic situation also [08:45] of course helped. [08:47] So he becomes prime minister in 2003. [08:50] And from there slowly but steadily he [08:52] starts reshaping Turkey, rolling back [08:54] secular education policies, expanding [08:56] religious influence in public life, [08:59] curbing the power of the military and [09:01] the courts. [09:02] He basically uh was dismantling [09:06] he was dismantling the um [09:09] um the institutional checks that kept [09:11] Turkey secular ever since Ataturk, uh [09:14] ever since the founding of the modern [09:16] Turkish Republic. [09:18] Now here's the thing. [09:20] Early on in power, [09:23] in during those early years, in early [09:25] 2000s, Erdogan was still pretty [09:28] pragmatic towards Israel. He actually [09:30] visited Israel in 2005. [09:32] Um and he always talked about wanting to [09:34] play a constructive role in the [09:36] Israeli-Palestinian [09:38] um negotiations and the peace efforts. [09:41] There are accounts of warm, even [09:43] friendly, conversations with Israeli [09:45] leaders during this stretch. [09:47] So, what we're seeing today what it [09:49] wasn't just like an overnight flip. [09:50] Like, oh, Erdogan comes to power and now [09:52] they're Muslim, you know, now they're [09:53] Islamic Muslim Brotherhood types. It was [09:56] more of a kind of slow burn. The real [09:58] turning point, [10:01] which in retrospect is almost like it [10:02] looks like a point of no return, [10:05] you know, that I guess that's what a [10:06] turning point is. The real turning point [10:07] happens around 2008 and 2009. There was [10:11] a [10:12] There was a a war in Gaza that winter. [10:16] And Erdogan then shows up at the World [10:19] Economic Forum in Davos. And some of you [10:21] might remember this incident. And he got [10:23] into this heated [10:27] He got into this heated exchange at [10:30] Davos [10:31] with Shimon Peres, where after Shimon [10:34] Peres was talking about how we pulled [10:35] out of Gaza and you're making Israel's [10:39] case. It was supposed to be a debate. [10:40] And Erdogan [10:42] then [10:44] started accusing Israel of killing [10:46] babies and saying you really know how to [10:48] kill and and and calling Israel [10:50] murderers. And then he stormed off the [10:53] stage and turned his back on Peres. He [10:55] made a real demonstrative, dramatic [10:57] exit. It was really um [11:00] you know, it was In diplomatic terms, it [11:02] was about as big an insult as you could [11:04] deliver. You could find clips of it [11:06] online. [11:09] Um and up on the screen I just put like [11:10] a a news story from the time. [11:13] And here's what's Here's what's [11:14] important about that [11:16] for the Erdogan story. [11:19] That moment [11:22] helped him a lot politically. It didn't [11:24] hurt him at all. When he flew home to [11:27] Istanbul, he was greeted with a hero's [11:30] welcome. Look at this headline in Al [11:32] Jazeera. Erdogan hailed after Davos [11:36] walkout. Turkey PM returns to grand [11:39] reception after clashing with Israeli [11:42] president over Gaza. This is a headline [11:44] from 2009. [11:46] From January 2009. [11:49] Okay, so he was [11:51] so [11:52] that [11:54] tells you a lot about what was happening [11:55] in Turkey. [11:58] He was greeted like a conquering sultan, [12:00] right? He realized at that moment, [12:02] probably, [12:04] that being loudly and publicly [12:05] anti-Israel was good politics [12:08] both inside Turkey and across the wider [12:11] Muslim world. He was getting a lot of [12:13] positive press for this. He found a [12:15] signature issue that he could build more [12:18] popularity from. [12:19] And then in 2010, [12:21] you get the big one, the big event in [12:24] this whole story, [12:26] the Mavi Marmara incident. Okay, this [12:28] was a Turkish-organized flotilla [12:31] that that tried to break through [12:34] Israel's uh tried to come into you know [12:37] to come into Gaza through Israel's [12:38] territorial waters. [12:41] And [12:43] it was a it was a disaster of an event. [12:48] It's worth It's worth knowing who [12:49] actually organized it. A lot of people [12:50] probably remember that there were people [12:52] who were killed. We'll get into it a [12:53] little bit more in a moment. But it's [12:55] worth remembering that the Mavi Marmara [12:59] incident [13:01] was organized by a Turkish NGO called [13:05] IHH. [13:06] And the IHH presents itself as an [13:09] independent humanitarian charity, but in [13:11] practice it's what's known as a GONGO, G [13:14] O N G O, a government-organized [13:17] and non-governmental organization, [13:19] meaning that it operates with with deep [13:22] ties to and effectively the backing of [13:25] Erdogan's own political apparatus. So it [13:28] pretends to be non-governmental [13:29] organization, but it's basically [13:32] organized by the government. So this [13:34] wasn't some grassroots activist [13:36] flotilla. It was a state-adjacent [13:39] event that had Erdogan's [13:42] approval. [13:44] Behind the scenes, clearly. There's no [13:46] way that the IHH could do something [13:47] without Erdogan's approval. [13:50] Uh cuz the way it's structured. [13:53] And what happened there was Israeli [13:54] commandos boarded the ship. Things got [13:56] violent. They got They were violently [13:58] confronted by activists on board who had [14:00] prepared weapons. There was a resulting [14:02] clash and 10 Turkish citizens were [14:05] killed. This was a genuine diplomatic [14:08] crisis. Turkey pulled its ambassador [14:10] from Israel. They downgraded diplomatic [14:12] relations and it took years of pressure, [14:16] including a phone call brokered by the [14:18] Obama administration, [14:20] uh [14:21] getting Israel to formally apologize and [14:24] agree to pay a compensation to the [14:26] families [14:28] uh in 2013. [14:31] So it was This was a protracted uh uh [14:34] problem that lasted a few years and [14:36] again Israel ended up apologizing and [14:38] paying compensation, which is just [14:41] you know, this is a point [14:44] This is a point that that a lot of [14:45] people don't fully understand when when [14:48] you when you think when you think of it [14:50] through a Western lens. [14:51] In in uh in Western political culture, [14:56] in Western culture, [14:58] Judeo-Christian Western culture, [15:00] whatever you want to call it, an apology [15:02] is generally seen as something virtuous, [15:05] uh a mature step towards reconciliation, [15:08] right? You you you you want to move past [15:10] the conflict. But in the Middle Eastern [15:13] context, in the broader Muslim political [15:15] culture, [15:16] an apology in this in a context like [15:19] this in an apology from a rival power [15:22] is read as a sign of submission and [15:24] weakness. It's not virtuous. So, when [15:27] Israel apologized in 2013, hoping that [15:30] it would close the chapter, the actual [15:32] effect in Erdogan's worldview was closer [15:36] to the opposite. It read as a [15:39] um [15:39] it was seen as a confirmation that [15:41] pressure works, that he, Erdogan, had [15:44] forced Israel to bend the knee. [15:48] And by most accounts and from what we [15:49] see, it it emboldened him rather than [15:53] rather than led to more reconciliation. [15:55] Now, relations did patch up somewhat [15:57] after that on the surface. And again, [16:00] after rough patches in 2016, 2022, [16:03] there were normalization pushes along [16:05] the way, but it never never never never [16:08] after the Mavi Marmara incident [16:10] incident, things have never gone back to [16:13] the old warm strategic partnership. And [16:16] remember, Mavi Marmara was organized by [16:17] IHH, which is an NGO that was is [16:21] organized by Erdogan's political [16:24] apparatus, and that comes right that [16:26] comes um [16:29] a year after [16:31] it comes a year after the the incident [16:33] at the at Davos with Shimon Peres. So, [16:36] that's the era where things really break [16:39] down in a significant way. [16:42] So, quick detour because I think it [16:43] matters for understanding um how [16:46] unchallenged Erdogan eventually became [16:49] in Turkey. [16:50] In the summer of 2016, [16:53] there was an actual attempted military [16:56] coup against Erdogan. [16:58] Uh there were tanks in the streets of [17:00] Istanbul and Ankara. [17:02] Uh there were fighter jets in the air. [17:04] It collapsed within about a day, partly [17:06] because regular citizens went out and [17:08] physically stopped the tanks. But [17:10] Erdogan used this failed coup as a cover [17:13] for a massive purge. He arrested tens of [17:16] thousands of people across the military, [17:18] the judiciary, the civil service, [17:21] basically gutting the one institution, [17:23] the army, that had historically kept [17:25] Turkey [17:26] more secular. They had kind of guarded [17:29] Turkey's secular character secular [17:31] character. [17:33] And remember that that's the same [17:36] apparatus that had imprisoned [17:38] Erdogan decades earlier. [17:41] So, [17:42] his response to the coup, he used it as [17:44] a pretense [17:46] to just really [17:48] purge all of these government [17:50] institutions in the military of all of [17:52] his enemies. [17:53] A lot of people even suspected that the [17:56] whole coup was really uh [17:58] uh organized by Erdogan as a false flag [18:00] to give him the to give him the cover to [18:03] do this, but that's a separate that's a [18:04] separate issue that we're not getting [18:05] into. But this happened in 2016. [18:09] So, after 2016 and since then there's [18:12] really nobody left in the Turkish [18:14] leadership that's strong enough to push [18:16] back on his [18:18] on on on his agenda, [18:20] including his agenda on Israel. And [18:23] remember he's also he also made reforms [18:25] in the education system and media. So, [18:28] he's indoctrinating the population all [18:30] these years. [18:33] Now, through all of this, and this is [18:34] really the key to understanding Erdogan, [18:36] there's one consistent ideological [18:38] thread. [18:40] Wherever there's a religious Islamist [18:42] political faction and a more secular or [18:45] nationalist one in any Muslim majority [18:47] context, Erdogan always sides with the [18:50] Islamist faction. [18:52] Right? Like in in the Somalia Somaliland [18:55] thing, right? Where Somali Somaliland [18:59] is like moderate Muslims who want [19:01] freedom and nationalism. And then in [19:03] Somalia, [19:06] where you have like [19:08] jihadists, he backs Somalia. Right? And [19:11] it's all across the Middle East. [19:14] So, he's had a long warm relationship [19:16] with Hamas going back years. [19:19] And that one actually makes even more [19:21] sense because Hamas was originally [19:23] founded as the Gaza branch of the Muslim [19:26] Brotherhood. When Sheikh Ahmed Yassin [19:28] founded Hamas, that's what it was. It [19:30] was the Muslim Brotherhood Gaza branch. [19:33] So, when Erdogan treats Hamas less like [19:36] a terrorist organization and more like a [19:38] sister movement, [19:41] that's [19:42] that's because he's from the same [19:44] ideological family. It's not just a [19:46] recent thing. [19:48] He's from the same ideological roots as [19:50] Hamas, which brings us to October 7th. [19:54] Turkey did not condemn the Hamas attack. [19:56] If anything, what the government really [19:58] did was they essentially waited. They [20:00] said nothing about it and and they [20:01] waited for Israel's military response to [20:03] start, [20:05] so they could fold into the broader [20:07] anti-Israel messaging messaging push, [20:11] you know, that that that Qatar was [20:13] already driving. Meaning that they could [20:16] they could kind of [20:18] instead of condemning October 7th, they [20:19] could just condemn the whole anti-Israel [20:22] thing. And then they could throw in a [20:24] few words about October 7th. That's what [20:25] they did there. Erdogan's government has [20:27] openly hosted senior Hamas leadership in [20:29] Turkey for years. And after October 7th, [20:32] his rhetoric escalated uh to a level we [20:35] hadn't really seen before, you know, [20:36] just a a couple examples here on the [20:38] screen. [20:39] Um [20:41] Turkish President Erdogan calls out West [20:42] and Israel for Gaza massacre. [20:45] This is October 28th, 2023. Israel had [20:49] barely [20:51] begun responding to October 7th. [20:54] Right? And then we have uh this is a [20:56] more recent one. Turkey calls for [20:57] liberating Jerusalem. [21:01] Okay? I mean, this is uh this is who the [21:02] guy is. [21:04] So, [21:08] so he's really ramped up this [21:09] anti-Israel rhetoric. He's talked about [21:11] conquering Jerusalem. [21:13] He's talking about praying to Allah to [21:14] destroy Israel, comparing Netanyahu to [21:17] Hitler. [21:18] Uh [21:19] This is This is what he's been up to [21:21] since October 7th. And in 2024 [21:24] Turkey suspended trade with Israel [21:26] entirely, the first real economic break [21:28] in the relationship's history. [21:30] And in November of that year, Erdogan [21:32] was talking openly about severing [21:34] diplomatic relations altogether. And I [21:36] want to bring in the Qatar piece here. [21:38] This is This is important. See, Turkey [21:40] and Qatar have been functioning [21:42] kind of like partners. Like they're both [21:45] ideologically and financially. And we [21:46] see this diplomatically. They are [21:48] They're often in tandem. Like in this [21:49] Iran war where you have the various Gulf [21:52] states and Israel and America and all [21:54] that. [21:54] Turkey and Qatar are always kind of [21:56] joined at the hip. [21:58] And the way you have to look at it is [21:59] that is that Turkey has the the manpower [22:04] and the infrastructure and the clout and [22:05] they're a NATO member and they have this [22:06] big military and Qatar is the money. [22:10] And that's where And that's really And [22:11] also from the Muslim Brotherhood [22:12] perspective, Qatar and Turkey are both [22:15] led by [22:18] led by people who are aligned with the [22:20] Muslim Brotherhood. [22:23] And together they've been pushing this [22:24] pretty aggressive pro-Islamist line all [22:27] across the region, including funding and [22:29] amplifying anti-Israel messaging. [22:33] And sheltering Hamas leadership, etc. [22:36] So Turkey's own economy [22:40] Turkey's own economy's actually been in [22:41] rough shape for years. High inflation, a [22:44] weak currency. And Qatari money has [22:47] helped cushion that. Which gives Qatar [22:51] significant influence over over Turkey. [22:54] Okay? Cuz they're they're pumping money [22:56] in there. So that's the the Turkey-Qatar [22:58] relationship. And then there's Syria. [23:01] Right? After Assad's regime fell, Turkey [23:03] moved in and ended up with enormous [23:05] influence over the new Syrian [23:06] government. Al-Sharaa's basically a [23:08] Turkish proxy to the point where I mean [23:11] a lot of security analysts just talk [23:13] about the Turkish-backed Syrian [23:15] government. That's the way we talk about [23:17] it now, the same way that people used to [23:19] talk about the Iranian-backed Lebanon [23:21] because of Hezbollah's control over [23:23] Lebanon. That's what [23:24] That's what Syria is becoming. It's kind [23:26] of like a Turkish [23:28] proxy. [23:29] So, Erdogan has has essentially turned [23:32] Turkey into a client state and it's [23:34] right on Israel's northern border. [23:37] And [23:38] that feeds right into his ambitions [23:41] about Gaza and the Ottoman and and and [23:44] and Jerusalem that he's been saying. [23:46] So, there's been real friction over [23:50] over Turkish involvement here and that's [23:52] why in the in all the conversations [23:53] about Gaza and about foreign troops [23:56] coming in as part of the international [23:58] stabilization force, Turkey was like all [24:01] eager to bring their troops in and [24:03] Israel said no. Israel's pushed back [24:05] against that because they know that once [24:08] Erdogan's forces are on the ground, [24:11] historically, they don't leave. We see [24:13] that all across the Middle East, like [24:15] where they came in ostensibly to keep [24:18] the peace or or something in Libya and [24:20] they've just remained there and [24:22] elsewhere in the Middle East, there's [24:23] Turkish troops on the ground in Somalia. [24:25] There's Turkish troops on the ground on [24:27] the ground There's Turkish troops on the [24:28] ground all over the Middle East. Israel [24:30] does not want them in Gaza. [24:33] So, things have only been escalating in [24:35] 2025 and 2026. [24:38] After Israeli forces intercepted another [24:40] Gaza-bound flotilla few months back, the [24:43] Sumud flotilla, [24:45] a Turkish court actually indicted Prime [24:48] Minister Netanyahu and dozens of other [24:50] senior Israeli officials, including the [24:52] defense minister, [24:54] uh because they intercepted this [24:56] flotilla and lo and behold, this [24:58] flotilla was also organized by the IHH, [25:02] the same Erdogan-linked [25:04] uh gongo from the Mavi Marmara. [25:08] So, [25:09] the IHH [25:11] is the tool that Erdogan uses [25:15] to [25:16] to you know, to attack. In fact, the IHH [25:19] isn't just running flotillas, it's it's [25:21] actively operating on the ground inside [25:24] Hamas-controlled areas of Gaza right [25:26] now. They've rebuilt a few mosques in [25:28] Hamas-controlled areas. There's not [25:29] supposed to be any reconstruction, but [25:31] they're rebuilding mosques, and we know [25:32] that mosques rebuilt by the IHH, run by [25:35] Erdogan, in Gaza, controlled by Hamas, [25:39] I think we all get the picture of what [25:40] Erdogan's doing there. He's entrenching [25:42] his power into into what's going on in [25:45] the Gaza Strip, into the into the civil [25:47] life in the Gaza Strip under Hamas, [25:50] as we speak. [25:53] So, Erdogan has referred to Netanyahu [25:55] and his government as baby killers, as a [25:57] massacre gang, [25:59] uh and Israeli officials fire back. They [26:02] call Erdogan a paper tiger. They accuse [26:04] him of massacring his own Kurdish [26:06] population. That's where the rhetoric is [26:08] on both sides. [26:11] And there's a real serious conversation [26:12] going on in in in Israeli security and [26:14] political circles right now about Turkey [26:17] as um as as the emerging strategic [26:20] threat. When Israel made this this [26:21] alliance last year with Greece and and [26:24] Cyprus, it was really all about [26:26] countering the Turkish threat in the [26:28] region. [26:31] And and some, you know, some experts, [26:33] some former [26:34] high-ranking officials have gone so far [26:37] as to call Turkey the new Iran. [26:40] Um [26:41] Erdogan himself has even said publicly [26:43] that Turkey could act against Israel the [26:45] way it acted in Libya. [26:49] You know, which to be clear was a [26:50] limited intervention, not a full [26:52] invasion, so uh [26:54] no one thinks that there's a direct war [26:56] with Turkey around the corner. [27:01] >> [laughter] [27:01] >> Excuse me, but the rhetoric has gotten [27:03] there. [27:04] And [27:05] it just shows you how far the [27:06] relationship has fallen. So, the bottom [27:08] line is this, if you're trying to [27:09] understand why the Turkey-Israel [27:12] relationship collapsed, it's not one [27:14] single event. [27:16] Even though the Davos incident with [27:18] Peres and the Mavi Marmara were were big [27:22] events and they were important turning [27:24] points and they get a lot of attention, [27:26] but really this is like a 20-plus year [27:28] arc [27:30] of [27:31] this [27:33] of Erdogan, this one ideologically [27:35] Islamist leader shaped by a worldview [27:39] that sees the fall of the Ottoman Empire [27:41] and the secular state of Turkey as a [27:43] tragedy that needs to be corrected. [27:47] And what he's doing is dismantling what [27:49] used to be a transactional, secular, [27:52] state-to-state relationship [27:55] and he's replacing it with this rivalry, [27:59] positioning himself as the defender of [28:01] the Muslim world [28:03] with Israel as the as the enemy. [28:06] Now, this is very as I said, this is [28:08] very useful to him domestically [28:11] when he needs people to rally around the [28:12] flag because he's [28:14] in a in a country where the economy, the [28:16] currency is collapsing. [28:18] It's also useful regionally where he's [28:21] he's he's he's joined at the hip with [28:23] Qatar but sort of competing with them [28:25] for supremacy of of of of the Jihadist [28:28] side of the Sunni world. [28:31] Uh in his it also suits him to criticize [28:34] Israel in his rivalry with Iran. [28:37] And he also has a rivalry with Saudi [28:38] Arabia for who's the you know, who you [28:40] know, for leadership of the of the of [28:42] the Muslim world of the Sunni world. [28:44] So, he has these these rivalries and [28:46] relationships where being being the [28:49] attack dog against Israel and throwing [28:52] his weight around against Israel [28:53] actually helps him politically. [28:57] And now he's got real power projection [28:59] in Syria and he's got these ambitions in [29:01] Gaza where he's he's getting his [29:03] tentacles in there through the IHH. [29:06] So, Erdogan is a real strategic problem [29:08] for Israel. He's not This isn't just [29:10] like, you know, a barking dog. [29:15] And [29:17] This is actually playing out in real [29:18] time as we speak. Remember what what I [29:20] mentioned at the beginning of this video [29:21] that 2 days ago Israel's cabinet voted [29:24] unanimously to formally recognize the [29:27] Armenian genocide. [29:29] Israel had specifically avoided doing [29:31] that for decades precisely because it [29:34] would cause a crisis in Turkey-Israel [29:36] relations. [29:39] Right? Turkey is the direct successor [29:41] state to the Ottoman Empire, the empire [29:43] that carried out the Armenian genocide. [29:47] So, this isn't some abstract historical [29:49] statement. It's Israel pointing directly [29:52] at the wound that Erdogan has spent his [29:56] whole political life trying to avenge. [29:59] And Israel is poking their finger in his [30:01] eye. [30:02] And Turkey's response was immediate. [30:04] They called it a They called it [30:05] political. They accused Israel of using [30:07] it to deflect from Gaza. [30:09] Even Azerbaijan, Turkey's close ally and [30:11] otherwise a friend of Israel's, publicly [30:14] criticized the move. [30:16] So, that's how far Israel was willing to [30:17] let this relationship go. And honestly, [30:20] that tells you everything. You know, [30:21] there's there's there's no relationship [30:22] left to protect here. [30:25] I think that's what the statement of the [30:27] Israeli government about the Armenian [30:28] genocide was really about. It was a way [30:30] of saying like, "Hey, we're done." [30:33] The relationship that used to involve [30:35] joint military exercises and Israeli [30:38] tourists flooding Istanbul is gone [30:42] and both sides know it. Anyway, [30:45] that's my take on Turkish on the [30:48] deterioration of Turkish-Israel [30:50] relations in the era of [30:53] Erdogan. [30:55] Okay? [30:56] That's it for this one. [30:57] Thanks for watching. Please like, share, [30:58] subscribe, all that good stuff. [31:01] Be well. God bless.
